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PARTICIPATION MORTGAGES AS A METHOD OF TRUST
INVESTMENT BY CORPORATE FIDUCIARIES
To find suitable investments for funds of trust estates has been one of the
most difficult problems of fiduciary administration in recent years. An import-
ant factor contributing to this problem is the fact that the development of new
fields for trust investment has not kept pace with the enormous increase in the
use of the trust device, an increase marked especially by the establishment Qf
a large number of small trust funds.2 One type of investment which, prior to
1. This Comment is in a large measure founded upon information received from various
banks and trust companies throughout the United States. The cooperation of those insti-
tutions is greatly appreciated, especially since data otherwise unavailable -was thus secured.
2. A "small trust" is usually regarded as one of less than $25,000. As of June 30, 1931,
the individual trusts handled by national banks averaged $49,319, but trusts of le1s than
$25,000 occurred most frequently. RIDDLE, THE IT-m'r PoLic" or TRusT L.Xsnru-
noNs (1934) c. 3; Clifford, Commingled Trust Funds (1933) 11 Htaw. Bus. REv. 253;
cf. Barclay, Commingled Funds Offer Broader Scope for Trust Service (1931) 53 Tnusr
Co. 615.
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1931 at least, combined a comparatively high rate of return with a minimum
of risk, was a note or bond secured by a first mortgage or trust deed of real
estate.3 Such mortgages have long been favored by trustees, and today they
are included on the list of "legals" in almost all the states which restrict by
statute the power of trustees to make investments.4 However, the utility of real
estate mortgages as a medium of trust investment was greatly diminished in
large urban communities by the scarcity of good mortgages small enough for
the investment of the funds of a single trust. To make possible the invest-
ment of funds of small trusts in large mortgages and to secure a distribution
of risk for all trusts, in the last decade of the nineteenth century corporate
trustees evolved the participation mortgage,5 by means of which several trusts
3. Unless the context makes a different meaning necessary, wherever hereafter the term
"mortgages" is used, it will include not only the mortgages themselves, but also the ac-
companying notes or bonds and all other documents generally transferred to mortgagees
in connection with loans upon real estate security.
4. In Matter of Balfe, 152 Misc. 739, 748, 274 N. Y. Supp. 284, 295 (Surr. Ct. 1934),
Surrogate Taylor speaks of the real estate mortgage as "the security etcrnal." Cf. Bishop
v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 218 Ky. 508, 291 S. W. 718 (1927); King v. Talbot, 40 N.
Y. 76 (1869) ; Curran's Estate, 312 Pa. 416, 167 Ati. 597 (1933). The statutes are: Corm.
GEN. STAT. (1930) § 4836; CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 7946; Del. Laws 1931, c. 259,
§ 1; FLA. ComT. GEN. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1934) § 6127 (1); IDAno Coon ANN. (1932)
§ 25-1502(e); Ind. Laws 1933, c. 40, § 186 (c); IL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1935) c. 3, § 144;
IOWA CODE (1935) § 12772; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) 40-307; KY, STAT. (Carroll,
1930) § 4706; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 589; MmN. GEN. STAT. (1927) § 7714;
N. Y. BANi. LAW (1935) § 188 (7); N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW (1935) § 111; N. Y. PRs.
PROP. LAW (1935) § 21; MONT. Ray. CODE ANN. (Choate, 1921) § 10306; N. J. Com,.
STAT. (Supp. 1930) tit. 72, § 37a; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 13-135; Oitio
GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1935) § 10506-41; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 22-1214, as amended
by Ore. Laws 1931, c. 278, § 17; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 20, § 801 (4); .R, I,
GEN. LAWS (1923) tit. 372, § 32; S. C. CODH (1932) § 9051; S. D. ComP. LAWS (1929)
§ 9049; TENN. COonE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 9596.1(f); TEx. REV. Civ. Coon (Vernon,
1935) art. 511; VT. PUB. LAws (1933) § 6706; VA. CODE (Michie, Supp. 1934) § 5431;
WAsir. Com. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 3255; W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1931) C. 44, art. 6,
§ 2; Wis. STAT. (1933) § 231.32; WYo. REv. STAT. (1931) § 10-305.
5. The participation mortgage was used in Massachusetts in 1892. Record, 13, Spring-
field Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. First Unitarian Society, Case No. 478, Sup. Jud. Ct.
Mass., Sept. Sitting, 1935. Cf. Matter of Flint, 240 App. Div. 217, 269 N, Y. Supp, 470
(2d Dep't, 1934), aff'd mem., 266 N. Y. 607, 195 N. E. 221 (1935); BDerger, Pooling or
Participation Mortgages as Investments for Trust Funds (1929) 48 TRusr Co. 599; Mc.
Kinney, The Legality of Participating Mortgage Certificates as Investments for Trustees
(1915) 24 YALE L. J. 286. In a sense participation mortgages are but one instance of
the application of the common investment fund idea to the particular field of mortgages,
On this common fund investment idea, see RiDDLE, loc. cit. supra note 2; BooET, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 677; Clifford, supra note 2; Whittlesey, Commingled Fund Recom-
mended as Solution of Several Major Trust Problems (1934) 58 TRUST Co. 321; Fen-
ninger, Common Trust Fund Problems (1935) 60 TRUST Co. 144. The idea of the parti-
cipation mortgage has also been applied to the holding of fee simple title to land In trust
by a trust company, and the issuance against such title of land trust certificates. This
seems to have been done most extensively in Ohio. Cf. In re Hotel Gibson Co., 11 F, Supp,
30 (S. D. Ohio, 1935), noted in (1935) 49 HAv. L. Rnv. 143; Goldman and Abbott,
Land Trust Certificates (1928) 2 U. or CiN. L. Rav. 255.
[Vol. 45
19]COMMENTS
were enabled to invest in a single mortgage or group of mortgages. In the
period from 1920 to 1930 the participation mortgage reached its highest
development, being used widely throughout the United States in many different
forms. But because of the acute deflation in real estate values in many locali-
ties since 1931, mortgages themselves are not currently regarded as desirable
investments, and consequently the use of participation mortgages has greatly
declined. 6
Two kinds of institutions, trust companies and title insurance and mort-
gage companies, are principally responsible for the development of the partici-
pation mortgage device. The trust companies have used it mainly as a means
of investing the funds of which they are trustees, although in some states they
have sold participating interests in such mortgages to the public as well.7
Title insurance and mortgage companies seized upon the device as one which
opened up a new and fertile field for private investment, particularly when
coupled with a guaranty of the principal and interest of the participating
shares.$ In this Comment, attention is directed principally to the situation
in which a trust company has used the participation mortgage as a device for
investing the funds of trusts of which it is trustee.
The Creation and Operation of Participation Mortgage Plans
The details of participation mortgage plans vary greatly in different sections
of the United States, but are of two general factual types. The first involves
the creation of participating interests in a single mortgage, hereafter referred
6. Bailey and Rice, The Duties of a Trustee with Respect to Defaulted Mortgage
Investments (1935) 84 U. op PA. L. Ray. 157; Gouley, Real Estate Mortgage Bonds as
Trust Investments (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 953.
7. Illustrative cases are Reichert v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 262 Mich. 123, 247 N. W.
128 (1933); Croghan v. Savings Trust Co., 85 S. W. (2d) 239 (Mo. App. 1935); Kelly
v. Middlesex Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 116 N. J. Eq. 228, 172 At]. 4S7 (Ch. 1934);
Seaboard Trust Co. v. Shea, 118 N. J. Eq. 433, 180 At!. 206 (Ch. 1935); Ulmer v. Fulton,
129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N. E. 557 (1935); Werner v. Gordon, 38 Dauphin County 8 (Pa.
C. P. 1933).
8. The most striking difference between participating mortgage certificates ieued by
trust companies and those issued by title insurance and mortgage companies is that only
rarely does a trust company guarantee the payment of the principal and interezt of its
certificates, even when issued to the general public. This guaranty is a normal part of
the certificates issued by title insurance and mortgage companies, and in New York City
and elsewhere it has resulted in nearly all such companies being unable to meet their obli-
gations during the depression. The cases and other literature on the guaranteed mortgage
certificates are innumerable, especially since the rehabilitation of the mortgage guaranty
companies has been undertaken in New York under the Schackno Act and the Mortgage
Commission Act. It is not the purpose of this Comment to consider thoze problems, but
the following cases and articles indicate some of the complicated problems which have
arisen. People v. Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Buffalo, 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E.
153 (1934); Matter of Balfe, 152 Misc. 739, 274 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Surr. CL 1934); Matter
of Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 157 Misc. 240, 283 N. Y. Supp. 623 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Proffitt, Trustee's Problems in Handling Guaranteed Mortgages (1933) 57 Tnusr Co. 479;
Naumburg, Status of Guaranteed Mortgages as Fiduciary Investments (1933) 57 Thusr
Co. 59; Comment (1934) 34.Cor.. L. Rav. 663.
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to as a straight participation mortgage; the second, the creation of participat-
ing interests in a pool of mortgages. Both types have been used by trust
companies, although the most extensive use of the mortgage pool has been by
title insurance and mortgage companies. 9 Up to the present time the straight
participation mortgage has been used in one form or another by trust com-
panies in at least twenty states, while their use of the mortgage pool has been
confined to a relatively few states.' 0
There are two normal methods of setting up a straight participation nort-
gage.'1 One method is for a trust company to combine the funds of several
trusts of which it is trustee, and with these combined funds to acquire a first
mortgage on real estate. This mortgage in some instances is held by the trust
company in its corporate capacity, but to insure the legality of the device
it is better to indicate the fiduciary capacity in some manner unless express
authorization is given by statute or by the trust instrument to hold such
mortgages in the corporate capacity.' 2 The second and more frequent method
used to create a straight participation mortgage is for the trust company
through its banking department to acquire a mortgage with its own funds,
and then at some subsequent date to declare itself trustee of the mortgage for
various trust estates, whose funds will then be used to reimburse the banking
department for the original expenditure.1 3
Once a mortgage is acquired by the trust department, it is always separated
in the trust department's files from the other assets of the trust company.
Where the number of trusts which have a participating interest in the mortgage
is small, the names of those trusts may be contained in a memorandum attached
to the mortgage itself or to the declaration by the trust company that it holds
the mortgage in trust. Complete records of the mortgage and of the interest
9. This is especially true of New York City, where enormous amounts were invested
in mortgage pools operated by mortgage guaranty companies. In Pennsylvania some
trust companies also have the powers of title insurance companies. E.g., United States
Bank & Trust Co. Case, 311 Pa. 320, 166 At. 871 (1933); Kisinger v. Pennsylvania Trust
Co., 180 AtI. 79 (Pa. Super. 1935). In other states other types of corporations have issued
participating mortgage certificates. Colorado Investment & Realty Co. v. Newkirk, 95
Colo. 71, 32 P. (2d) 830 (1934); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. Harper,
148 Md. 234, 129 AtI. 641 (1925).
10. See infra, pp. 876-877.
11. For general description of the manner of setting up and operating a straight
participation mortgage, the following cases and references contain fairly adequate accounts.
Bowden v. Citizens' Loan & Trust Co., 259 N. W. 815 (Minn. 1935); Matter of Flint,
240 App. Div. 217, 269 N. Y. Supp. 470 (2d Dep't, 1934); Matter of Peene, 155 Misc. 155,
279 N. .Y. Supp. 131 (Surr. Ct. 1935); Record, Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
First Unitarian Society, Case No. 478, Sup. Jud. Ct. of Mass., Sept. Sitting, 1935; BRADY,
BANO iANAGEMFNT OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES (1932) §§ 107, 108; Miller, Allocation of
Small Trust Balances to Mortgages and Bonds (1930) 50 TRUST CO. 581; Peters, Some
Problems Affecting Various Types of Commingled Trust Fiends (1931) 53 TRusT Co. 325.
12. As to 'the legality of holding title to the mortgages in either the corporate or trust
capacity, see infra, p. 870. As to disadvantages of holding in trust capacity, see Brief
of Amicus Curiae Russell Chapin, 10, Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. First Uni.
tarian Society, Case No. 478, Sup. Jud. Ct. of Mass., Sept. Sitting, 1935.
13. See note 54, infra.
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therein of each trust estate are kept at all times so that they can be readily
ascertained. It is the usual practice to issue a participating certificate to each
trust which holds a partial interest in a mortgage, these certificates being
placed in the portfolios of the respective trusts. Originally such certificates
were extremely simple, merely stating that the trust estate was the owner
of a participation of a certain amount in a certain mortgage held by the trust
company for the equal benefit of all the certificate holders, and that the trust
estate was entitled to participate pro rata in the principal and interest col-
lected on the mortgage, less a pro rata deduction by the trust company to cover
the reasonable costs of administration of the mortgage. In other instances the
certificate stipulated that a fiat rate of interest such as five per cent should
be paid, and the difference between that rate and that paid by the mortgagor
went to the trust company to cover its expenses; in still others no charge what-
ever has been made by the trust company for its services in administering
the mortgage.14 More recently the tendency has been to add further provisions
to the certificates so as to constitute each certificate in effect a separate declara-
tion of trust by which the trust company is made trustee of the mortgage and
given complete powers with respect to its administration, such as the power
to make extensions of the maturity of the principal and interest of the mort-
gage, to change the rate of interest on the mortgage, to foreclose the mort-
gage, and to do all other similar acts which an owner of a mortgage can
The necessity for such provisions became apparent in some states, where on
the termination of a trust the participating certificates were distributed to
the former beneficiaries. In such instances there was often no dear authority
for the trust company to continue to administer the mortgage for the benefit
of this type of certificate holder. Under the more detailed certificates, how-
ever, the trust company would continue to be trustee of the mortgage for the
benefit of all the certificate holders until the mortgage debt was paid.10 Prior
to 1931, when a trust terminated before the maturity of the mortgage, the
trust company generally preferred to distribute cash rather than the certificates
to the beneficiaries, even though distribution in cash was not required, and
often purchased the interest of the terminated trust for some other trust
of which it was trustee. If no other trust had funds available for investment
at the moment, the trust company would purchase the participating interest
in its corporate capacity through its banking department and hold it for
future investment purposes. Conditions since 1931 have made this practice
less frequent because of the inadvisability of loading up the banking depart-
14. Cf. Bowden v. Citizens' Loan & Trust Co., 259 N. W. 815 (Minn. 1935); Reins
Estate, 15 Lehigh County 348 (Pa. 0. Ct. 1932).
15. Examples of participation certificates are to be found in Matter of Union Trust
Co., 219 N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057 (1916); Matter of Thomson, 135 Misc. 62, 237 T. Y.
Supp. 622 (Su'rr. Ct. 1929); Ulmer v. Fulton, 129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N. E. 557 (1935);
Squire v. Central United Nat. Bank, Daily Legal News and Cleveland Recorder, Cleveland,
Ohio, Dec. 19, 1935, at 1; Matter of Commercial Trust Co., 36 Dauphin County 393 (Pa.
C. P. 1933); In re Manayunk Trust Co. (No. 2), 21 D. & C. 405 (Pa. C. P. 1934).
16. In New York and Pennsylvania the power to do all such acts is given by statute.
N. Y. BAnx. LAw (1935) § 1SS(7); PA. STAT. Aam. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 7, § 809-1109.
Cf. Blair v. Pennsylvania Co., 24 D. & C. 490 (Pa. C. P. 1935).
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ment with a large volume of participations. Consequently there have been
more frequent distributions of the participating certificates themselves.
In many states trust companies have used a device less highly developed
than the straight participation mortgage, but similar to it in many respects.
Known as the split mortgage, it is set up in much the same way as the straight
participation mortgage, save that the mortgagor, instead of executing a single
note or bond secured by the mortgage of real estate, will execute several notes
or bonds of small denominations, possibly varying in amount and date of
maturity, but all secured by a single mortgage. Then, instead of issuing par-
ticipating certificates to the various trusts which have contributed funds, the
trust company will place notes and bonds in the portfolios of each trust in pro-
portion to the amount each contributed.1 7  Compared with a straight partici-
pation mortgage, the split mortgage involves more administrative difficulties
in that it requires the acquiescence and cooperation of the mortgagor, and it
is less flexible in operation because of the fixed denominations of the notes
or bonds. However, apparently because each trust holds a direct obligation
of the mortgagor rather than a mere certificate of interest in a mortgage of
which the trust company has complete control, this type of participation mort-
gage seems to be regarded as less subject to attack on the ground of illegality
than a straight participation mortgage. Yet, in reality there would seem to be
little difference between the two so long as the device is operated entirely
within a trust company, for in both cases the control of the trust company as
mortgagee and as trustee of the individual trusts is the same.18
Between 1920 and 1930 the desire to utilize the possibilities of the partici-
pation mortgage device to its fullest extent led to the creation of the mortgage
pool. While the method of setting up a mortgage pool follows the general
outlines of that used to create a straight participation mortgage, some of the
details are quite different.") The initial step is for the trust company to acquire
first mortgages on real estate, usually in its corporate capacity. 20  When a
sufficient number of mortgages has been acquired and sufficient funds of trusts
are available for investment, the trust company executes a declaration of trust
constituting itself trustee for the mortgage pool, and such mortgages will
17. Cf. In re Guardianship of Lutz, 280 Ill. App. 587 (1935); In the Matter of the
Estate of Lalla, App. Ct., 1st Dist., Ill., July 5, 1935.
18. See note 82 infra, for cases involving the legality of this type of investment,
19. Excellent descriptions of the creation and operation of mortgage pools are con-
tained in Squire v. Central United Nat. Bank, Daily Legal News and Cleveland Recorder,
Cleveland, Ohio, Dec. 19, 1935, at 1; Estate of Mary L. Iredell, 51 Montgomevy County
174 (Pa. 0. Ct. 1934). Cf. also Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Atwood, 78 F. (2d) 92 (C.
C. A. 3rd, 1935); Gratzinger v. Arehart, 198 N. E. 787 (Ind. 1935); Matter of Union
Trust Co., 219 N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057 (1916); Roberts's Trust Estate, 316 Pa. 545,
175 At. 869 (1934); Merion Title & Trust Co.-Huff Memorial Scholarship Fund, 23
Delaware County 557 (Pa. C. P. 1933); Berger, supra note 5. In Pennsylvania, prior to
1931, installment mortgage pools were operated with apparently a high degree of succes.
In such pools the mortgagor made payments monthly, covering both principal and inter-
est, for a period varying from three to five years, which payments were passed on to
the certificate holders. Cf. Crick's Estate, 315 Pa. 581, 173 AUt. 327 (1934).
20. See note 54, infra.
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be segregated from the other assets of the trust company. As funds of various
trusts are invested in the pool, participating certificates are issued, ordinarily
only one certificate being issued to each trust. In some instances the issuance
of certificates has been regarded as cumbersome and unnecessary, and instead
an "asset card" is kept for each trust, on which every transaction which takes
place in reference to that trust is recorded. 2' The interest may be paid in a
pro rata share or at a flat rate, and it is always provided that the trust com-
pany shall have the exclusive power to administer the mortgages in the pool.
In the operation of most mortgage pools a usual feature is the existence of
an equity in the pool held by the trust company in its corporate capacity,
often referred to as the "float." When a trust is to be distributed in cash,
the banking department of the trust company pays to the trust department the
amount of the certificate, which is then distributed, and the banking depart-
ment acquires the interest in the pool formerly held by the trust, thus
increasing the equity in the pool of the trust company in its corporate capacity.
When a new trust is to come into the pool, the process is reversed and the
trust company's equity is correspondingly decreased. The banking department
usually receives a return from the pool in proportion to the amount of the
trust company's equity therein, just as an ordinary certificate holder, and in
the event of liquidation of the trust company, it has been held that the
liquidator representing the banking department is entitled to come in on an
equal basis with the other certificate holders in the distribution of the assets of
the pool.2 2 Since the existence of this "float" exposes the trust company to the
charge of self-dealing, some trust companies feel it should be eliminated as
a banking department transaction, and instead that it should be cared for
by requiring the pool to carry its own cash.P Thus a certain percentage of the
pool assets would always be in cash and available for liquidating purposes.
While this would probably result in decreasing the yield from the pool,
it would do much towards eliminating one of the principal legal objections
to the mortgage pool device.2 4
The so-called power of substitution may or may not be present in the
operation of a mortgage pool. This power permits the trust company operat-
ing the pool to withdraw mortgages from the pool at any time and to replace
them with other mortgages of equal value. By this means mortgages which are
in default may be removed from the pool and be replaced by good mortgages,
thus making it possible to maintain the security of the pool unimpaired. On the
21. Estate of Mary L. lredell, 51 Montgomery County 174 (Pa. 0. Ct. 1934).
22. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Atwood, 78 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935); Kelly
v. Middlesex Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592, 171 At. 823 (Ch. 1934);
cf. Matter of Lawyers Mortgage Co., 151 Misc. 744, 272 N. Y. Supp. 390 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
But cf. Matter of Lawyers Westchester Mortgage & Title Co., N. Y. L. J., Feb. 2S, 1936,
at 1056, col. 2; Morton, Liquidating One of the Largest Mortgage Pools in Cap!hity
(1932) 55 Tausr Co. 695, where apparently the trust company's equity did not inure to the
benefit of the banking department till all the other pool participants had been paid off
in full.
23. A certain percentage of the funds of each trust would be retained by the trust
department, at the time the pool is set up, to provide cash.
24. See p. 873, infra.
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other band, in a few instances trust companies have exercised this power to
the detriment of the trusts Which held participating certificates.25 Since such
a power of substitution may be held to constitute self-dealing, the more gen-
eral and better practice is to operate pools without the power of substitution.2 0
Where a trust company issues participating certificates in a mortgage pool
to its trusts and also sells certificates in the same pool to the general public,
it exposes itself to the temptation to over-appraise the value of the real estate
securing the mortgages in order to sell more certificates, and as a result the trusts
are prejudiced.27 For institutions engaged solely in the banking and trust
business, this practice of selling participating certificates to the public is not
to be recommended, and the most recent comprehensive legislation on the subject
has expressly forbidden it.28
The Practical Utility of the Participation Mortgage Device
As a medium of trust investment, properly administered straight participation
mortgages, split mortgages and especially mortgage pools all afford practical
advantages to both the beneficiaries of the trusts and to the trust company.2D
Their use is advantageous to the beneficiaries in that it makes possible the
investment of funds of small trusts in mortgages, whereas separate investment
of such funds might, because of the insufficient amount of small mortgages
available, result in a lower yield. They have proved particularly convenient as
a means of ready invesfment of small amounts of principal and income of
trusts accruing from time to time, and which otherwise could not be invested
profitably at so early a date. In some states the use of participation mortgages
has resulted in a substantial increase in the average yield from all trust estates.
Proper diversification within the real estate mortgage field is also made possi-
ble, since the funds of a single trust can be allocated to several different
straight participation mortgages. This spreading of the risk is inherent in the
nature of the mortgage pool device, which also has the additional special
25. Ulmer v. Fulton, 129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N. E. 557 (1935); Squire v. Central United
Nat. Bank, Daily Legal News and Cleveland Recorder, Cleveland, Ohio, Dec. 19, 1935, at 1.
In the latter case on one occasion $3,000,000 worth of choice mortgages were withdrawn
to be used by the bank as collateral fonr the deposit of public funds.
26. See p. 873, infra for a discussion of the legal objections to this power.
27. For an example of this double use of the participation mortgage, see Werner v.
Gordon, 38 Dauphin County 8 (Pa. C. P. 1933), where of a mortgage pool amounting
to $363,740, $228,675 was sold to the public and $125,211 were used for the investment
of funds of trusts of which the trust company was trustee. In Michigan, where &.,trust
company issued guaranteed participating mortgage certificates solely to the public, the
guarantee was held invalid as against public policy since it imperiled the trust funds com-
mitted to the company's care. Also cf. Reichert v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 262 Mich. 123,
247 N. W. 128 (1933); Report of Streit Committee, N. Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1936, at 25, col. 1.
28. PA. STAT. Arr. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 7, § 819-1109.
29. For general discussions of both advantages and disadvantages, consult Klein's
Estate, 22 D. & C. 490 (Pa. 0. Ct. 1934); Berger, supra note 5; Clifford, supra note 2;
Knowles, Pooling of Mortgages for Trust Investment (1928) 46 TRusT Co. 631; Morton,
supra note 22; Standeven, Installation and Operation of "Mortgage Investment Trust Ac-
count" (1929) 49 TRUST Co. 663; Whittlesey, supra note S.
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advantage of assuring continuity of investment, for as soon as one mortgage
matures, it is replaced by another. It also provides a more equal treatment
for all trusts of which a trust company is trustee; it is extremely flexible in
operation; and because of the large volume of mortgages which are handled,
a specialized mortgage loan department can be set up, thereby making possi-
ble more frequent and better appraisals and reappraisals of the mortgage
security. For the trust company, one of the biggest advantages prior to 1931
was that a well conducted mortgage pool ordinarily resulted in a substantial
increase in its volume of trust business. Furthermore, since all mortgage
transactions could be concentrated in one department, it was thus possible
to reduce operating costs. °
The practical disadvantages of the participation mortgage device have mostly
appeared since 1931, when the economic depression began seriously to affect
the real estate mortgage market. The severe deflation in real estate values in
most communities made trustees extremely cautious in investing in mortgages.
Furthermore, where the trust company was bound by the terms of a trust to
pay over cash to the beneficiaries on the termination of a trust, the self-created
market within the trust company which formerly existed practically disap-
peared, the trust company not desiring or being able to take over the partici-
pating certificates, either for another trust or for its banking department. For
this reason many trust companies ceased, at least temporarily, to invest in
participation mortgages. 3 ' Further complications have arisen from the numer-
ous defaults by mortgagors on both principal and interest. With increasing
frequency the trust company has been forced to foreclose mortgages and take
over and administer the mortgaged properties, thus preventing cash distri-
bution upon termination of trusts and also increasing the administrative
burden of the trust company.3 2  In some states the solution of this problem
has been to distribute the participating certificates to the beneficiaries unless
a cash distribution is made necessary by the terms of the trust.as As men-
tioned previously, the beneficiaries are always subject to the risk of misman-
agement by the trust company, a risk which is substantially increased in a
mortgage pool in which the trust company has the power of substitution.
30. Squire v. Central United Nat. Bank, Daily Legal News and Cleveland Recorder,
Cleveland, Ohio, Dec. 19, 1935, at 1; Clifford, suPra note 2; Standeven, mipra note 29.
As compared to an equal amount of straight participation mortgages, a mortgage pool
entails less bookkeeping and other clerical wok.
31. This has been the experience of certain trust companies in Connecticut, Delaware,
Indiana, Pennsylvania and Washington. Cf. Kefover v. Poqter Title & Trust Co., 181
At. 771 (Pa. 1935).
32. On foreclosure, cf. Kelly v. Aliddlesex Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592,
171 At. 823 (Ch. 1934); Scheetz v. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank, 23 D. & C. 209 (Pa. C. P.
1935); Blair v. Pennsylvania Co., 24 D. & C. 490 (Pa. C. P. 1935).
33. For circumstances under which payment in cash may be necessar, cf. Osterling v.
Commonwealth Trust Co., 181 At. 769 (Pa. 1935); Matter of Lecds, 154 M ic. 228, 276
N. Y. Supp. 950 (Sun'. Ct. 1935). For circumstances under which certificates may be
distributed, cf. Crick's Estate, 315 Pa. 581, 173 At]. 327 (1934); Matter of De Winter,
154 Mlisc. 50, 276 N. Y. Supp. 576 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
34. Cf. cases cited in note 25, sup.
1936]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Further difficulties insofar as the trust company is concerned arise from incon-
veniences occasioned by lack of uniformity in the type of trusts 6 and by
variations in directions of settlors and testators as to the scope of the invest-
ment powers of the trust company. This latter difficulty has led to the
suggestion by trust companies that the power to invest in participation Mort-
gages and other types of common funds be expressly inserted in the instru-
ment creating the trust.86
The Legality of the Participation Mortgage Device
Prior to the present depression the participation mortgage device was gen-
erally operated so profitably that its legality was rarely questioned. Since 1931,
however, challenges to this method of investment by both corporate and indi-
vidual trustees have been constantly increasing. The question is most fre-
quently raised where substantial diminutions in income lead beneficiaries of
trusts to ask for accountings or where objections have been made to attempts
to distribute participating certificates in lieu of cash on the termination of
trusts 7 Another situation in which the question frequently arises is in the
liquidation of trust companies dosed after the bank holiday in March, 1933.
Here the issue is presented when the depositors of the trust company seek to
gain control of the mortgages against which participating certificates have been
issued to trusts,38 and when a mortgagor who mortgaged real estate to the
trust company in its corporate capacity desires to set off against his mortgage
debt the amount of a deposit he may have had in the banking department of
the trust company.3 9
35. Different types of trusts such as living trusts with or without the power of revoca-
tion and testamentary trusts may all have different needs and require different handling.
Especially troublesome is the living trust with a poweY of revocation in the settler,
Cf. Roberts's Trust Estate, 316 Pa. 545, 175 At]. 869 (1934).
36. Peters, supra note 11; Smith, Commingled Trust Funds as a New Advance in Fidu-
dary Service (1932) 54 TRusT Co. 593; cf. RIDDLE, loc. cit. supra note 2; Barclay, Valua.
ble Experience with Commingled Funds for Trust Estates (1933) 66 Tr.usT Co. 183;
BoomT, loc. cit. supra note 2. This same problem is present to an even greater degree In
the plans for common investment funds. In Delaware one trust company operateg two
separate common investment funds. The securities in one fund are all legal invest-
ments under the laws of Delaware, and trust funds are invested therein without any
express permission from the settlor. The securities in the second fund are more general
in nature, and trust funds are invested in it only with the permission of the settler.
37. E.g., Matter of De Winter, 154 Misc. 50, 276 N. Y. Supp. 576 (Surr. Ct. 1934)
(objections to accounting overruled and distribution of certificates permitted); Crick's
Estate, 315 Pa. 581, 173 Atl. 327 (1934) (same); Osterling v. Commonwealth Trust Co,,
181 At. 769 (Pa. 1935) (trustee ordered to pay in cash).
38. E.g., Gratzinger v. Arehart, 198 N. E. 787 (Ind. 1935) (holders of mortgage certi-
ficate, on which issuing bank was directly liable for principal and interest, held entitled
to mortgages securing the certificates as against the receiver of the bank). The reverse
of this situation has arisen where mortgage certificate holders have found it more to their
advantage to come in as general creditors of the issuing bank or trust company because
of the great depreciation in the value of the mortgages against which the certificates were
issued. Ulmer v. Fulton, 129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N. E. 557 (1935); In re Manayunk Trust
Co. (No. 2), 21 D. & C. 405 (Pa. C. P. 1934).
39. As a general rule the mortgagor-depositor is not entitled to set off the amount of
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In any case in which the legality of the investment of trust funds in a
participating mortgage of any type is questioned, the trust company which
operated the participation device is of course always subject to the ordinary
rules governing investments by trustees.40 In those states where trustees
are left to their discretion, a trustee must make only such investments as a
reasonably prudent man would make of his own property, having in mind the
preservation of the corpus of the trust and the probable income which the
investment will yield. In the states where legal investments are prescribed by
statute, a trustee is usually held to this same general standard of care.4
his deposit against his mortgage debt when the mortgage has been declared to bL held in
trust for participating certificate holders. United States Bank & Trust Co. Case, 311 Pa.
320, 166 AUt. 371 (1933); In re Washington Trust Co., 16 Washington County 1 (Pa. C.
P. 1935); cf. Lawrence v. Lincoln County Trust Co., 123 Me. 273, 122 At!. 765 (1923).
Contra: Ulmer v. Fulton, 129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N. E. 557 (1935). This latter case is much
controverted and should be confined to its particular fact% especially in the light of the
general practices of the litigant trust company. See Comment (1935) 9 U. or Cr ;. L.
Rav. 490; (1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 314; (1935) 33 Micii. L. Rmr. 111'. But where a valid
right of set-off was in existence at the time the trust company declared itself trustee of
the mortgage for the certificate holders, the mortgagor-depositor is entitled to enforce that
right. Gordon v. Anthracite Trust Co., 117 Pa. Super. 544, 173 At!. 405 (1935); Kisingcr
v. Pennsylvania Trust Co., 180 At. 79 (Pa. Super. 1935).
40. Of course, where there are directions in the instrument creating the trust as to
the types of investments which the trustee may make, such directions govern, regardlr-s
of the equitable or statutory rules. In the following cases investments in participation
mortgage certificates were held to exceed the authority given in the instrument. Will of
Mendel, 164 Wis. 136, 159 N. W. 806 (1916); Matter of Trimbey, 151 Misc. 37, 271 N.
Y. Supp. 703 (Surr. Ct. 1934); Matter of Waxelbaum, 156 Misc. 45, 231 N. Y. Supp. 186
(Surr. Ct. 1935).
41. In this connection there have been two general i-ules laid down in different juris-
dictions. For the so-called Massachusetts or liberal rule, see Harvard College v. Amory,
26 Blass. 446 (1830); Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mlass. 321, 123 N. E. 665 (1919). For
the so-called New York or strict 'rule, see King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76, 85, 86 (1,69),
where the court said that trustees are "bound to employ such diligence and such pru-
dence in the care and management, as in general, prudent men of discretion and intelli-
gence in such matters, employ in their own like affairs. This necessarily exclude3 all specu-
lation." . . . "The preservation of the fund, and the procurement of a just income there-
from, are primary objects of the creation of the trust itself, and are to be primarily
regarded." Cf. also In re Buhl's Estate, 211 Mich. 124, 173 X. W. 651 (1920), and Hart's
Estate (No. 1), 203 Pa. 480, 53 At. 364 (1902), in which the statement of the rule is
changed to a requirement of such diligence and prudence as a man would exercise who was
trustee of the property of others. Recent cases applying the rule of King v. Talbot in the
light of the New York statute are Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fisk, 244 App. Div. 200, 278 N.
Y. Supp. 809 (1st Dep't, 1935); Matter of Leonard, 151 Misc. 558, 271 N. Y. Supp. 897
(Surr. Ct. 1934). That this rule still operates even where a particular type of invest-
ment is authorized by statute, see Matter of Sarah Blake's Estate, 146 Misc. 780, 263
N. Y. Supp. 310 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Matter of McKeough, 151 Mic.. 327, 271 N. Y. Supp.
362 (Surr. Ct. 1934). Also, R.sTATmzamr, Tausrs (1935) § 227, comment p.; State-
ment of Principles of Trust Institutions, art. 3, § 3, reprinted in (1934) 58 Tnusr Co.
712. To the effect that the New York statute, stating that investments shall be made
at the "sole risk" of the trustee, does not make a trustee the guarantor of the safety of
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At the present time, because of the superior facilities of corporate trustees for
obtaining investment information, there is a slight tendency to hold them to
this standard more strictly than the individual trustee. 42
The application of this general duty of trustees to the investment of funds in
participation mortgages requires the trust company which sets up a par-
ticipation mortgage plan to investigate the property which is to be mort-
gaged to ascertain that its value affords a safe margin of security for the
amount of funds invested, a margin which in many states is prescribed by
statute.43 While most trust companies which invest in real estate mortgages
to any great extent have specialized mortgage loan departments with experi-
enced real estate appraisers, it is often safer to have the real estate valued 'by
independent appraisers. Since the margin of security must be maintained after
the mortgage has been acquired, reappraisals should be made at stated inter-
vals; and should the margin become inadequate, the mortgage must be replaced
by another investment.44  A second part of this general duty of trustees is
to exercise prudence in diversifying the investments of each trust in order to
minimize the risk of loss. 45  In such diversification the trust company should
investment of trust funds in participating mortgage certificates, Matter of Flint, 240 App.
Div. 217, 269 N. Y. Supp. 470 (2d Dep't, 1934); aff'd mem., 266 N. Y. 607, 195 N. E.
221 (1935); cf. Matter of Staten Island' Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 156 Misc. 330, 282
N. Y. Supp. 163 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
42. See Estate of Allis, 191 Wis. 23, 29, 209 N. W. 945, 947 (1926); Matter of
Clark, 136 Misc. 881, 889, 242 N. Y. Supp. 210, 220 (Surr. Ct. 1930), mod. on other
grounds, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931); National Trustees Co. v. General Finance
Co., [1905] A. C. 373, 381; RESTATEMrNT, TRusTs (1935) § 227, comment d. But see
Linnard's Estate, 299 Pa. 32, 39, 148 Atl. 912, 914 (1930).
43. The percentages of the amount of the value of the real estate up to which loans
may be made by trust companies varies in different states, of which the following statutes
are typical: COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 7946 (50%); Ind. Laws, 1933, c. 40, § 186
(c) (50%); MAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1935) c. 172, § 34 (60( improved real
estate, 50% unimproved); N. Y. BANx. LAW (1935) § 188(7), N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAtW
(1935) § 21(1), N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW (1935) § 111(1) (66 2/3%) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
don, 1935) tit. 20, § 801 (66 2/3%); W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 44, att. 6, § 2 (80%). RE-
STATE .ENT, TRusTs (1935) § 229. Cf. In re Haydock's Estate, 284 N. Y. Supp. 931
(Surr. Ct. 1935) (corporate trustee surcharged where amount of mortgage exceeded per-
missible percentage allowed by statute and terms of the will); Matter of Hammersley,
152 Misc. 903, 274 N. Y. Supp. 303 (Surr. Ct. 1934) (no surcharge where necessary margin
existed at time investment was made).
44. The difficulties of trustees who fail to get adequate appraisals are illustrated by
the case of Estate of Marguerite Hanson, 42 Dauphin County 13 (Pa. 0. Ct. 1935); ef.
Matter of Jones, 155 Misc. 315, 280 N. Y. Supp. 521 (Surr. Ct. 1935); RESTATM JNT,
TRusTs (1935) § 231.
45. Appeal of Dickinson, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N. E. 99 (1890) (individual trustee);
Durant v. Crowley, 197 App. Div. 540, 189 N. Y. Supp. 385 (1st Dep't, 1921) (individual
trustee invested more than one-half of trust fund in a single mortgage) ; Matter of Jacobs,
152 Misc. 139, 273 N. Y. Supp. 279 (Surr. Ct. 1934) (corporate trustee invested too much
of trust funds in participating mortgage certificate issued by mortgage guaranty company) ;
Matter of Harbeck, 142 Misc. 57, 254 N. Y. Supp. 312 (Surr. Ct. 1931) (entire fund In a
single mortgage); RESTATEMENT, TRusTs (1935) § 228. But see Matter of Balfe, 152
Misc. 739, 755, 274 N. Y. Supp. 284, 302 (Surr. Ct. 1934), where it was held as long as
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consider the nature, purposes and size of the particular trust estate. Where
the trust estate is only a few thousand dollars in amount, it has been held
proper in some cases to invest the entire fund in a single participating certi-
ficate.46 With respect to trusts of fixed duration, ordinarily the trust com-
pany should be careful not to invest in certificates secured by mortgages
whose maturity date is long after the date of the termination of the trust,
although it has been held that under the circumstances of a particular case
such investments may b6 proper.4 7 The marketability of the participating
certificates is another element which the trust company should consider,
especially where distribution to the beneficiaries must be in cash. However,
by many courts the stability of an investment is regarded as of superior im-
portance to marketability, and for this reason they have refused to find any
breach of duty by trustees, even though the certificates are not salable.49 Fur-
thermore, the trust company must give due consideration to the limitations
upon charges it may make for its services in operating a participation mortgage
plan. While the trust company would seem entitled to charge the trusts
with the costs of operation in addition to its reasonable compensation for act-
ing as trustee of each separate trust, it is not entitled to make any profit from
the administration of such an investment plan.49 For this reason, if any charge
the trustee (an individual) remained within the statute, he could put all his "apples
in one basket."
46. Matter of Adriance's Estate, 145 Misc. 345, 260 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Surr. Ct. 1932);
Matter of Packard, 146 Misc. 65, 261 N. Y. Supp. 580 (Surr. CL 1932); Matter of Balfe,
152 Misc. 739, 274 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Surr. Ct. 1934). See Matter of Froelich, 150 isc.
371, 375, 269 N. Y. Supp. 541, 546 (Surr. Ct. 1934), where Surrogate Wingate labeled as
"ridiculous" the suggestion that the trustee should have diverified a trust fund of $1,000.
47. Held improper in Matter of Sarah Blake's Estate, 146 Misc. 780, 263 N. Y. Supp.
310 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Matter of Guenard, 149 Misc. 182, 266 N. Y. Supp. 770 (Surr. Ct.
1933). Where a trust company retained participating mortgage certificates for four years
after its ward attained majority, it was held responsible for the loss. In re Giee's Estate,
180 AtI. 711 (Pa. Super. 1935). Where a trust company failed to sell the certificates at
the termination of the trust, and thereby incurred a loss, it was held liable. Matter of
Jacobs, 152 Misc. 139, 273 N. Y. Supp. 279 (Surr. Ct. 1934). Such investment was
held proper under the circumstances in Matter of Turner, 156 MIisc. 63, 281 N. Y. Supp.
452 (Surr. Ct. 1935); cf. Marczak v. Brooklyn City Rr. Co., 147 Misc. 399, 263 I. Y.
Supp. 27 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (where the investment was held improper since the conservator
disregarded the age of the child), rev'd mem., 237 App. Div. 841, 261 N. Y. Supp. 915
(2d Dep't, 1932), aff'd mem., 262 N. Y. 473, 188 N. E. 25 (1933). In an analogous
situation where a trustee has made a lease of property extending beyond the date of
the termination of the trust, some courts have held the lease proper as a necessary means
of renting the premises profitably. Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 AU. 648 (1929);
Sweeney v. Hagerstown Trust Co., 144 Md. 612, 125 AU. 522 (1924); Comment (1924)
38 YALE L. J. 794.
4S. Matter of Flint, 240 App. Div. 217, 269 N. Y. Supp. 470 (2d Dep't, 1934), awd
mem., 266 N. Y. 607, 195 N. E. 221 (1935); Matter of Guenard, 149 Misc. 182, 266
N. Y. Supp. 770 (Surr. Ct. 1933) ; Matter of Jacobs, 152 Misc. 139, 273 N. Y. Supp. 279
(Surr. Ct. 1934) ; see Matter of Frazer, 150 Misc. 43, 50; 260 N. Y. Supp. 477, 484 (Suer.
Ct. 1933), where Surrogate Delehanty stated that "stability and not liquidity is the
desideratum in such an investment." RasTArMEm,,, Thuts (1935) § 227, comment m.
49. Carey v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 178 At. 242 (Mid. 1935); see Sanders v. Hall,
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is to be made for administering the participation mortgage plan, the trust
company should be careful, where, for example, a flat interest rate is paid on
the participating certificates, to adjust that rate to the rate paid by the
mortgagor so that the difference which goes to the trust company will not be
so large as to suggest the inclusion of profit. In several states one-half of one
per cent has been regarded by trust companies as a reasonable charge for the
expense of operating a participation plan, and this rate has been approved by
some courts.50
These foregoing elements of fiduciary duty are present in varying degrees in
the case of every type of investment, whether participation mortgages are in-
volved or not. More serious doubts as to the legality of this form of invest-
ment arise from certain factors inherent in the participation mortgage device
itself which tend to violate certain fundamental equitable principles govern-
ing the conduct of trustees 1 The first of these objections arises in those
participation mortgage plans in which title to the mortgage or mortgages is
taken in the corporate name of the trust company without any designation of
its trust capacity. This method of acquiring mortgages violates the duty of a
trustee to earmark trust property the moment it is acquired.52 It has been
argued that it is impracticable to attempt to list the names of all the partici-
pating trusts in the mortgage itself, and that even the trust company's taking
the mortgage as trustee for various undisclosed trusts is objectionable on the
ground that it raises a cloud on the title to the land in the eyes of title exam-
iners and thus lessens its value in the real estate market.53 However, it would
seem that some designation of the trusteeship should always be made unless
the trust company is expressly allowed by statute or by the trust instrument to
take title in its own name. 54
74 F. (2d) 399, 406 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934); Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty (1936)
49 HAv. L. REv. 521, 559; RESTATEMrENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 242. For the trustee's right
to compensation generally, see BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at §§ 974-979; for the amounts
allowed in New York by statute, see NEw YORK SUaROOAT'S COURT ACT § 285 and Nmv
YORK CWvM PRACTICE ACT § 1548.
50. Bowden v. Citizen's Loan & Trust Co., 259 N. W. 815 (Minn. 1935); cf. Reims
Estate, 15 Lehigh County 348 (Pa. 0. Ct. 1932); Merion Title & Trust Co.-Huff Memorial
Scholarship Fund, 23 Delaware County 557 (Pa. C. P. 1933).
51. For general treatments of these more serious objections, consult BOOERT, 0). cit.
supra note 5, at § 676; McKinney, supra note 5; Comments (1930) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. RV.
950; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 455.
52. Yost's Estate, 316 Pa. 463, 175 At1. 383 (1934); Peligo v. Pedigo's Committee,
247 Ky. 403, 57 S. W. (2d) 54 (1933); Matter of Harbeck, 142 Misc. 57, 254 N. Y. Supp.
312 (Surr. Ct. 1931); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 179, comment d. Under certain
exceptional circumstances, such as will benefit the estate, and where the trustee acts in good
faith, it has been held that no liability ensues. Keen's Estate, 306 Pa. 363, 159 Ati, 713
(1932).
53. Record, 7, Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. First Unitarian Society Case
No. 478, Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass., Sept. Sitting, 1935.
54. Statutes permitting this are N. Y. BANx. LAw (1935) § 188 (7); PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1935) tit. 7, § 819-1109. The Pennsylvania statute has been interpreted to create
an exception in the case of participation mortgages from the operation of the general rule,
Guthrie's Estate, 182 At]. 248 (Pa. 1936). However, where a trust company acquires
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Closely akin to this duty to earmark trust property is the duty of a trustee
to keep trust property separate both from its own propertym and from the
property of other trusts of which it is trustee.G This duty was originally
imposed in order to call to account any individual trustee who had mingled
trust property with his own individual property, thereby making identification
of the trust property practically impossible. In some straight participation
mortgages a trust company through its banking department may hold a partial
interest in a mortgage, while the balance of the interest is held by its trust
department as trustee for various trusts. In the mortgage pool the trust com-
pany nearly always retains an equity in the pool. This manner of investment
may be regarded by the courts as a mingling of fiduciary funds with those
of .the trust company, and as such it violates the duty that trust property
should be kept separate. The rule against mingling the funds of two separate
trusts for the purposes of investment is not so well established as that against
mingling trust funds with a trustee's individual funds. Thus it has been held
that the necessity of finding secure investments and the convenient manner in
which participation mortgages fill this need will justify a mingling of funds
of separate trusts.57 On the other hand, it has been argued that such mingling
mortgages through its banking department for future trust investments, they must be
earmarked as such at the time of acquisition and within one year from that date must L2
utilized for trust investment purposes. It is also required that a monthly report be made
to the state banking department of all such earmarked acquisitions. PA. Sr,'r. A-z:..
(Purdon, 1935) tit. 7, § 819-1111.
55. De Jarnette v. De Jarnette, 41 Ala. 708 (1868); Estate of Hinkel, 218 Cal. 614, 24
P. (2d) 778 (1933); Alspaugh v. Adams, go Ga. 345, 5 S. E. 496 (1SSS); Pedigo v. Pedigo's
Committee, 247 Ky. 403, 57 S. W. (2d) 54 (1933); First Nat. Bank of Pateron v. Jerkly
Central Power & Light Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 242, 170 At. 209 (Ch. 1934); Doud v. Holmeo,
63 N. Y. 635 (175); Re Edmund Hodges' Estate, 66 VL 70, 28 At!. 663 (IS94); see
Duncan v. Williamson, 18 Tenn. App. 153, 160, 74 S. W. (2d) 215, 219 (1933); cf. E-tate
of Pfister, 216 Wis. 42, 255 N. W. 911 (1934); Estate of Wittwer, 216 Wis. 432, 257 N. W.
626 (1934). But cf. Estate of Sarment, 123 Cal. 331, 55 Pac. 1015 (1899); Graver's Ap-
peal, 50 Pa. 189 (1865). RESTATmI NT, TRusTs (1935) § 179, comment b.
56. Moore v. McKenzie, 112 Me. 356, 92 AU. 296 (1914); Lannin v. Buckley, 256 Mas.
78, 152 N. E. 71 (1926); Heaton v. Bartlett, 180 Adl. 244 (N. H. 1935), noted in (1935)
10 T= Lr L. Q. PTv. 94; Fowler v. Colt, 25 N. 2. Eq. 202 (Ch. 1874), afi'd, Salisbury v.
Colt, 27 N. J. Eq. 492 (1875); McCullough's Executors v. McCullough, 44 N. 21. Eq. 313,
14 AtI. 642 (Ch. 1888). Cf. the English cases on contributory mortgages: Webb v. Jonas
[1S71 39 Ch. Div. 660; In re Dive [1909] 1 Ch. 32S. These are distinguishable in that
the trustee mingled his trust funds with those of a third person, thus giving up a portion
of his control over the security. Where different trusts are created by the came instrument,
rather than hold the trustee the courts may find that the instrument did not necez:itate
segregation. Titsworth v. Titsworth, 107 N. J. Eq. 436, 152 AUt. 869 (Ch. 1931) ; Matter of
Kohler, 193 App. Div. 8, 183 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1st Dep't, 1920); Matter of Sidenberg, 147
Misc. 742, 264 N. Y. Supp. 704 (Suer. Ct. 1933). See arguments given in Matter of Union
Trust Co., 86 Misc. 392, 149 N. Y. Supp. 324 (Surr. Ct. 1914), aft'd, 219 N. Y. 514, 114
N. E. 1057 (1916). For a statutory prohibition of the mingling of the funds of two
trusts for investment purposes, see S. C. CoDo (Michle, 1932) § 7909. REsTATE, ;T,
TRusTs (1935) § 179, comment c, § 227, comment j.
57. Chesterman v. Eyland, 81 N. Y. 39S (18S0); Barry v. Lambert, 93 N. *V. 3C)
(1885); Matter of Union Trust Co., 219 N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057 (1916); ElUin v. Elkin,
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prevents a trustee from administering each investment solely in the interest of
a single trust, for the needs and desires of different trusts and their bene-
ficiaries may conflict upon such questions as reductions in interest rates, exten-
sions of time for payment, and foreclosures of mortgages. Moreover, it may
prevent a proper allocation of losses and charges between the various trusts.08
However, the practical possibility of a conflict between the interests of differ-
ent trusts seems extremely remote except in very unusual cases.
In view of the fact that this duty tb keep the property of each trust separate
from all other property was one formulated for the individual trustee at a time
when the modern corporate trustee with its complete bookkeeping and account-
ing facilities was unknown, it would seem that objections to the participation
mortgage device on this score lose much of their forceP The application of
this duty to the present situation is further weakened by the fact that by the
issuance of participation certificates to each trust in addition to keeping com-
plete and accurate bookkeeping records, the trust company makes possible an
immediate identification of the interest of each trust at any time, thus satisfy-
ing the primary basis of the duty to keep trust property separate.00
The third and by far the most serious of the objections inherent in the
nature of the participation mortgage device is the frequency with which it
involves transactions partaking of the nature of a sale to or purchase from the
banking department of the trust company by the trust company as trustee.
To prevent his personal interest from conflicting with his obligation to admin-
29 Misc. 513, 61 N. Y. Supp. 947 (Sup. Ct. 1899); see Re Walker, 62 L. T. R. 449, 451
(Ch. Div. 1890); cf. Matter of Menzie, 54 Misc. 188, 105 N. Y. Supp. 925 (Surr. Ct.
1907); Nance v. Nance, 1 S. C. 209 (1869); Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 455; 11
RULLNG CASE LAW 143.
58. BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 676.
59. But see Matter of Union Trust Co., 219 N. Y. 514, 522, 114 N. E. 1057, 1059 (1916),
where the court stated that "the identity of investment of trust funds should not . . . be
wholly dependent upon the continuance of rules relating thereto by corporate trustees or
the accuracy and honesty of bookkeepers and employees."
60. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 227, comment j. A further argument is that in
many states statutes have made the corporate bonds of railroad and public utility companies
legal investments for trustees. These bonds are secured by a single mortgage to a trustee,
so that while each bondholder has a separate promise of the obligor to pay, he has merely
an undivided interest in the security. The courts have never found any objection on the
grounds of mingling where a trustee has made such an investment. A certain analogy
exists between such bonds and the situation presented in the mortgage certificate. BooGRT,
op. cit. supra note 5, at § 676. A further tendency to permit a greater degree of com-
mingling by corporate trustees is evidenced in the statutes and decisions of various states,
permitting deposit of trust funds in a general fund in the trust company's banking depart-
ment. Cf. Herzog v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 148 App. Div. 234, 132 N. Y. Supp.
1114 (1st Dep't, 1911), aff'd, 210 N. Y. 531, 103 N. E. 885 (1913); McDonald v. Fulton,
125 Ohio St. 507, 182 N. E. 504 (1932) and OHIO GEn. CODE (Page, 1926) § 710-165;
also Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374, 119 Atl. 341 (1923); CommonWealth v. Tradesmen's
Trust Co., 250 Pa. 378, 95 Atl. 577 (1915). The cases are discussed in Ex parte Michle,
167 S. C. 1, 165 S. E. 359 (1932). The practice was held improper in Glidden v. Gutellug,
96 Fla. 834, 119 'So. 140 (1928). For general discussion, Whitmore, Self-Deposit by Trust
Companies oj Fiduciary Funds (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 350; Comment (1935) 48 HARv. L.
REv. 1184.
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ister a trust solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries, a trustee is under a duty
of loyalty not to sell trust property to himself nor to sell his own property
to the trust.61 In setting up many straight participation mortgage plans, a
trust company will first acquire the mortgage with its own funds, then declare
itself trustee of the mortgage for certain of its trusts, and reimburse its bank-
ing department from the funds of those trusts for the initial expenditure.
Subsequently, in the operation of such a participation mortgage plan, the trust
company as trustee often sells to and buys from its banking department the
participating certificates issued against the mortgage. Although not regarded
by all trust companies as cases of sale or purchase, these types of transactions
do possess certain of the characteristics of a sale or purchase, and have been
regarded by some courts as such self-dealing as will constitute a breach of the
trust company's duty of loyalty.62  In the mortgage pool these incidents of a
sale or purchase become more pronounced where the so-called "float" and the
power of substitution are present. Since trust companies in several instances
used the power of substitution as a means of unloading poor mortgages on
their trusts, the power has been singled out as the target for most of the recent
criticism of the mortgage pool. 3 While in actual practice the existence of the
power of substitution leads to more frequent interdepartmental sales and pur-
chases within the trust company and thus affords greater opportunities for
manipulation by unscrupulous trustees, on purely legal grounds the sales and
purchases of mortgages pursuant to this power are no more reprehensible
than the sales and purchases of participating interests by one department to
another. In effect, when the trust company substitutes one mortgage for an-
other it has merely effected a partial change in the investment held for each
trust, a change which would be legal were it not for the self-dealing. Hence,
if statutory permission is given to trust companies to operate a participation
mortgage plan by sales and purchases of certificates from one department to
another, there would seem to be no reason for denying them the power of sub-
stitution, especially if the statute provides for strict supervision of these tran-
sactions by the state banking authorities. It would seem that a properly exer-
cised power of substitution might be very advantageous to the trust, and
the instances of manipulation could be cared for by a surcharge of the trustee
in the individual case.
61. St. Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, 85 Minn. 1, SS N. W. 256 (1901); Comet v. Comet,
269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333 (1916); Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns Ch. 252 (N. Y. 1816);
Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N. Y. 548 (1876); Matter of Long Island Loan & Trust Co., 92
App. Div. 1, 87 N. Y. Supp. 65 (2d Dep't, 1904); Matter of Peck, 152 Misc. 315, 273
N. Y. Supp. 552 (Surr. Ct. 1934); In re Guardianship of Lodge, 32 N. P. (N. S.) 40
(Ohio Prob. Ct. 1934); cf. Roberts v. Michigan Trust Co., 273 Mich. 91, 262 N. W. 744
(1935); Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 154 N. E. 303 (1926). Scott, supra note 49;
RESTATEmramT, TRusTs (1935) § 170.
62. Ulmer v. Fulton, 129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N. E. 557 (1935); In re Guardianhip of
Lodge, 32 N. P. (N.S.) 40 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1934); cf. Matter of Thomson, 135 Mi c. 62,
237 N. Y. Supp. 622 (Surr. Ct. 1929); Matter of Balfe, 152 Misc. 739, 274 N. Y. Supp. 234
(Surr. Ct. 1934), aff'd with modifications, 245 App. Div. 22, 280 N. Y. Supp. 128 (2d Dep't,
1935).
63. See cases cited in note 25, supra.
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While not relevant to the situation in which a trust company issues par-
ticipating certificates to its own trusts, other serious legal objections arise
when a trust company or individual trustee invests trust funds in participating
certificates issued by another trust company or a title insurance and mortgage
company. The strongest of these objections is that such a method of invest-
ment involves an improper delegation of powers by the trustee.0 4 Under most
participation mortgage plans the trustee must surrender to the issuing company
complete power to make all decisions arising in connection with the adminis-
tration of the mortgage, and even in the absence of such provision in the plan,
the trustee would seem dependent upon the issuer to ascertain whether the
requisite margin of security is present at the time the investment is made and
is maintained during the term of the investment. In the absence of a per-
missive statute or trust instrument, the rule against the delegation of such
powers would invalidate investments made in this manner"
Possibly because these various legal objections may be raised to most par-
ticipation mortgage plans notwithstanding their financial desirability under
normal circumstances, corporate trustees have been expressly authorized by
statutes of California, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Washington, Hawaii G and probably Vermont 7 to invest in par-
ticipating mortgage certificates. In California, New York, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Tennessee, Washington and Hawaii trust companies are specifically
empowered to issue such certificates against the security of a single mortgage
to the trusts of which they may be trustees, or in other words to operate a
straight participation mortgage plan.0 8 In Indiana it would seem that this
64. For the general rule, cf. North American Trust Co. v. Chappell, 70 Ark. 507, 69
S. W. 546 (1902); Coleman v. Connolly, 242 Ill. 574, 90 N. E. 278 (1909); In re Iscovltz'
Estate, 179 Atl. 548 (Pa. 1935); Meck v. Behrens, 141 Wash. 676, 252 Pac. 91 (1927);
RESTATIMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 171; BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at §§ 554-557.
65. BOG aT, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 676; Will of Mendel, 164 Wis. 136, 159 N. W.
806 (1916); cf. Matter of Allen, 142 Misc. 113, 254 N. Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
This point of delegation is discussed at length in Gouley, supra note 6.
66. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) tit. 50, § 104; Ind. Laws 1933, c. 40, § 186 (c);
N. J. Co P. STAT. (Supp. 1930) tit. 72, § 37a; N. Y. BANE. LAW (1935) § 188 (7); N. Y,
PERs. PROP. LAW (1935) § 21 (1), N. Y. DEc. EST. LAW (1935) § 111 (1); Ore. Laws
1935, c. 212, §§ 5, 6; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 20, § 801 (7), tit. 7, § 819-1109;
TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 9596.3; WAsu. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932)
§ 3255 (1) (b); HAWAIr REv. LAWS (1935) § 6910. In New York the Streit Committee
has recently recommended drastic amendments of the respective permissive statutes so as to
prohibit the use of the participation mortgage device by fiduciaries. Section 188
(7) of the Banking Law, in particular, would be altered so as to prohibit trust companies
from distributing participating mortgage certificates to their trust estates, from transferring
certificates from one trust to another, and from purchasing certificates from thenselves.
N. Y..Times, Feb. 24, 1936, at 25, col. 1.
67. VT. PUB. LAWS (1933) § 6816, which permits a trust company to "associate to-
gether for common investment the funds of individual trusts held by it whether created by
order of court or otherwise, if the terms of the trust do not require a separate investment."
68. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) lit. 50, § 104; N. Y. BANx. LAW (1935) § 188
(7); Ore. Laws 1935, c. 212, §§ 5, 6; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 7, § 819-1109D;
TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 9596.3; WASr. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §
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power can be reasonably implied. In New Jersey the statute provides that the
mortgage or trust deed against which the participating certificates are issued
shall be deposited with another trust company, bank, or title guaranty com-
pany, thus apparently preventing the entire transaction from being carried on
within a single trust company. 9  Express statutory authority to create mort-
gage pools exists only in Pennsylvania;7 0 but although the implication of such
a power is doubtful, trust companies in other states have operated pools.71 In
California, New York, Pennsylvania and Hawaii the statutes clearly confer the
right to hold the mortgages in the corporate name of the trust company with-
out designating any trust capacity. 72 In California, New York, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania and Hawaii the trust company has the statutory power to sell to
and buy from its banking department in its trust capacity."3 In Washington
this power seems to be expressly denied.74 The statutes of New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania and Hawaii require that the records of the trust company at all
times show the separate interests of each trust; that of New Jersey requires the
issuance of participating certificates to all parties interested in the mortgage.75
In New York it is provided that notice must be given, to the beneficiaries
of each trust whenever an investment for that trust is made in participating
-mortgage certificates. 70 In New Jersey, New York, Oregon and Hawaii each
3255 (1) (b); HAW vA Rev. LAWS (1935) § 6910. For the legislative history of N. Y.
BANE. LAw (1935) § 18 (7), see Matter of Frazer, 150 Misc. 43, 26S N. Y. Supp. 477
(Surr. Ct. 1932).
69. N. J. ComT. STAT. (Supp. 1930) tit. 72, § 37a. However, at least one trust com-
pany did keep the whole transaction within the company by assgning the mortgage or
trust deed to one of its own trust officers as trustee thereof for all the certificate holders.
70. PA. ST.T. A-N'N. (Purdon, 1935) fit. 7, § 819-1109. For a similar act in reference to
title insurance companies with trust company powers, see PA. ST,%T. Am.. (Purdon, 1930)
fit. 15, § 2514. Prior to January 15, 1934, the Hawaii statute expressly sanctioned mortgage
pools. Hawaii Laws 1931, p. 299, amending HAwAiI Rrv. L-w,,s (1925) § 3454A. How-
ever, the amendment of January 15, 1934, has apparently removed this power. See
HAWAiE R.v. LAws (1935) § 6910.
71. In Indiana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and Ohio. For New York, cf.
Matter of Union Trust Co., 219 N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057 (1916); for Ohio, Ulmer v.
Fulton, 129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N. E. 557 (1935), and Squire v. Central United Nat. Bank,
Daily Legal News and Cleveland Recorder, Cleveland Ohio, Dec. 19, 1935, at 1.
72. CAL. GFx. LAws (Deering, 1931) fit. 50, § 104; N. Y. Bmumx. Lww (1935) § 183
(7); PA. STAT. AwN. (Purdon, 1935) fit. 7, § 819-1109; HAWAII RLv. L.ws (1935) § 6910.
73. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) fit. 50, § 104; N. Y. BiwK. LAw (1935) § 188 (7);
Ore. Laws 1935, c. 212, §§ 5, 6; PA. STAT. A'N. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 7, § 819-1109; HAw,,xr
Rzv. LAws (1935) § 6910.
74. WAsi. Riev. STAT. Ai-x. (Remington, 1932) § 3255 (s).
75. N. Y. BANx. LAw (1935) § 188 (7) ; Ore. Laws 1935, c. 212, §§9 5, 6; PA. STAT..
(Purdon, 1935) fit. 7, § 819-1109; H lwAI REV. LAws (1935) § 6910; N. J. Comp. Srxr.
(Supp. 1930) tit. 72, § 37a.
76. N. Y. BAxK LAw (1935) § 183 (7); Matter of Roche, 245 App. Div. 192, 281
N. Y. Supp. 77 (4th Dep't, 1935) (trustee surcharged for failure to give notice); Matter
of Peene, 155 Misc. 155, 279 N. Y. Supp. 131 (Surr. Ct. 1935) (same); Irving Trust Co. v.




certificate must be equal in lien to every other certificate issued against the
mortgage. 77
The most complete legislative pronouncement on participation mortgages at
the present time is the Pennsylvania mortgage pool statute.7 8 Under it a trust
company is authorized to establish a pool of mortgages purchased solely with
the funds of estates held by it as fiduciary. The trust company is to apportion
fractional interests in the pool to the trust estates in proportion to the amounts
of their respective contributions. The participating interests in the pool are
to be held solely by the trust company as fiduciary and the equitable interests
solely by the trust estates of which the trust company is fiduciary. Upon dis-
tribution of any trust estate its interests in the pool may be sold to another
trust estate or to the banking department of the trust company, which after-
wards may resell to another trust estate. Participating certificates need not
be issued, since the records of the trust company must at all times show the
names and interests of each trust estate. But if certificates are issued, the cer-
tificates must state that they are issued without guaranty and are payable
only out of' such funds as become available from the mortgages comprising
the pool. The power to substitute mortgages is expressly granted.
Statutory authority for trustees to invest in split mortgages seems to have
been given more freely than that for investment in straight participation mort-
gages. While never included in the statute eo nomine as are participating cer-
tificates, the split mortgage type of investment appears to be legal by the
statutes of Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and
Wisconsin, and may be implicitly authorized by the statutes of other states.70
Even in the absence of any statutory authority, corporate trustees in many
other states have for a long time used participation mortgages as a means of
investing their trust funds. Insofar as it has been possible to secure accurate
information, the straight participation mortgage has been used in Alabama,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island and possibly in other states,80 as
77. N. Y. BANK. LAW (1935 § 188 (7); N. J. ComI'. STAT. (Supp. 1930) tit. 72, § 37a;
Ore. Laws 1935, c. 212, §§ 5, 6; HAWAII REv. LAWS (1935) § 6910.
78. 'PA. STAT. ANNl. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 7, § 819-1109.
79. CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 7946; Del. Laws 1931, c. 259, § I; Ind. Laws 1933,
c. 40, § 186 (c); IOWA CODE (1931) § 12772 (5); MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 7714 (4);
N. J. Comp. STAT. (Supp. 1930) tit. 72, § 37a; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1935) § 21 (1),
N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW (1935) § 111 (1); Omo GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1935) § 10.506-41;
Ore. Laws 1935, c. 212, §§ 5, '6; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 20, § 801 (7); VA.
CODE (Michie, Supp. 1934) § 5431; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 44, art. 6, § 2; Wis. STAT. (1931)
§ 231.32. These statutes generally state that investments may be made in notes or bonds
secured by a first mortgage or deed of trust of real estate. Other statutes, less clear in
their import, merely state that investments may be made in "first mortgages." E.g. ILL.
R-v. STAT. (Cahill, 1935) c. 3, § 144; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1929) § 13-135. Another type
authorizes investments in real estate "mortgage notes, bonds." Ky. STAT. (Carroll, Supp.
1934) § 4706.
80. Of these states, insofar as it has been possible to secure information, participation
mortgages are in use today as a medium of trust investment in Alabama, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. They were used prior to the depression In
[Vol. 45
COMMENTS
well as in those states where statutory permission has been granted. In other
states it is probable that trust companies have purchased participating certifi-
cates from title insurance or mortgage guaranty companies8 l The split mort-
gage device has been utilized in Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Massachuusetts,
Minnesota, Virginia, Wisconsin and very probably in numerous other states. In
addition to Pennsylvania, mortgage pools have been created and operated by
trust companies in Indiana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and Ohio. -
As mentioned previously, the amount of litigation involving the legality of
the participation mortgage device has been constantly increasing since 1931.
During 1935 and up to the present time in 1936 the highest courts of five
states-Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania-rendered
opinions on questions involving various aspects of the participation mortgage
device.83 In the lower courts there was an even greater amount of such liti-
gation.8" In Massachusetts and Illinois, cases involving the legality of fiduciary
investments in straight participation mortgages and split mortgages respec-
tively have been argued and now await decision8 3 In the other states where
participation mortgages have been used without their legality being as yet
passed upon, it seems probable that the question will soon be raised.
In view of the high degree of uncertainty in so many states as to the legality
of participation mortgages as a means for the investment of trust funds, it
is extremely desirable that their use be either approved or disapproved by
the legislatures of the various states. If real estate mortgages regain their
Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, and Oklahoma. In Colorado the practice was discon-
tinued in some cases at the instigation of national banking authorities. In Wisconsin
participation mortgages were used prior to 1913, but they fell into disrepute in that state
because of the failure of a large trust company which had made extensive use of them.
They have never been used in Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, South Carolina, or
Texas. In Michigan participating mortgage certificates have been sold to the public by
trust companies, but apparently have never been used as a method of trust investment.
81. Generally it seems that a trust company prefers to issue participating certificates
against mortgages which it holds itself, rather then to buy guaranteed certificates from title
insurance or mortgage companies "because of the greater familiarity with the security and
because of faith in its own appraisals." Matter of Flint, 240 App. Div. 217, 220, 269 N. Y.
Supp. 470, 474 (2d Dep't, 1934). Also, Record, 14, Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
First Unitarian Society, Case No. 478, Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass., Sept. Sitting, 1935.
82. In Ilinois, the case of Matter of Estate of Lalla, involving the legality of invest-
ments by guardians and conservators in split mortgages, is now pending before the Illinois
Supreme Court. The Appellate Court, First District, held the investments legal in an opinion
rendered July 5, 1935. Apparently contra to this holding is the decision of the Appellate
Court, Third District, in the case of In re Guardianship of Lutz, 280 MII. App. 5S7 (1935);
cf. In re Estate of Sargent, 276 Ill App. 312 (1935).
83. Gratzinger v. Arehart, 198 N. E. 787 (Ind. 1935); Bowden v. Citizens' Loan & Trust
Co., 259 N. W. 815 (M1inn. 1935); Matter of Flint, 266 N. Y. 607, 195 N. E. 221 (1935)
(mem. decision); Ulmer v. Fulton, 129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N. E. 557 (1935); Guthrie's
Estate, 182 At. 248 (Pa. 1936).
84. See lower court cases from Ohio, New York and Pennsylvania cited supra.
89. In the Matter of the Estate of Lalla, Sup. Ct. of Ill.; Springfield Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. First Unitarian Society, Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. The investment in the latter case
was held valid in an opinion filed Feb. 27, 1936.
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former position as a prime medium of investment, it would seem that the utility
of the participation mortgage device sufficiently outweighs its defects to justify
statutory sanction of its use, especially since it is possible to frame the statutes
in the light of the weaknesses of the device which have been revealed during
the depression."0 While certain incidents of the participation mortgage device
afford opportunities for manipulation by unscrupulous fiduciaries, it would
seem unreasonable to condemn an entire class of investments for the sole
reason that a few trustees have used it to their own advantage. The courts
and legislatures should recognize that a reasonable reliance must be placed
in the honesty and integrity of fiduciaries,8 7 and should seek to safeguard the
beneficiaries of trusts by requiring the strictest sort of supervision of the invest-
ment policies of trust companies by the banking authorities, rather than by
restricting further the already too narrow field of investments.
Mere legislative permission for corporate trustees to invest in participation
mortgages would not in itself be sufficient. In the statutes of those states
which at the present time make such a grant, aside from California, New York
and Pennsylvania, so much is left to implication that the degree of uncertainty
is almost as great as if there were no statutes at all.88 Hence, the type of
statute which should be enacted would be one prescribing in detail the manner
of creating and operating the straight participation mortgage or the mortgage
pool or both. Such detailed provisions should include specifications as to the
types of institutions which may become the issuers of participating certificates.
Insofar as trust companies are concerned, both the sal6 of certificates to the
public and the guaranty of the payment of the certificates by the trust com-
pany, should be forbidden. It should be clearly indicated whether the trust
company may hold mortgages in its corporate capacity or solely as trustee,
and whether it may engage in those interdepartmental transactions, involving
the sale or purchase of participating interests, which may be regarded as self-
dealing. Where the mortgage pool is sanctioned and also the exercise of the
power of substitution, it may be deemed desirable in the light of recent experi-
86. In New York, however, on the basis of the report of the Streit Committee, It has
been recommended that the participation mortgage device be prohibited as a method of
trust investment for both corporate and individual fiduciaries. The Streit Committee found
that from 1928-1935, $283,569,603 had been invested by fiduciaries in participation
mortgages, 45% of which are now in default; that many mortgages were placed on proper-
ties without proper appraisals or even inspections; and that many trust companies had
been forced into the real estate business of managing and servicing mortgaged properties,
On the other hand it should be pointed out that no investigation was made of the invest-
ment of funds of single trusts in whole mortgages, of which possibly a comparable amount
may be in default. Moreover, no distinction seems to have been made between the situation
where a trust company issued the certificates, and that where it purchased them from a
mortgage guaranty company. N. Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1936, at 25, col. 1; N. Y. Herald
Tribune, Feb. 24, 1936, at 21, col. 6. See note 66, supra.
87. See Bowden v. Citizens' Loan & Trust Co., 259 N. W. 815, 818 (Minn. 1935).
88. Even in New York and Pennsylvania there has been a great amount of litigation
over the interpretation of these statutes. In some cases litigation seems to have arisen
solely from an unwillingness on the part of beneficiaries to accept the language of the
legislatures at its face value.
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ence to require that when substitutions are made they should be reported to the
banking authorities. Finally, some provision should be made to require the
utmost care and prudence in making appraisals of the real estate upon which
mortgages are to be placed, for the success or failure of any type of mortgage
investment depends ultimately on the accuracy of these valuations8 2
USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES
The disorder which commonly attends industrial conflicts has, with increasing
frequency, furnished occasion for the exercise by the Governor of his power to
call forth the military forces of the State for the purpose of maintaining security
of life and property.' While employment of the militia to this end is purely an
administrative function, it has frequently given rise to justiciable controversies
which courts have been forced to decide. The result has been the development
of a branch of administrative law which has rarely been recognized as falling
within that category. A survey of this field concerns itself with the effect of
the Governor's resort to military action, the limits which courts have placed
upon that action, and the liability of the Governor and members of the militia
for acts which exceed those limits.
Within the exclusive discretion of the Executive, as the officer charged with
the duty of executing the laws,2 has been vested the determination of whether
or not a situation has arisen which demands the summoning of troops.? His
89. In New York City where the guaranteed participation mortgage certificates were Eo
common, practically all the difficulties existing today can be traced to improper appraials
or appraisals based on the hope of an ever-continuous rise in real estate values. This is
clearly brought out in the reports of the Moreland investigation in the New Yorl: Times
during 1934 and 1935. See also Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. REV. 663.
1. By the Constitutions of most states, the Governor is the Commander-in-Chief of
the militia, which he may call out to execute the laws, to suppress insurrection, and to
repel invasion. STaosoN, Amx.xcA STATuT LnWv (1$86) §§ 297, 298. See, e.g., In re
Advisory Opinion to Governor, 74 Fla. 92, 77 So. 87 (1917).
For the common-law duty of magistrates to quell riots and rebellions by the use of
military force, see Case of Armes, Pop. 121 (1597); Rex v. Kennett, S Car. & P. 282
(1781); Rex v. Pinney, 5 Car. & P. 254 (1832).
2. SmTsoN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 280.
3. See Martin v. Mott, 25 U. S. 19, 30 (1827); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 35s, 358
(S. D. Ind. 1935), noted (1936) 34 MIcH. L. RLv. 417; In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 164,
165, 85 Pac. 190, 192 (1905); Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 238, 134 S. W. 484, 487
(1911); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 460, 143 Pac. 947, 949 (1914); Hartranft's Appeal,
85 Pa. St. 433 (1877); State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 524, 77 S. E. 243, 246 (1912).
Thus, a court cannot make a determination in advance that troops are necessary to quell
an insurrection. Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Beale, 282 Fed. 934 (S. D. Ohio, 1922).
Nor can it command the executive branch of the state government to perform the duties
imposed upon it in this respect. Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, No. 2909 Eq. (D. Minn.
Feb. 5, 1936).
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decision is ordinarily regarded as conclusive by the courts. 4 Otherwise, it is
said, the legality of executive orders would depend not upon the executive
judgment, but upon that of a co-ordinate branch of government.0
In practice, however, while courts have purported to accept the Governor's
declaration as final, they have often reviewed the evidence upon which it is
based where the legality of his action, taken pursuant thereto, is in question.0
Thus, a Federal District Court, examining into the arrest and detention of a
striker by the militia, paid lip service to the doctrine that the court cannot
inquire into the degree of necessity for troops or substitute its judgment for that
of the Governor. Nevertheless, it proceeded to find that the strike situation
was effectively handled by the state police without the aid of troops, and dis-
charged the prisoner from a military arrest.7 Similarly, notwithstanding a
Governor's proclamation that a state of insurrection existed in the Texas oil
fields in 1932, the United-States Supreme Court, while adhering to the proposi-
tion that the Executive's finding of an exigency requiring military aid is con-
clusive, discovered no evidence of disturbance or riot, and, accordingly, denied
the existence of any occasion which would justify the particular military action
complained of.8
But although courts examine the facts to see, not whether they justify the
Governor's determination, but only whether they justify his action, the practical
effect in many cases is to nullify the proposition that the Executive decision is
not subject to judicial review.9 This subtlety of reasoning results in part from
the fact that the Governor's call to the militia is often embodied in a so-called
proclamation of "martial law."10 While the proclamation may be a potent
4. See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 83 (1908); Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson,
7 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D. Minn. 1934); In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 612, 57 Pac. 706, 707
(1899); Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. 121, 136, 137 (1855); Hearon v. Calus, 183 S. , 13, 20
(S. C. 1935) ; Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621, 630 (1867) ; and see cases cited supra note 3.
5. In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 165, 85 Pac. 190, 192 (1905); Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky.
232, 238, 134 S. W. 484, 487 (1911).
6. See Constantin v. Smith, 57 F. (2d) 227 (E. D. Tex. 1932), aff'd, Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (S. D. Ind. 1935);
Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934); United States v. Adams,
26 F. (2d) 141 (D. Colo. 1927); Hearon v. Calus, 183 S. E. 13 (S. C. 1935); Druecker
v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621, 631 (1867); cf. Betty v. State, 188 Ala, 211, 66 So. 457 (1914).
7. United States v. Adams, 26 F. (2d) 141 (D. Colo. 1927).
8. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932), aff'g Constantin v. Smith, 57 F. (2d)
227 (E. D. Tex. 1932); cf. Hearon v. Calus, 183 S. E. 13, 21 (S. C. 1935): "It Is
common knowledge that in the area where a state of insurrection was said to exist, the
militia was called out and martial law declared, all was as calm, quiet and peaceful as
a May morn."
9. Where the only action for which the troops have been called out is enjoined, the
Governor's determination that an exigency requires military action is, in effect, reviewed
and reversed by the court. See, e.g., Constantin v. Smith, 57 F. (2d) 227 (E. D. Tex.
1932); Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 162 Okla. 216, 19 P. (2d) 582 (1933); Hearon
v. Calus, 183 S. E. 13 (S. C. 1935); Fairman, Martial Ride in the Light of Sterling v.
Constantin (1933) 19 CoaR. L. Q. 20, 33; Note (1936) 34 Mxcix. L. Rav. 417, 418.
10. The statutes of only two states provide for a gubernatorial proclamation of martial
law. Mo. STAT. ANwr. (Vernon, 1932) § 13825; UTAn REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) 54-1-8. Tho
COMMENTS
incantation, it is, nevertheless, devoid of legal effect by itself." It neither en-
larges the powers of the Governor or the military authorities which he summons,
nor alters the legal rights and obligations of the citizens within the territory
proclaimed.' 2 Being a mere formula of words, the proclamation itself can
neither be inquired into nor enjoined.13
The designation "martial law" has served to obfuscate the legal principles
which govern present day gubernatorial exertion of the military power. His-
torically, martial law included (1) the articles of war, enforced by courts-martial,
regulating the military and naval forces of the government,-termed military
law,' 4 and (2) the administration by military forces of foreign territory occu-
pied in time of war-termed military government."5 It has long been established
that martial law in the sense of military law is solely for the internal regula-
statutes of most states, however, provide that whenever the militia is employed, the Governor,
if in his judgment the maintenance of law and order will thereby be promoted, may by
proclamation declare the county or city in which the troops are serving to he in a "state
of insurrection." See, e.g., CA.=. POL. CODE (Deering, 1932) § 1917; NEn. Coup. STAT.
(1929) c. 55, § 152; N. Y. Mn. LAW (1917) § 13.
11. Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, 108 S. E. 428 (1921), noted (1921) 35 Ruiv.
L. REv. 338. But note that this same court in two previous cases [State v. BrovM, 71
W. Va. 519, 563, 77 S. E. 243, 262 (1912); Ex porte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 590, 77 S. E.
1029, 1039 (1913)] distinguished Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S. W. 4S4 (1911) and
Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. 121 (1855) upon the ground that they did not arise under
proclamations of "war.2
See 3 WLouG;HBY, COisTrITiONAL LAw (1929) 1591. The British view is similar.
Tilonko v. Attorney-General of the Colony of Natal (1907) A. C. 93, 94; Dodd, The Case
of Marais (1902) 18 L. Q. Ray. 143, 145.
Some courts have said that "martial law" prevailed notwithstanding the absence of a
proclamation to that effect. In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 705 (1899); Commonwealth
v. ShortaUl, 206 Pa. 165, 55 At. 952 (1903). Others have enjoined military meaures
notwithstanding the promulgation of a martial law proclamation. Ex parte Lavinder,
supra; and cases cited supra note 9. But see United States v. Adams, 26 F. (2d) 141
(D. Colo. 1927), where the court said, at page 144: "If the Governor here had declared
martial law, we would have an entirely different situation."
12. See 1 STEpu--, HISTORY or =a Cm AL LAW (1833) 214; Holdsworth, Marlijl
Law Historically Considered (1902) 18 L. Q. Rav., 117, 129. The only value of a martial
law proclamation would appear to rest in some supposed emotional effect upon the public.
See Arnold, Martial Law (1933) 10 ENcyc. Soc. Scrmxcas, 162, 163.
13. See Hearon v. Calus, 183 S. E. 13, 20 (S. C. 1935).
14. See HALE, HIsTORy OF =s COmmoN LAw (Runnington's ed. 1820) 42: "For always,
preparatory to an actual war, the kings of this realm . . . were used to compose a book
of rules and orders for the due order and discipline of their officers and soldiers, together
with certain penalties on the offenders; and this was called martial law." See further
1 BL. Comm. 413; CLODE, MIrARY Amsr .L'.TIA LAw (1874) c. 1; DAvis, M=,A ny LAw
(3d ed. 1913) c. 1 and 2; Pollock, What is Martial Law? (1902) 18 L. Q. RaM. 152;
Holdsworth, loc. cit. supra note 12.
15. See 2 Muz, A Camc CoNsTrruTnoNAr. LAw (1889) 930, 944, 949; 2 Wmruntop,
MIIARY LAw (1886) 18 et seq., and 37 et seq.; B1nuarrm, MLmTARY GOv'.=.n=.T AND
MARTAL LAW (3d ed. 1914) c. 1 and 2. Note that none of the instances of "martial law"
cited by these authorities have their locus within the United States or England.
Military government has been aptly designated "the law of hostile occupation." Dmas,
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tion of the army, and can never be extended over non-military persons.10 Mili-
tary government, on the other hand, knows no distinction between soldier and
civilian; it applies alike to all persons within the territory subject to its
dominion.17 A concomitant of war, it is generally recognized as depending upon
the mere arbitrary will of the military commander in the field, exercised accord-
ing to the laws and usages of war.1 8  It received its most extensive application
in this country during the occupation by Union Forces of the Southern States
in the Civil War. As the Union Army penetrated into the South, substitutes
for the hostile civil governments which it overthrew were necessary; and as no
power was left but the military, it was allowed to govern by martial law.10
Use of the same phrase to describe the current employment of military force
to abate domestic disorder has led some courts to equate the disturbance
occasioning the summoning of troops with a state of international war.20 Civil
war precedents for martial rule21 are relied upon to analogize the power of the
Governor and the State militia over a local district to the war-time power of the
President and the Federal troops over the territory of the invaded SoUth.22
Constitutional guarantees in the affected area are said to be abrogated2 3 the
status of belligerency is attached to the citizens therein,24 and the will of the
Governor, as the military chief, is exalted as the controlling authority in the
theater of "war." 25
M=ARY LAW (3d ed. 1913) 300. See discussion of martial law in New Orleans after
its capture by Union forces in 1862. Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158 (1879).
16. "For others who had not listed with the army, had no colour or reason to be
bound by military constitutions, applicable only to the army, whereof they were not parties."
HALE, loc. cit. supra note 14. Wise v. Withers, 7 U. S. 331 (1806); In re Reynolds, Fed.
Cas. No. 11,721 at 592 (N. D. N. Y. 1867); Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N. Y. 1815).
Several state constitutions declare that no person shall be subjected to "martial law"
except the army, navy, or militia in active service. SrmsO , op. cit. supra note 1, § 293.
17. See United States v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754, 761 (E. D. N. Y. 1920).
18. See United States v. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 520, 526 (1875); In re Egan, Fed. Cas.
No. 4,303, at 367 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1866); 8 Op. Att'y-Gen. 365, 369 (1857).
19. See Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158 (1879); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2, 127
(1866); 2 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW (1886) 46 et seq.
20. United States v. Fischer, 280 Fed. 208 (D. Neb. 1922); State v. Brown, 71 W.
Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243 (1912); Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567 (1913); cf. Regina v. Frost,
9 Car. & P. 129 (1839).
21. Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158 (1879); United States v. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 520
(1875); New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 87 U. S. 387 (1874); The Grapeshot, 76 U. S.
129 (1869); In re Egan, Fed. Cas. No. 4,303, at 367 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1866). None
of these cases deals with state power.
22. See, e.g., Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va., 567, 574, 594, 77 S. E. 1029, 1032, 1041 (1913).
23. See State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 521, 522, 77 S. E. 243, 244 (1912).
24. See Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 605, 606, 77 S. E. 1029, 1045 (1913).
25. See United States'v. Fischer, 280 Fed. 208, 210 (D. Neb. 1922); State v. Brown,
71 W. Va. 519, 521, 77 S. E. 243, 244 (1912). State v. Swope, 38 N. M. 53, 28 P. (2d)
4 (1933), and Commonwealth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 Aft, 952 (1903) would also
seem to support this view. Cf. the British cases which hold that once a state of war
justifying martial law is established to the court's satisfaction, it has no jurisdiction,
durante bello, to interfere with the action of the military authorities. Rex (Garde) v.
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Other courts, attacking as pernicious any doctrine involving the suspension
of the Constitution and the supremacy of the military power, refuse to recog-
nize that "martial law" in the above sense can have any lawful existence within
the confines of states adhering to the National Government.20 The Executive
is held to summon the militia merely as a sort of supplementary police in order
to aid the civil administration in the execution of the laws.27 Only under the
civil authority do the troops act, with no more power than the law gives to
regularly constituted peace officers.2 7  Military measures are held at all times
subject to judicial review and injunction.28
The extreme war-time theory of executive military action
has been the subject of severe criticism. 09 Domestic "insurrection" is not
Strickland, [19211 2 Ir. Rep. 317; Ex parte Marais (1902] A. C. 109. But see Egan v.
General Macready [1921] 1 Ir. Rep. 265; The King (O'Brien) v. Military Governor [1924]
1 Is. Rep. 32. Note that the locus in quo of none of these cases is within the
realm of England, and that the early English cases dealing with the duty of magistrates.
to quell riots and rebellions by military force within the realm of England did not talk
in terms of "war" or "martial law." See cases cited supra note 1.
26. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2, 120-126 (1866); Constantin v. Smith, 57 F. (2d)
227, 236, 237 (E. D. Tex. 1932); Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N. V. 278
(1924); Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 242, 243, 134 S. W. 484, 488 (1911). Still other
courts have left the question open. Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D.
Minn. 1934); In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 169, 85 Pac. 190, 194 (1905). But see Chase,
C. 3., concurring, in Ex parte Mlilligan, 71 U. S. 2, 132 (1886).
27. See Constantin v. Smith, 57 F. (2d) 227, 238 (E. D. Tex. 1932); County of
Christian v. Merrigan, 191 I1. 484, 61 N. E. 479 (1901); Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. 121, 140
(1355); Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N. W. 273 (1924); Allen v. Gardner,
182 N. C. 425, 427, 109 S. E. 260, 261 (1921); In re Smith, 14 N. P. (N. S.) 497 (Com.
Pl. Ohio 1913); State v. Coit, 8 Ohio Dec. 62 (Com. PL 1898); cf. In re Moyer, 35 Colo.
159, 85 Pac. 190 (1905); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 462, 143 Pac. 947, 951 (1914).
But see State v. Swope, 38 N. M. 53, 28 P. (2d) 4 (1933); Commonwealth v. Shortall,
206 Pa. 165, 55 Ati. 952 (1903).
The statutes authorizing the Governor to order out the militia generally provide that
they be called out "in aid of the civil authorities." See, e.g., CoLo. A,:;. Sr,%. (Mills, 1930)
§ 4813; ILL. Rv. STAT. AsiN. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 129, § 194; L%. Grex. Sr,%r. (Dart,
1932) § 4574; N. Y. Am. LAw (1916) § 115.
28. Constantin v. Smith, 57 F. (2d) 227 (E. D. Tex. 1932); aff'd, Sterling v. Constantin,
287 U. S. 378 (1932); Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, No. 2909 Eq. (D. Minn. Feb. S,
1936); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (S. D. Ind. 1935); United States v. Adams,
26 F. (2d) 141 (D. Colo. 1927); Hearon v. Calus, 183 S. E. 13 (S. C. 1935); Allen v.
Oklahoma City, 52 P. (2d) 1054 (Okla. 1935); Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 162 Okla.
216, 19 P. (2d) 562 (1933). See Ex parte Moore, 64 N. C. 802, 808 (1870); In re Kemp,
16 Wis. 359, 371 (1863).
29. See ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2, 120-126 (1866); Constantin v. Smith, 57 F.
(2d) 227, 240, 241 (E. D. Tex. 1932); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 474, 476, 143 Pac.
947, 953, 954 (1914); Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 309, 200 N. W. 278, 281 (1924);
Woodbury, J., dissenting, in Luther v. Borden, 48 U. S. 1, 48 (1849); Steele, J., dizsenting,
in re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 170, 85 Pac. 190, 194 (1905); Robinson, J., dissenting, in
State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 527, 77 S. E. 243, 247 (1912); Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va.
567, 609, 77 S. E. 1029, 1047 (1913); Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 774, 81
S. E. 533, 539 (1914). See further 3 WILLouGHBY, Co.srruryo:.AL L.w (1929) 1605;
FAmssssN, LAW OF MARdAnn RUiE (1930) 152-157; Ballantine, Unconstitutional Clims of
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war. 0 War is- an act of sovereignty, which makes enemies of the inhabitants
of the contending states, and creates the rights and duties of belligerency.8 1
Insurrection, on the other hand, lacks political form, and does not change the
legal relations between its participants and the government.8 2  Moreover,
doubts have been expressed whether a state may wage war at all.y8 On the
other hand, the theory which restricts military power over domestic disturbances
to that of civil peace officers has been said to be more in accord with state
constitutional provisions that the military shall be forever subordinate to the
civil authority. 4
II
But however at variance with one another these theories may be, they seem
to break down upon analysis into merely two divergent methods of reasoning
by which courts reach similar results. All courts start from the premise that
it is necessity which alone justifies gubernatorial military action.85 As to the
measures which may be taken for abatement of the disturbance or the preserva-
tion of order the Governor is allowed a wide range of discretion. 0 Those
Military Authority (1914) 24 YA L. J. 189; Note (1921) 5 MINN. L. Rsv. 540. But
see Shumaker, Martial Law to Suppress Domestic Disorder (1923) 26 L. Norrs 225;
Wallace, Martial Law (1917) 8 Joui. Camr. L. 167.
30. See In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 474, 143 Pac. 947, 953 (1914); Woodbury, J.,
dissenting, in Luther v. Borden, 48 U. S. 1, 48, 70, 75 (1849); Fairman, Martial Rule and
Suppression of Insurrection (1929) 23 ILL. L. REv. 766, 770.
31. See Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158, 164 (1879); United States v. Dieckelman, 92
U. S. 520, 525 (1875).
32. See In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 474, 143 Pac. 947, 953 (1914). Here analogy
to the Civil War fails. The Southern States set themselves up as a separate political entity
and were recognized as such. They were granted belligerent rights; the people of the Union
and those of the Confederacy became enemies to each other; and commercial intercourse
between them was prohibited. Thus the territory embraced by the Confederacy cannot
be said to have been domestic. See Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158, 164 (1879); Prize
Cases 67 U. S. 635 (1862).
33. See U. S. Cousr. Art. I, § 10; Commonwealth v. Blodgett, 53 Mass. 56, 81, 82
(1846); Underhill, Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals (1924) 12 CALir. L. Ray. 75, 159,
168 et seq. At least one state has held that the Federal Government alone may recognize
belligerent rights. Price v. Poyntexr, 64 Ky. 387 (1866) ; Bell v. Louisville and Nashville Rr,
Co., 64 Ky. 404 (1866).
34. STniSON, op. cit. supra note 1, § 292. In one state, martial law, "in the sense of
the unrestricted power of military officers or others, to dispose of the persons, liberties
or property of the citizen," is declared to be "inconsistent with the principles of free
government, and is not confided to any department" of the state government. T=NN.
CONST. Art. I, § 25.
35. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 767, 81 S. E. 533, 536 (1914); Druecker
v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621, 630 (1867); 8 Op. Att'y-Gen. 365, 374 (1857).
Analogy has been made to the common law right of an individual to self-defense. See
In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 612, 57 Pac. 706, 707 (1899); State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519,
521-523, 77 S. E. 243, 244 (1912).
36. See e.g., Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355, 360 (S. D. Ind. 1935); Powers Mercantile
Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D. Minn. 1934); State v. Swope, 38 N. M. 53, 57,
28 P. (2d) 4, 7 (1933).
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measures which courts find reasonably necessary and substantially related to
the attainment of that object are upheld, either upon a direct assignment of
these grounds,37 or upon the theory that the court cannot interfere with the
controlling authority of the Executive, as the military chief.38 On the other
hand, where courts can discover no necessity to justify the military measures
undertaken, such action is enjoined, either for the reason that it is beyond the
constitutional power of the Governor9" or violates due process of law,40 or,
where the court has adopted the war-time military government approach, upon
the ground that there is no actual "martial law." 41
That the fundamental difference between the two doctrines is one merely
of argumentative technique is revealed by an examination of the treatment
which courts have accorded to military measures undertaken by the Governor
in suppressing domestic disturbances. The cases resolve themselves into two
broad categories: (1) those involving military infractions of property interests,
and (2) those concerned with invasions of interests of personality.
In the summer of 1934, violence arising out of the Minneapolis truck drivers'
strike prompted the Governor of Minnesota to send troops into the City. His
ensuing military order, restricting the movement of trucks to those operated
by employers acquiescing in a strike settlement plan, was attacked by recalcitrant
truck owners, who sought to enjoin the order as a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law. Although asserting its authority to enjoin arbitrary
and capricious acts of the Executive, the Federal District Court refused that
remedy upon a finding that the facts of the situation justified the call to the
troops and that the order could not be said to be unrelated to the necessities of
the occasion or to fall outside the range of Executive discretion.4 2
Twenty years previously, during a desperate coal miners' strike in West Vir-
ginia, the Governor of that State ordered out the militia and suppressed an in-
flamatory Socialist newspaper which, he alleged, was thwarting his efforts to effect
a compromise. In a suit for damages brought after the return of order, the West
Virginia Supreme Court, which two years before had announced an extreme war-
37. Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934); Dakota Coal Co.
v. Fraser, 883 Fed. 415 (D. N. D. 1919); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947
(1914); see Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 609, 161 Pac. 164, 166 (1916); d. Hatfield
v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533 (1914).
38. In re Boyle, 6 Idaho, 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899); State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519,
77 S. E. 243 (1912); Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1913).
But only so long as the executive does not exceed his constitutional power. In re
Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 85 Pac. 190 (1905); Drucker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621, 631 (1867);
c. Hawkins v. Governor, 1 Ark. 570 (1839) and the British cases cited supra note 25.
See Note (1933) 33 Cor. L. RLy. 152, 153.
39. Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, No. 2909 Eq. (D. Mlinn. Feb. 5, 1936); Hearon
v. Calus, 183 S. E. 13 (S. C. 1935).
40. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932); United States v. Adams, 26 F. (2d)
141 (]D. Colo. 1927); Russell Petroleum v. Walker, 162 Okla. 216, 19 P. (2d) 582 (1933);
and cases cited supra note 39.
41. Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, 10S S. E. 428 (1921); d. The King (O'Brien)
v. Military Governor [19241 1 Ir. Rep. 32.
42. Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. mnn. 1934), noted in Vol. 3,
No. 3 (1934) Iar. Juam. Ass'N. BuL. S.
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time doctrine of "martial law," sustained the Executive's action, but upon the
basis that he had rehsonable grounds for his bona fide belief that the necessity
therefor existed, and that he had acted within the limits of his constitutional
powers.43  While this West Virginia case is the only one concerning military
invasions of property interests in a jurisdiction which purports to clothe its
Executive with supreme war-time powers, the clear implication of the decision
is that military measures not undertaken in good faith, and unsupported by
necessity, would not escape the sanction of the law.44 Upon these grounds, other
courts, which reject the West Virginia theory of extreme war-time powers, have
condemned military infractions of property rights. Thus, when the Governors
of Texas and Oklahoma promulgated declarations that insurrections existed in
their respective states and summoned forth the troops to enforce oil proration
orders, their military measures were promptly enjoined as being unjustified by(
any exigency and as constituting deprivations of the oil operators' properties
without due process of law.45  In January, 1936, the Governor of Minnesota
again sent troops into the City of Minneapolis, at the instance of its Mayor, to
prevent the violence which threatened to arise from a strike at the plant of the
Strutwear Knitting Company. As the most effective means of preventing riot,
the troops proceeded to close the plant. But the same court which, in the truck
drivers' strike two years previously, had denied the injunction sought by truck
owners, 42 now enjoined the Governor and the troops from interfering with the
right of the Company to the use of its property, on the ground that, by the closing
of the plant, the Company was deprived of its property without due process of
law. The limits of executive authority were thereby transgressed. 40
Abatement of disorder often requires military action more drastic than en-
croachments upon rights of private property. Invasions of interests of per-
sonality resolve themselves into two categories: the first comprising the direct
application of force to an individual; the second concerned with his summary
arrest and detention by the military authorities. Action falling within the first
class is presented to the courts, after the passing of the exigency, in civil actions
for assault and battery or in criminal prosecutions of soldiers for murder. Ela
v. Sm7ith47 was a tort action, arising in 1855, against the Mayor of Boston and
two officers of the Massachusetts volunteer militia for an assault on the plain-
tiff. Apprehending a riot over the return to the South of a fugitive slave, the
Mayor called out the troops to clear the streets while the fugitive was being
marched to the wharf for deportation. The plaintiff, attempting to pass through
a guarded street, was pushed back and knocked down by the soldiers. The
43. Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533 (1914).
44. Id. at 766, 767, 108 S. E. at 535, 536.
45. Constantin v. Smith, 57 F. (2d) 227 (E. D. Tex. 1932), aff'd, Sterling v. Constantin,
287 U. S. 378 (1932); Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 162 Okla. 216, 19 P. (2d) 582
(1933). Similarly, the recent action of the Governor of South Carolina, in employing
the militia to oust hostile State Highway Department Commissioners, was enjoined as
depriving them of their offices without due process of law. Hearon v. Calug, 183 S. E,
13 (S. C. 1935).
46. Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, No. 2909 Eq. (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 1936). See
N. Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1936, at 1.
47. 71 Mass. 121 (1855).
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, adhering to the doctrine that the troops
were called out to aid the civil authority as "armed police" only,4 s announced
that no liability could be incurred for acts reasonable and necessary for the
clearing and guarding of the streets. However, if the force used towards the
plaintiff was excessive and unreasonable, recovery could be had. Thereupon
it sent the case back for trial. Upon the same theory the Michigan Court, in
Bishop v. Vandercook,49 held that the use of a log to ditch autos which refused
to stop for military search, constituted a wanton disregard for human life, and
sustained an award of substantial damages against the military officer who had
directed that such a measure be taken.
In Manley v. State °5 0 a member of the Texas National Guard, under orders
to keep the public out of an inclosure "at all hazards," upon the occasion of
President Taft's visit to Dallas in 1909, ran his bayonet through a man attempt-
ing to pass through the military cordon. The man died, and the soldier was
promptly prosecuted for murder. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held
that even a command to guard the inclosure "at all hazards" would not author-
ize a militiaman to kill, or otherwise to violate the law. A soldier could use
only such means as were necessary to carry out this order without taking life
or committing an assault.51 Another prosecution for murder, State V. Coilj, 2
was that of an Ohio National Guard Colonel for having ordered the militia
to fire on a mob which threatened to break in the door of a court house in an
attempt to lynch a Negro charged with rape. The Court, announcing that the
military was subordinate to the civil authority, instructed the jury that it was
the duty of the defendant to use only such force as was necessary and proper to
protect the prisoner and the public property. He could not legally take human
life in accomplishing those ends unless he had first ascertained, by such a prudent
and reasonable exercise of his faculties as the circumstances permitted, that
such action was necessary and proper. The jury were further instructed that if
the only destruction of property which was threatened was the breaking in of the
court house door, the order to fire "in case" the door were broken could not be
justified or excused on the ground that the Colonel was endeavoring to protect
the public property. He had no right to wait until the destruction had been
completed, and then to fire on the crowd. 3
These four cases were decided by courts which held the military in a position
subordinate to the civil power. But Commonwealth v. Shortal, 4 arose in a
Court which exalts the military above the civil power during times of domestic
disturbance, and which embraces the doctrine that, during their active service,
the rights and obligations of militiamen are to be judged by the standards of
actual wary5 In 1902, during a strike in the anthracite coal regions of Pennsyl-
vania, several houses occupied by non-union men had been dynamited. The
48. Id. at 140. 49. 228 Blich. 299, 200 N. W. 278 (1924).
50. 62 Tex. Crim. Rep. 392, 137 S. W. 1137 (1911).
51. Id. at 399, 137 S. W. at 1141. 52. 8 Ohio Dec. 62 (Com. PI. 1897).
53. Id. at 64, 65.
54. 206 Pa. 165, 55 Ad. 952 (1903). See Roberts, The Case of Private Wadsworth
(1903) 51 Am. L. RrG. 63, 161.
55. 206 Pa. 165, 170-174, 55 Adl. 952, 954-956 (1903).
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Governor sent troops into the district, and a guard was placed at a house which
had been dynamited two nights before, and which was ocupied by a woman and
four small children. Orders were given to shoot if any attempt to dynamite was
made or if suspicious characters ventured close. Near midnight a sentry dis-
covered a man approaching. Four times he called him to halt. The man, un-
heeding, opened the gate and turned into the yard of the house. The sentry shot,
and killed. Upon a writ of habeas corpus directed to the sheriff who was holding
the slayer for criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ordered
his discharge. It was found that the order to shoot was a precautionary measure,
and that the sentry had reasonable cause to believe in the necessity for action
under it.
Any real difference between the decision in Commonwealth v. Shortall, by a
Court which subordinates the civil authority, and the cases which limit the power
of the militia to that of civil police only, is difficult of perception. All the deci-
sions seem to be governed by the same rules of law-the ordinary principles of
tort and criminal liability. Nor does any distinction seem to be made on
the ground that the actor was a soldier." The premise upon which the cases
appear to be based is that in times of national peace a militiaman has no more
privilege to take human life than any other officer or citizen.57 In general, this
privilege may be exercised only as a defensive measure, where the actor has
reasonable cause to believe that it is necessary in order to prevent death or
serious bodily harm to himself or to those whom he is protecting. In Common-
wealth v. Shortall the soldier was guarding a house and its occupants from
an anticipated dynamiting; in State v. Coit he was protecting a Negro from
a lynch mob.
The converse of this principle is that there is no privilege to take human
life where there is no threat of death or serious bodily harm.58 Accordingly,
it would appear doubtful whether the aggressive tactics of modern militias in
attacking crowds of strikers is justifiable. Such aggressiveness cannot be
condoned as a precautionary measure.5r Furthermore, since strikers, unless
provoked, seldom threaten death or serious bodily harm to persons, military
aggressiveness with deadly weapons would not seem justifiable on that score.
56. The fact that one is a member of the military does not give him a license to
do those things which a civilian cannot do. Allen v. Gardner, 182 N. C. 425, 528, 109
S. E. 260, 262 (1921). See Lord Chief Justice Tindal's charge to the Bristol Grand Jury,
Jan. 2, 1832, in the note to Rex v. Pinney, 5 Car. & P. 254, at 261.
57. See Manley v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. Rep. 392, 400, 137 S. W. 1137, 1141 (1911);
Rex v. Pinney, 5 Car. & P. 254, 270.
58. See Manley v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. Rep. 392, 400, 137 S. W. 1137, 1141 (1911);
State v. Mills, 6 Penn. 497, 502, 69 AUt. 841, 843 (Del. 1908); BURDICx, ToRTs (1913)
59 et seq.; HARPER, ToRTs (1933) c. 4; Bohlen, The Privilege to Protect Property (1926)
35 YALE L. J. 525.
59. In this respect, the instruction in State v. Coit, 8 Ohio Dec. 62 (Com. PI. 1897),
made a fine distinction between shooting as a protective device, and otherwise. To wait
until the destruction had been completed, and then to fire on the crowd, could not be
said to constitute defensive conduct. See report of the two "fierce battles" between Ohio
National Guardsmen and strikers, at the Electric Auto-Lite plant, Toledo. N. Y. Txmts,
May 25, 1934, at 1.
[Vol. 45
96]COMMENTS
In this respect, the second instruction in State v. Coit should have gone further
than it did. Aside from the question of protecting the Negro, the threat of
breaking in the court house door, of itself, could not warrant an order to fire.
While reasonable measures may be taken for the protection of property, it can
seldom be said that the taking of life constitutes one of them. 0 Nor is this
less true where militias are employed to guard factories from the stones and
bricks of menacing strikers. Since the objects of destruction are generally
limited to windows and doors, the social desirability of preventing their loss
must outweigh the right of a human being to his life, before orders to fire under
such circumstances would be justifiable. But it would appear to be conceded
that no interest which is merely one of property can be equal or superior to
the interest which both individual and society have in life and limb.01
More common as a means of abating disorder than the direct application
of force is the arrest without warrant and temporary detention by the military
authorities of those suspected of inciting or participating in the violence.
Military officers often believe that the confinement of such participants is
essential for the successful suppression of the disturbances. During the great
textile strike of 1934, for example, National Guardsmen, summoned by the
Governor of Georgia, arrested approximately 200 pickets and interned them in
a concentration camp until termination of the strike.
2
The question of the legality of such arrests is raised, during the period of
military activity, by writs of habeas corpus. Approaches to the problem
have varied according to the theories of gubernatorial military power which
the courts have adopted. Courts which view the use of troops as inaugurating
war-time military government have sustained military arrests either upon the
theory that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, or that
the Executive has power to ignore it.63 Other courts reject this view as contrary
to constitutional principles, 4 but reach the same result upon the ground of
60. See State v. Alls, 6 Penn. 497, 69 At]. 841 (Del. 1908); State v. Taylor, 143 Mo.
150, 44 S. W. 785 (1898).
61. See Bohlen, supra note 58, at 528. 62. N. Y. Tnrus, Sept. 17 to 23, 1934.
63. In re Boyle, 6 Idaho, 609, 57 Pac. 706 (IS99), State v. Swope, 38 N. l. 53, 28 P.
(2d) 4 (1933); State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243 (1912); Ex parte Jones,
71 W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1913); cf. Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (S. D. Ind.
1935); In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 85 Pac. 190 (1905); Fairman, Law of Martial Rule
(1928) 22 AM. POL. SCL RV. 591, 609. But see Ex parte Vallandigham, Fed. Cas. No.
16,816 at 874 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1863).
64. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, d. 2. By the Constitutions of most states, the writ of
habeas corpus can only be suspended where, in cases of rebellion or invaison, the public
safety requires it. Some state constitutions provide that it can never be sup2nded in any
case. S1 ntsozN, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 126, 127. It is now generally conceded that the
writ can be suspended only by the legislature, and not by the executive. See Ex parte
Bollman and Swartout, 8 U. S. 75, 101 (1807); Ex parte Merryman, Fed. Cas. No. 9,487
at 144 (C. C. D. Md. 1861), McCall v. McDowell, Fed. Cas. No. 8,673 at 1235 (C. C. D.
Calif. 1867); In re Gillis, 49 Mont. 454, 466, 143 Pac. 947, 951 (1914); Ex parte Moore,
64 N. C. 802, 808 (1370); In re Kemp; 16 Wis. 359, 380 (1863); see Brief of David
Dudley Field in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2, 40, 41 (1866). Fairman, supra note 63,
at 608. But see Ex parte Field, Fed. Cas. No. 4,761 at 1 (C. C. D. Vt. 1862).
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necessity. 65 In Re Moyer65 and Re McDonald'5 the returns to the writs were
similar. Each stated that the prisoner was a leader of the insurrection-a
strike-that his arrest was necessary for its successful suppression, and that
he would be released from military arrest as soon as that safely could be done.
Upon such a showing the internments were sustained as reasonable measures
within the discretion of the Executive and the military authorities under him,
and as having direct relation to the suppression of the disturbance which the
militia had been summoned to subdue. 6
On the other hand, in United States v. Adams.07 the Ccurt, upon a finding
that the strike disturbance was effectively handled by the civil authorities, held
that there was no justification for a summary military arrest, and discharged
the prisoner. Likewise, in Ex parte Lavinder,68 the West Virginia Court, prime
exponent of military supremacy in times of domestic disorder, 0 held that,
since there was no actual warfare or military occupation, there was no "martial
law," notwithstanding the Governor's proclamation to the contrary. Accord-
ingly, those who had been detained under military arrest were discharged. As
in the Adams Case, the disturbance was being handled by the civil authorities.
This West Virginia decision would seem to indicate that any distinction between
those cases based upon findings of reasonable necessity, and those based upon
war-time analogies is more apparent than real.
Where military arrests have been sustained, courts have been careful to
65. In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 85 Pac. 190 (1905); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454,
143 Pac. 947 (1914) ; Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621 (1867); cf. the cases cited supra
note 63. The actual holdings in all of them, except State v. Brown, would seem to rest
solely upon necessity.
See Ex parte Moore, 64 N. C. 802 (1870) where the Court said, at 807, that the arrest
and detention of the prisoner must be not only necessary, but proper, and held that it
was not proper, for it violated the Declaration of Rights.
66. Cf. State v. Swope, 38 N. M. 53, 28 P. (2d) 4 (1933) and Ex parte Jones, 71
W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1913), cited supra note 63.
In answer to contentions that such military arrests and confinements constitute restraints
of liberty without due process of law, courts adheking to both theories have pointed out
that the prisoner is neither tried by military court nor denied the right of trial by jury
nor punished for violation of the law. Thus, his detention, being merely to prevent the
prisoner's taking part in the condition which the Governor is employing the militia to
suppress, is said to violate none of his constitutional rights. In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159,
167, 85 Pac. 190, 193 (1905) ; Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 608, 77 S. E. 1029, 1046 (1913).
The speciousness of this argument would seem to be apparent. That the prisoner is
neither tried by military court nor denied the right of jury trial nor punished for crime
cannot have any possible bearing upon the question whether the restraint upon his liberty
is with or without due process of law. Nor can the purpose of the arrest change the
character of the restraint. The only relevant consideration in determining whether a
deprivation of liberty is or is not in accordance with due process would seem to be whether
it had been or could have been achieved through the normal channels of the lawi-by
judicial process. Before a summary arrest and confinement can be justified upon the
ground of necessity, resort to ordinary legal procedure must have become impossible. See,
generally, Hall, Arrest Without a Warrant (1936) 49 HARv. L. Rav. 566.
67. 26 F. (2d) 141 (D. Colo. 1927). 68. 88 W. Va. 713, 108 S. E. 428 (1921).
69. See State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243 (1912) and Ex parte Jones, 71
W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1913).
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indicate that they are merely precautionary measures for the prevention of
the exercise of a power hostile to the efforts of the Executive to restore order.70
They cannot continue beyond the period of the emergency. Upon its term-
ination the prisoner must either be set at liberty or turned over to the civil
authorities for trial according to law.71 Thus, the Court, in Re McDonald,
while refusing to discharge a military prisoner where the disturbance was
still in progress, granted him leave to re-apply for a writ of habeas corpus
in case his confinement should be continued beyond the period of exigency.
Nevertheless, attempts have been made by military authorities to go beyond
mere temporary detention and to punish their prisoners by sentences imposed
by military commissiohs. 72 While the West Virginia case of State v. Brown7 3
is universally cited as supporting such action, the actual holding of that case,
if obfuscating dicta may be brushed aside, was that, the territory being still
under military domination, the imprisonment ordered by the military commis-
sion was lawful. The question whether the re-establishment of order would
terminate it was left open.74 Two cases in federal district courts, however,
have sustained in their entirety sentences imposed by such bodies.7c
These two decisions can neither be reconciled with any other cases dealing
with the power of the military in domestic disturbances, nor can they be
justified upon any ground. Historically, military commissions are properly
concomitants only of war, when civil government and civil courts within the
embattled zone have been overthrown. 76 Their exercise of jurisdiction in times
of domestic disturbance would appear to be unwarranted.77 Convictions imposed
70. See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 84, 85 (1909); In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159,
167, 168, 85 Pac. 190, 193 (1905); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 466, 143 Pac. 947, 951
(1914); cf. In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899); State v. Swop-, 38 N. M. 53,
28 Pa. (2d) 4 (1933), criticized in (1933) Vol. 2, No. 7 L". Juam. A':. BuL. 8; Ex
parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1913).
71. In re Gllis, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947 (1914); Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621
(1867); see In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 85 Pac. 190 (1905).
72. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2 (1866); In re Gillis, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947
(1914); see (1933) Vol. 2, No. 7 INT. Ju~az. Ass'x. Bur.. 8. During the Georgia textile
strike, the military prisoners were "officially" awaiting trial by "court martial." They
were, however, released upon termination of the strike. N. Y. Tn&rs, Sept. 19, 1934, at 3.
73. 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243 (1912).
74. Id. at 527, 77 S. E. at 247: "We are not called upon to say whether the end of
the reign of martial law in the territory in question will terminate the sentences and upon
that question we express no opinion."
75. United States v. Wolters, 268 Fed. 69 (S. D. Tex. 1920), overruled, Constantin v.
Smith, 57 F. (2d) 227, 241 (E. D. Tex. 1932); United States v. Fischer, 280 Fed. 203
(D. Neb. 1922). Both these cases are noted in (1935) 13 Nm. L. Br, 292, 301. And
see Note (1921) 5 Mfunem. L. REv. 540.
76. DAvis, M=Ryu LAw (3d ed. 1913) 307 et seq. They were initiated in 1847, during
the war-time occupation of Mexico by the United States forces, and were extensively re-
sorted to in Confederate territory during the Civil War. See 2 Whnop, Mar.rrv - Iw
(1886) 57 et seq.
77. Neither Davis nor Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 76, cites any cas. sustaining their
jurisdiction within domestic territory acknowledging allegiance to the United States. Note
their use of the word "domestic" in referring to Confederate territory. But see supra note 32.
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by such bodies cannot be said to be so related to the suppression of disorder
that they could be sustained as precautionary measures upon the ground of
military necessity. 78 The power of punishment can be exercised alone by the
judiciary, through the means which the laws have provided for that purpose. 9
Military commissions constitute no part of the judicial system, and are governed
by no definite code.S0 Convictions of civilians within the United States in
times of national peace by such extra-judicial bodies, without trial by jury,
would appear to contravene the guarantees of both Federal and State Consti-
tutions.81 Accordingly, the weight of authority holds sentences imposed by
military commissions void, insofar as their purpose is punitive.8 2 Their
legitimate function during periods of domestic disturbance would seem to be
limited to inquiry into the necessity for temporary confinement of persons
apprehended by the military authorities as participants in the violence.8 3
III
Termination of the disturbance which the militia has been summoned to
subdue brings with it civil actions for damages against both the Governor 84 and
78. See Underhill, Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals (1924) 12 CAI.I. L. Rlv. 159, 178;
Comment (1935) 13 NEB. L. BUL. 292, 301; cf. In re Gillis, 49 Mont. 454, 476, 143 Pac.
947, 954 (1914).
79. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2, 119, 123 (1866).
80. See In re Egan, Fed. Cas. No. 4,303 at 367 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1866); Rex v. Allen
[19211 2 Ir. Rep. 241; Fa=AN, LAW OF MARTIAL RULE (1930) 197; Arnold, le. cit. supra
note 12. Military commissions are not bound by common law rules or procedure. See
Rex (Garde) v. Strickland [19211 2 Ir. Rep. 317. Nor has statute law defined their
authority or made provision as to their constitution, composition, or procedure, DAvis,
M=rARY" LAW (3d ed. 1913) 309.
81. U. S. CoNsT. Am. VI. Most state Constitutions provide that no person can be
deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law, or by the law of the
land or the judgment of his peers, and that all persons accused shall have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury. SrMrsoN, op. cit, supra note 1, §§ 130, 131. Twenty-seven
state Constitutions preserve the right to trial by jury inviolate. Id. at § 72. See Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U. S. 2 (1886); Ex parte Merryman, Fed. Cas. No. 9,487 at 144 (C. C. D.
Md. 1861); Curran, Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians (1933) 9 NoTm DAM LAWYER 26.
82. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2 (1886); Milligan v. Hovey, Fed. Cas. No. 9,605 at
380 (C. C. D. Ind. 1871) ; In re Egan, Fed. Cas. No. 4,303 at 367 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1866) ;
In re Gillis, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947 (1914). And see cases cited supra note 16;
Fairman, supra note 9, at 23. The sentences of military commissions have been sustained
however, without the boundaries of the United States. In re Kalanianaole, 10 Hawaii 29
(1895); England: Rex v. Allen [19211 2 Ir. Rep. 241; Rex (Garde) v. Strickland [19211
2 Ir. Rep. 317.
83. See Note (1913) 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996, 998.
84. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78 (1908) (Recovery denied); Hatfield v. Graham,
73 W. Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533 (1914) (same); Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621 (1867)
(same); Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161 (1774). On Feb. 24, 1936, the Strutwear Knit-
ting Company filed a suit for $101,000 damages against the Governor and the Adjutant-
General of Minnesota and the Mayor of Minneapolis, as the result of the closing of its
plant by the militia. N. Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1936, at 5. See FREUND, ADINISTRATIVE
PowERs OvER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928) 253.
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the military officers under him,85 and criminal prosecutions of soldiers for lives
destroyed. 6 As has been indicated, neither the Governor nor the military
derive any immunity from liability for their acts, whether by virtue of their
military capacity, or by their power to suppress insurrection.8 7 Nor do military
orders, per se, even though they may appear reasonable, protect a subordinate
from civil or criminal liability.88 For wrongful acts, the militiaman is re-
sponsible, whether with or without orders.
Realizing the plight of the soldier, who is "liable to be shot by court-martial
for disobedience of orders, or to be hanged by a judge and jury if he obeys,"8s
some states have sought by statute to relieve members of the militia from civil
and criminal liability for acts done in the performance of their duty in active
service 90 Such an enactment, however, has been construed so as not to exempt
85. State v. District Court in and for Shelby County, 260 N. W. 73 (Iowa 1935);
Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S. W. 484 (1911) (recovery allowed); O'Shee v. Stafford,
122 La. 444, 47 So. 764 (1908) (recovery allowed) ; Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 M Ich. 299,
200 N. W. 278 (1924) (recovery allowed); Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 161 Pac. 164
(1916) (recovery allowed); Allen v. Gardner, 182 N. C. 425, 109 S. E. 260 (1921)
(recovery allowed); cf. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U. S. 115 (1851); McCall v. McDowell,
Fed. Cas. No. 8,673 at 1235 (C. C. D. Calif. 1867); Milligan v. Hovey, Fed. Cas. No. 9,G0S
at 380 (C. C. D. Ind. 1871) ; Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142 (1867) ; Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind.
370 (1863); McLaughlin v. Green, 50 Miss. 453 (1874); Bryan v. Walker, 64 N. C. 141
(1870); Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N. Y. 1815); McConnell v. Hampton, 12 Johns.
234 (N. Y. 1815); Jones v. Seward, 40 Barb. 563 (N. Y. 1863); Wright v. Fitzgerald,
27 State Trials 759 (1799).
86. Trial of Joseph Wall, 28 State Trials, 51 (1802).
87. See State v. Coit, 8 Ohio Dec. 62 (Com. P1. 1897); Dxcmz, LAv or rim Co:.srru-
foN (1915) 285.
88. Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S. W. 484 (1911); Bishop v. Vandercooh, 228
M'.ich. 299, 200 N. W. 278 (1924) ; Allen v. Gardner, 182 N. C. 425, 109 S. E. 260 (1921) ;
cf. Ex parte Field, Fed. Cas. No. 4,761 at 1 (C. C. D. Vt. 1862); Griffin v. Wilcox, 21
Ind. 370 (1863); Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142 (1867); McLaughlin v. Green, 50 Miss. 453
(1874); Bryan v. Walker, 64 N. C. 141 (1870). The British view is similar. See Rex
(Ronayne) v. Strickland [1921] 2 IR. REP. 333, 334; Dicmz, LAw or Tim Co:.snuo:;
(1915) 299. But see McCall v. McDowell, Fed. Cas. No. 8,673 at 1235 (C. C. D. Calif.
1867); Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 161 Pac. 164 (1916).
The orders a soldier is justified in executing are confined to such as a peace officer might
execute. Franks v. Smith, supra; Bishop v. Vandercook, supra.
Where, however, the Governor or superior officer is immune from liability for orders
given, his subordinates share the same immunity. See State v. District Court in and for
Shelby County, 260 N. W. 73, 84 (Iowa 1935); Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. 121, 136 (1355);
Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa. 433, 444 (1877); Hatfield v. Graham, 73 IV. Va. 759, 773,
81 S. E. 533, 538 (1914).
See, generally, Brown, Military Orders as Civil Defense (1917) 8 JoUl. CM. L;vr 190;
Roberts, loc. cit. supra note 54.
89. DicEY, LAw or THE CoNsrnTuo (1915) 299. See I STEP=n,, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 204, 206.
90. See, e.g., Lss. AnN. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 33, § 31; NED. Comsr. STAr.
(1929) c. 55, § 150; N. Y. lmr. LAW (1921) § 15. The Louisiana statute (Act No. 181,
1904) was repealed in 1912 by Act No. 191. Cf. ILL. Rnv. STAT. Aznz,. (Smith-Hurd, 1934)
c. 129, § 197; Alicm. ConoP. LUws (1929) § 671.
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a soldier from civil responsibility for his torts.90 Any other construction, it
was indicated, would have violated the state constitutional provision guarantee-
ing to every person adequate remedy by due process of law for injury done
him. 92  This decision would appear to be sound upon a broader basis. While
it may be fitting and proper to protect militiamen in the performance of their
duty, complete immunity would operate in many cases to induce in military
officers a lack of caution which would defeat the very objects for which the
troops are called out. Nor is there any valid reason why soldiers should be
clothed with an immunity which only attached to superior judges at common law.
IV
Judicial redress, however, pursued against the Governor and members of
the militia can scarcely even palliate the broader social effects of gubernatorial
resort to military action. "Martial law" has been most frequently associated
with industrial conflicts.93 The militia, summoned to suppress the violence
attendant upon a strike, has, in general, suppressed the strike itself.0 4 Exec-
utive military action is coming to replace the injunction as the strike-breaking
machine par excellence. Use of the latter has been curbed by the Norris-La
Guardia Anti-Injunction Act95 and the various state enactments modelled after
it.90 But the utilization of troops at executive command effectively abrogates
the provisions of these statutes. Yet there would appear to be no reason why
the public policy they enunciate should not bind the executive as well as the
judicial department of government. The social policy adopted by Congress
and those state legislatures which have followed its lead would seem to militate
against such a use of the military power of the state as renders these legis-
lative enactments ineffective. 97
91. O'Shee v. Stafford, 122 La. 444, 47 So. 764 (1908). The Michigan statute, supra
note 90, that troops shall be privileged from legal prosecution "except by direct order of
the Governor," was likewise held not to bar a tort recovery againit a military commander.
Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N. W. 278 (1924).
92. LA.'CoNsr. Art. I, § 6. Most state constitutions have such or similar provisions.
STMsoN, "op. cit. supra note 1, § 70. Cf. Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 306,
200 N. W. 278, 280 (1924).
93. See VALTER WILsoN, THE Mm= (1935).
94. See, e.g., how the Georgia National Guard, during the textile strike in that state
was employed to re-open the mills, after the Governor had declared that "the right to
work must be protected." N. Y. Times, Sept. 17 to 23, 1934. Cf. the use of troops
in the San Francisco General Strike and in the Pullman strike of 1894. N. Y. Times, July'
17, 1934, at 1, 2, 3, 5. See Breaking Strikes by Martial Law (1935) Vol. 4, No. 5. INT.
JuRm. Ass'N. BUL. 1; WILSON, op. cit. supra note 93.
95. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 101-115 (1934), noted in (1932) 30 Micit.
L. Ray. 1257.
96. See, e.g., Idaho Laws (1933) c. 215; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1935) §§ 4379.5 to
4379.17; MASS. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1935) c. 149, §§ 20 A to 24; MINN. STAT.
(Mason, Supp. 1934) §§ 4260-1 to 4260-15; PA. STAT. (Purdon's compact ed. 1936) Tit.
43, §§ 202 to 205; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1935) §§ 7612-1 to 7612-19. But
see Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union, Local No. 148, 51 P. (2d) 372 (Wash. 1935).
97. At least one state, by statute, has prohibited the calling of its national guard Into
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Yet any check upon the Executive's employment of the military in labor
disputes would depend for its efficacy upon judicial review and control. And
judicial history reveals that the courts are not more likely to be jealous of
the rights of labor than the Executive." In passing upon military conduct,
however, in cases involving labor disputes, courts could well consider the
declared public policy of preserving to a large section of society the right to
maintain and raise its standards by means of the strike. Thus, where the
summary military arrest and detention of strikers is presented for judicial
review in habeas corpus proceedings, the social role of the prisoners in exercising
a right protected by the legislature, as well as their personal loss by actual
deprivation of bodily freedom, should be weighed against the military necessity
which is alleged as the cause for the confinement. This factor, which has
hitherto not been considered in cases arising out of military interference in
labor disputes, is deserving of serious attention.
THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
NoT infrequently, a person desires to invest in a non-corporate enterprise.1
In order that the return upon his investment be not limited by a fixed rate of
interest, he may wish to share in the profits of the business.2 To protect his
investment and ensure the largest possible return, he may insist upon some
participation in the conduct of the enterprise. And in addition, he may desire
that his liability for the debts of the business be limited to the amount which
he wishes to invest.
At one time, investment upon such conditions in a non-corporate enterprise
was not possible because profit-sharing alone sufficed to render the investor
liable as a general partner.3 In order to provide a means through which the
non-corporate profit-sharing investor might secure participation in the manage-
ment of the business and a limited liability, New York in 1822 enacted a statute
enabling the organization of a noil-corporate enterprise similar to the partner-
service in the event of disturbances arising from "labor trouble, strike or lockout." Nnv.
Comip. LAws (Hillyer, 1930) § 7140.
98. See FRAsxruRTi .,v GREENE THE LABOR L'rjuxcno. (1930) c. IV; Brisenden,
The Labor Injunction (1933) 48 Po.. ScL Q. 413; Note (1935) 45 YA.E L. J. 372; Norris-
La Guardia Act Bankrupted (1935) VoL 4, No. 6 Ir. Juaz. Ass',. BuT.. 7; The New
York Anti-Injunction Law in the Courts (1935) Vol. 4, No. 7 Ir. Junm. Ass'.,. BUT.. 1;
Note (1936) 36 COL. L. Rav. 494.
1. This comment assumes without discussion the existence of certain types of businEz2s
to which the non-corporate form of organization is the most suitable, as well as the desir-
ability of encouraging investment in such enterprises by allowing the investor certain priv-
ileges which he may desire. On the latter point, cf. Steffen, The Independent Contractor
and the Good Life (1935) 2 U. or CH. L. RLv. 501.
2. An arrangement of this character is also satisfactory to the management, since they
thereby avoid the ffixed charges upon the capital invested.
3. This doctrine, enunciated in the English cases of Grace v. Smith (1775) 2 W. BI. 993
and Waugh v. Carver (1793) 2 H. BI. 235 (1793), had a wide following in this country.
Rowland v. Long, 45 Md. 439 (1876); Hackett v. Stanley, 115 N. Y. 625, 22 N. E. 745
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ship "en commandite" recognized by the French Commercial Code.4 The
New York statute entitled this form of business organization a "limited partner-
ship"; 5 and other states, following the example set by New York, thereafter
enacted similar limited partnership statutes which have with little amendment
remained in force in most of these jurisdictions.6
When these statutes were drafted, and the limited partnerships formed under
their provisions first subjected to judicial scrutiny, the general idea prevailed
that those who partook of the profits of an enterprise when it prospered should
in a like manner share in its losses in the event of failure.7 The limited partner-
ship was accordingly regarded by the courts as providing a privilege specially
granted by the legislature to the profit-sharing investor.8 Therefore, any condi-
tions attached to the allowance of that privilege had to be meticulously met if
the freedom from unlimited liability which it afforded, was to be secured.0 In
(1889); MEcHm, PRRsmpsr (2d ed. 1920) 77. See also Douglas, Vicarious Liability
and the Administration of Risk Hi (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 720; Comment (1922) 22 CoL. L.
Rxv. 576.
4. See BATES, Lnenw PARTNERSm (1886) 17; 2 ROWLEY, THE MoDERN LAW or
PATNERSHp (1916) 1376; Crane, Unintended Partnership (1924) 31 W. VA. L. Q. 1, 7.
The historical background of the partnership en commandite and its introduction into New
York, is treated in Ames v. Downing, 1 Bradf. 321 (N. Y. 1850); LEv, MERCANTIz LAW
(1854) 164, 215; PoLLocx, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENc E (1882) 100. For a discussion com-
paring the partnership en cominandite of the French Code with the organization thus
introduced into this country see TROUBAT, COMMANDATARY AND LrTED PARTNERsuips IN
= UNIzD STATES (1853).
5. "An Act Relative to Partnership," Laws of N. Y., 45th Sess., Ch. ccxliv. p. 259
(April 17, 1822). The adoption by New York of the limited partnership from the French
Commercial Code is the first instance of the introduction of a statute into the United
States, that was not of British origin. 3 KENT, Comm. *36.
6. BATES, supra note 4, at 21. Louisiana and Florida, since they originally were not
English Colonies, always had some form of organization similar to the limited partnership,
PoLLocx, supra note 4, at 101. At the present time, limited partnership statutes exist in
all jurisdictions but Arizona and Florida, although the latter at one time did have such a
statute. VARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1929) 306; Lewis, The
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1917) 65 U. or PA. L. REv. 715, 716.
7. See Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. BI. 235 (1793) at 247, "He who takes a moiety of the
profits . .. shall he liable to losses ...upon the principle that by taking a part of the
profits, he takes from the creditors a part of that fund, which is the proper security to
them for the payment of their debts." See also Lewis, supra note 6, at 720.
8. The limited partner was regarded as a general partner to whom a contingent limita-
tion upon liability was allowed. In re Merrill, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,467, at 83 (C. C. N.
D. N. Y. 1874); Pres. etc. of Manhattan Co. v. Laimbeer, 108 N. Y. 578, 581, 15 N. E,
712, 713 (1888) (criticizing above concept); Vanhorn v. Corcoran, 127 Pa. 255, 268, 18
AtI. 16, 19 (1889). See also Commissioner's Note to § 1 of the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act (8 U. L. A.); BuRmic, PARTNERSH= (3d ed. 1917) 385; Crane, Are Limited
Partnerships Necessary? (1933) 17 MINN. L. REv. 351, 355.
9. See Holliday v. Union Bag and Paper Co., 3 Colo. 342, 344 (1877); Pierce v.
Bryant, 87 Mass. 91, 94 (1862); Maloney v. Bruce, 94 Pa. 249, 252 (1880); cf. Clapp v.
Lacey, 35 Conn. 463, 466 (1868); Van Riper v. Poppenhausen, 43 N. Y. 68, 73 (1870). At
a later date, some courts, notably those in New York, adopted a more liberal view and
held "substantial compliance" sufficient. They, moreover, limited the occasions for i-
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addition, the fact that the limited partnership was not of common law origin
further prompted some courts, on the ground that statutes in "derogation of
the Common Law must be strictly construed" to require rigid adherence to
their provisions.' o
These statutes generally provide that a limited partnership can be formed by
one or more general partners and "one or more persons who shall contribute in
actual cask a specific sum as capital to the common stock, who shall be called
a special (limited) partner."" In accordance with the customary strict con-
struction, a contribution in the form of goods or other property has been held not
to constitute a "cash" contribution, and the would-be limited partner, as a
result, held liable as a general partner.12  A further condition of obtaining
lirited liability under these statutes is that the persons desiring to form the
limited partnership file and publish a certificate setting forth enumerated matters
of detail.' 3  It has been held that this condition is not fulfilled, and therefore a
limited partnership not formed, when the certificate contains any false statement
even though it be minor and unintentional; 14 when the requirements for publi-
position of partnership liability because of departures from statutory provisions, to thoz2
cases wherein such a result was expressly required by statute. See Fifth Ave. Bank v.
Colgate, 120 N. Y. 381, 396, 24 N. E. 799, 803 (1890); White v. Eiseman, 134 N. Y. 101,
103, 31 N. E. 276, 277 (1892); Chick v. Robinson, 95 Fed. 619 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899).
10. See In re Merrill, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9, 467 at 83 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1874). In
Jacquin v. Buisson, 11 How. Prac. 385 (N. Y. 1855) at 393, the Common Law is called
the "strong enemy of the limited partnership!" See also Comment (1923) 36 BMw. L. REv.
1016.
11. E.g. D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 23 § 6; G.L. COonE (1933) Tit. 75 § 402. Other statutes
allow the contribution to be in property as well. E.g. CoLo. A-:. Srr. (Mills, 1930) §
5358. If a contribution in property is allowed, the amount of the contribution conziting
of property must be clearly stated and valued so as to avoid creation of impression that
the contribution was wholly in cash. Holiday v. Union Bag and Paper Co, 3 Colo. 342
(1877); Vandike v. Rosskam, 67 Pa. 330 (1871); Maloney v. Bruce, 94 Pa. 249 (1850)
(requirement of itemization and evaluation of specific articles of property). See al-o
BATEs, supra note 4, at 55 et seq.
12. McGinnis v. Farrelly, 27 Fed. 33 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886) (check not cashed by
time of filing of certificate not sufficient "cash" contribution); Pierce v. Bryant, 87 Mass.
91 (1862) (promissory notes); Haggerty v. Foster, 103 Mass. 17 (1869) (United States
Government bearer bonds); Myers v. Edison General Electric Co., 59 N. J. Law 153, 35
AtL 1069 (1896) (post-dated check); Durant v. Abendroth, 69 N. Y. 148 (1877) (post-
dated check). But cf. White v. Eiseman, 134 N. Y. 101, 31 N. E. 276 (1894). Generally,
the means by which the sums contributed were obtained, were held immaterial. In re
Rasmussen, 287 Fed. 860 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Webster v. Lanum, 137 Fed. 376 (C. C. A.
2d, 1905); see Crehan v. Megargel, 234 N. Y. 67, 78, 136 N. E. 296, 299 (1922). But d.
Buckley v. Bramhall, 24 How. Prac. 455 (N. Y. 1863).
13. E.g. M osr'. R v. CODE A,... (Choate, 1921) §§ 8027, 8028, 8029, 8030, 8031, S032.
The requirements concerning the nature of the certificate were very strictly construed and
generally in favor of the third party creditor. See Holliday v. Union Bag and Paper Co.,
3 Colo. 342, 345 (1877); Haddock v. Grinnell Mfg. Co., 109 Pa. 372, 381, 1 At. 174, 176
(1885). See also BAT.s, supra note 4, at 56.
14. Lineweaver v. Slagle 64 Md. 465, 2 AUt. 693 (1886); Van Ingen v. Whitman, 62
N. Y. 513 (1875); Spencer Optical Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 53 S. C. 533, 31 S. E. 392 (1893).
See also cases cited note 12 supra. The following excerpt from Durant v. Abendroth, 69
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cation are not satisfied; 15 and when there has been a failure properly to renew
the certificate upon its expiration.'"
The limited partner under these statutes is expressly allowed to share in the
profits of the business.' 7  But if the sums paid the limited partner later appear
to have been a withdrawal of his contribution, although at the time of payment
they seemed to constitute permissible compensation, it has been' held that the
limited partner is liable to creditors at least for the amount so "withdrawn." ' ,,
Similarly, the statutes expressly permit participation by the limited partner in
the conduct of the business, to the extent of inspection of the partnership books
and consultation with the general partners. However, usually by the same
section of the statute, the transaction of any partnership business by the limited
partner is forbidden, and if he "interfere(s) contrary to these provisions,"
then he "will be deemed a general partner."'19 The construction of such pro-
N. Y. 148 (1877) at 154 is typical: "The parties made a careless, though no doubt
innocent mistake; but they failed to comply with the statute and the special (limited)
partner is therefore deprived of its protection."
15. Smith v. Argall, 6 Hill, 479 (N. Y. 1844) aff'd 3 Denio 435 (N. Y. 1846); cf. Madi-
son County Bank v. Gould, 5 Hill 309 (N. Y. 1843); Bowen v. Argall, 24 Wend. 496 (N.
Y. 1840); Metropolitan National Bank v. Sirret, 97 N. Y. 320 (1884).
16. Statutes generally provide that at the expiration of the certificate, a renewal cer-
tificate must be filed, meeting certain requirements. See e.g. MONT. Rav. CODE ANN.
(Choate, 1921) § 8033. See Haddock v. Grinnell Mfg. Corp., 109 Pa. 372, 1 Atl. 174
(1895). (repetition of statements contained in original certificate insufficient when original
capital has been impaired); Strang v. Thomas, 114 Wis. 599, 91 N. W. 237 (1902) (failure
to certify and record renewal certificate made partnership general). But cf. Fifth Ave.
Bank v. Colgate, 120 N. Y. 381, 24 N. E. 799 (1890).
Another typical provision, which has also often resulted in imposition ofgeneral partner-
ship liability, is that any "alteration" in the names of the partners, or the nature of the
business, or the capital thereof will result in the "dissolution of the limited partnership,"
unless a renewal certificate is filed. See e.g. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 3268; Beers
v. Reynolds, 11 N. Y. 97 (1854); Andrews v. Schott, 10 Pa. 47 (1848) (change of mem-
bership) ; cf. Singer v. Kelly, 44 Pa. 145 (1863) (limited partner not held liable because
of "alterations" effected by general partners, of which he was ignorant and in no way
responsible).
17. E.g. Omo GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) § 8048.
18. See, e.g., Omo GFs. CODE (Page, 1931) § 8049: "If it appears that, by the pay-
ment of interest or profits to a special (limited) partner, the original capital has been re-
duced, the partner receiving it shall be bound to restore the amount." Cf. N. H. Pt'n,
LAWS (1925) Ch. 156 § 7, imposing general partnership liability for withdrawals of
capital. On what will constitute a withdrawal, see BATES, supra note 4 at 103; BURDIK,
supra note 8, at 406. Intentional 'withdrawals will result in general partnership liability.
Madison County Bank v. Gould, 5 Hill 309 (N. Y. 1843).
Although the limited partner may obtain the return of his contribution on the dis-
solution of the organization the return may be held a "withdrawal" if all creditors are not
paid, even though at the time of such return, the assets were sufficient to meet all claims.
Baily v. Hornthal, 154 N. Y. 648, 49 N. E. 56 (1898); Kittredge v. Langley, 252 N. Y.
405, 169 N. E. 626 (1930) noted in (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1162; (1930) 4 ST. JoiNs L,
REv. 300.
19. See, e.g., KANSAS REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 56-116. On the permissible degree of
consultation and advice, see Ulman & Co. v. Briggs Payne & Co., 32 La. Ann. 659 (1880).
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visions has generally been that "interference" will result from an attempt to
participate further than by the exercise of the privileges specifically authorized
in the statute.2 0
The fact that any minor infractions of or derivations from the statutory
provisions would either prevent a limited partnership from being formed, or
subject the "limited" partner to unlimited liability, despite proper formation of
the limited partnership, naturally rendered the limited partnership a hazardous
means of obtaining limited liability and therefor discouraged its employment.
Thus interpreted, it was apparent that the statutes would have to be changed if
the limited partnership was to be made an attractive form of non-corporate
business organization. 2 '
Accordingly, in 1916, a Uniform Limited Partnership Act was drafted to
remedy the defects of the limited partnership as then recognized, and thereby
to establish it as a non-corporate business organization through which a profit-
sharing investor could safely obtain a limited liability and some participation
in the conduct of the business.22  In accordance with that purpose, the limited
The limited partner could generally direct the conduct of the business when the general
partners were incapacitated. Cropper & Co. v. Ilinois Sewing Machine Co., 100 AMi&. 127,
54 So. 849 (1911). The latter privilege is expressly granted in some statutes. See e.g.,
GA. CODE (1933) tit. 75, § 414. On the extent of the privilege to inspect books, see Sander-
son v. Cooke, 256 N. Y. 73, 175 N. E. 518 (1931).
20. Farnsworth v. Boardman, 131 Mass. 115 (1881) (causing transfer of firms asets
to third party); Madison County Bank v. Gould, 5 Hill 309 (N. Y. 1843) (negotiation of
purchases); First National Bank of Canandaigua v. Whitney, 4 Lans. 34 (N. Y. 1871)
(having caused transfer of all of firm assets to himself, limited partner was held liable
even for those obligations arising before transfer) ; Richardson v. Hogg, 38 Pa. 153 (1861)
(placing agent in firm as bookkeeper with general powers of superviion); Strang v.
Thomas, 114 Wis. 599, 91 N. W. 237 (1902) (firm managed largely by board of directors
chosen by limited partners). Bowes & Hall v. Holland (1857) 14 U. C. Q. B. 316; Hutchi-
son v. Bowes (1858) 15 U. C. Q. B. 156 (limited partners met as managing board); cf.
Continental Bank v. Strauss, 137 N. Y. 148, 32 N. E. 1066 (1893) (bringing of action for
dissolution held not "interference"); Lawson v. Wilmer, 3 Phila. 122 (Pa. 1858) (taking
possession of firm property after dissolution, held not "interference").
The limited partner could act with respect to the partnership as any third party, and
not "interfere". In re Terry, 5 Bliss (U. S.) 110 (N. D. Il. 1870); Ulman & Co. v. Briggs
Payne & Co., 32 La. Ann. 655 (1880); Rayne & Co. v. Terrell, 33 La. Ann. 312 (1831);
Metropolitan National Bank v. Sirret 97 N. Y. 320 (1884); Skolny v. Richter, 139 App.
Div. 534, 124 N. Y. Supp. 152 (1st Dept., 1910) (limited partner may negotiate Eales and
purchases but not to the point of binding the firm); McKnight v. Ratcliff, 44 Pa. 156
(1863) (buy from and sell to firm).
21. See In re Marcuse & Co., 281 Fed. 928, 934 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922); Kittredge v.
Langley, 252 N. Y. 405, 418, 169 N. E. 626, 630 (1930) ; Brown, The Limited Partnership
in Indiana (1930) 5 Lan. L. J. 421; Lewis, supra note 6, at 720; Comment (1923) 71 U. or'
PA. L. Ra. 150.
22. For a general discussion of the Uniform Act, its purposes and a comparison with
pre-existing statutes, see Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1917) 65 U. or
PA. L. Rv. 715. See also Commissioners' Note to § 1 of the Act (8 U. L. A.); Legis.
(1922) 22 CoL. L. Rxv. 669; W.uAx, supra note 6, at 306; Comment (1923) 2 Wis L.
Rxv. 301. The Act has been adopted in 20 jurisdictions. See Ht,uoor or NAno.,,L
CoayaaxvcE or ComarassiouNEs ox Umrriom STATE L.,ws (1934) 433. The manner in
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partnership, which the Act regards as an unincorporated association composed
of persons of limited and unlimited liability,23 is brought into being if there be
substantial compliance in good faith with the requirements for a certificate.2 4
And if for any reason the limited partnership has not been legally formed, any-
one who mistakenly but in good faith believed himself to have become a limited
partner, may on discovering his error avoid general partnership liability by
renouncing his interest in the profits of the business.2 5 If, however, the limited
partner knowingly makes false statements in the certificate, he is liable to
creditors for the damage caused by reliance thereon.
20
which it is enacted in some jurisdictions is criticized by Perkins, Uniformity in Uliform
Legislation (1920) 6 IowA L. BuLL. 1.
23. Although the Act calls the investor a "Limited Partner," he is "not in any sense
a partner. He is, however, a member of the association." See Commissioners' Note to § 1
of the Act (8 U. L. A.); Lewis, supra note 22, at 724.
24. 8 U. L. A. § 2 (2). A very detailed certificate is, however, required by part 1 of
§ 2. For the occasions and procedure for amending and renewing the certificate, see §§
24, 25.
The Act does not state the types of enterprise for which the limited partnership may be
used, but leaves that to the discretion of the individual jurisdictions (§ 4). Although In
some states, no business is specifically excluded [e.g. N. Y. PARImEsnn' LAw (1922) § 921,
the usual businesses excluded, if any, are banking, insurance and brokerage Cc. g. ILL. REV.
STAT. ANNr. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) Ch. 106 1/2 § 46]. The wisdom of such exclusions, may be
questioned since the greatest utility of the limited partnership would be in financial busi-
nesses where there is the possibility of very great financial responsibility. See Brown, supra
note 21, at 424.
25. 8 U. L. A. § 11. This section represents the introduction of a new concept into a
limited partnership statute, since under pre-existing statutes, the good faith of the limited
partner was generally held immaterial. See note 14, supra. The section has already received
a liberal interpretation in Giles v. Vette, 263 U. S. 553 (1924) [aff'g 281 Fed. 928 (C. C. A,
7th, 1922) sub. Nom. In re Marcuse]. It has, however, not been decided whether com-
pliance with the section requires paying back of all past profits and not merely the renuncia.
tion of the right to future profits. See Comment (1923) 36 HAiv. L. R-v. 1016; Comment
(1924) 22 Micir. L. R-v. 588; Comment (1923) 71 U. OF PA. L. REy. 150.
26. 8 U. L. A. § 6. Under the old statutes, a creditor could recover without showing
injury. See Durant v. Abendroth, 69 N. Y. 148, 152 (1877).
Liability to creditors resulting from a violation of § 6 of the Act is one of three excep-
tions to the idea otherwise prevailing under the act, that the liability of a limited partner
is always to the partnership and not to creditors. See Commissioners note to § 1. (8 V.
L. A.). For enumeration of instances of liability to the partnership, see § 17. The second
exception is in cases of a violation of § 7 by participation in control. See note 37, infra.
The third arises when, contrary to the provisions of § 5, the limited partner permits his
surname to be used in the partnership name. Then he is liable "as a general partner to
partnership creditors who extend credit to the partnership without actual knowledge that
he is not a general partner." Similar provisions forbidding the use of the limited partner's
name or "& Co." are contained in other statutes. E.g. GA. CODE (1933) tit. 75 § 412.
However, in the case of a violation of this provision, or of any other provision of these
old statutes, the knowledge of the creditor as to the purported status of the "limited"
partner was generally held immaterial. Andrews v. Schott, 10 Pa. 47 (1848); Pierce v.
Bryant, 87 Mass. 91 (1862). But cf. Tracy v. Tuffly, 134 U. S. 206 (1890) commented
upon in WARRNx, supra note 6, at 308.
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The Uniform Act dearly specifies the circumstances under which the limited
partner may receive compensation and thus obviates the possibility that seem-
ingly permissible compensation may at a later date be held a withdrawal of
capital.2 7 The problem of what constitutes a proper "cash" contribution, which
arose under the other statutes, is avoided in the Uniform Act by a provision
permitting the contribution to be in property as well as in cash.2 8 Such con-
tributions, however, may not be withdrawn except under circumstances which
are clearly indicated2 9 Contrary to the practice current in jurisdictions where
the old limited partnership statutes are still in force,3 0 the limited partner
recognized by the Uniform Act may claim as a creditor with respect to any
advances or loans made by him to the firm.31 The limited partner's interest is
expressly made assignable32 and provision is made for the effects of an assign-
mentL3 3 Accordingly, the death of the limited partner will no longer cause the
27. 8 U. L. A. § 15. Cf. note 13 supra.
28. 8 U. L. A. § 4. The term "property" is probably employed in its broadest
significance, as signifying any set of legal relations capable of transfer or sale. However,
the contribution expressly may not be in services.
29. 3 U. L. A. § 16. See Kittredge v. Langley, 252 N. Y. 405, 169 N. E. 626 (1930)
cited note IS supra (although the limited partnership was organized under the old New
York Statute, the court interprets and construes the corresponding provisions of the
Uniform Act).
30. White v. Hackett, 20 N. Y. 178 (1859); Aills v. Argall, 6 Paige 577 (N. Y. 1837);
Dunnings Appeal, 44 Pa. 150 (1863); cf. Hayes v. Heyer, 35 N. Y. 326 (1866); Matter of
Price, 171 N. Y. 15, 63 N. E. 526 (1902). Contra: Clapp v. Lacey, 35 Conn. 463 (1863).
31. 8 U. L. A. § 23(1) (a). With respect to his contribution, the limited partner may
claim only after creditors have been satisfied but before any of the general partners.
However, the degree of priority among the partners general and limited as set out in
§ 23 may be modified by an agreement inter se. Hays v. Wightman, 237 App. Div. 158, 261
N. Y. Supp. 275 (lst Dep't 1932), aff'd 261 N. Y. 70S, 185 N. E. 802 (1933). See also § 12
which permits one person to be both a general and a limited partner, dizcus:ed in Lewis,
supra note 22, at 725.
32. 8 U. L. A. § 19. Some of the older statutes also made the limited partner's in-
terest assignable. E.g. Ism. STAT. A=. (Bums, 1926) § 12158.
The question arises whether the drafters of the Uniform Act should have made pro-
vision for a limited partnership, in which the interest of the limited partner is represented
by shares that are freely transferable. A partnership "en coinmandite, of that type was
recognized in the French Commercial Code in addition to the one adopted by New York. The
Partnership with transferable shares was, however, deliberately encluded when the original
New York statute was drafted. See Ames v. Downing, 1 Bradf. 321, 330 (N. Y. 1850).
Perhaps, by not incorporating this second form of limited partnership, the drafters of the
Uniform Act have narrowed the field of operation of the limited partnership. However,
a recent case has demonstrated that it may be possible to create a limited partnership with
transferable shares by putting the trustee of a business trust in the position of limited
partner. Crehan v. Megargel, 234 N. Y. 67, 136 N. E. 296 (1922) discusced in WnxnoTno
Ton, Un2Oa0coRAz AssociATio.Ns AND Busnrass TRusTs (1923) 93, 96 and criticized in
WAPR~n, supra note 6, at 311. See also Comment (1922) 22 CoL. L. Rnv. 576; cf. Com-
ment (1922) 8 Coin. L. Q. 90, 93.
33. 8 U. L. A. § 19. The assignee does not acquire all the rights and privileges of the
limited partner, unless all the other members of the firm consent to his becoming a 'sub-
stituted limited" partner, and the certificate is duly amended in accordance with the
provisions of § 25.
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dissolution of the firm.34
Unlike the other sections of the Uniform Act, those provisions dealing with
the extent to which the limited partner may participate in the management of
the partnership without incurring unlimited liability, are quite vague85 In
Section 10, the Act enumerates the "rights" of the limited partner, namely, the
right of access to the partnership books, full information concerning partnership
affairs, and the right to dissolution and winding up by decree of court.8 0 And
in Section 7, it is provided that the limited partner "becomes liable as a general
partner (when) in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited
partner, he takes part in the control of the business."3 7  But nowhere in the
Act is the term "control" defined, and commentaries upon the Uniform Act
cast no light upon its meaning. 38 Since Section 1 has not as yet been interpret-
ed by any court, the significance of "control," as therein used, is uncertain.
Of course, under the express language of Section 7, it is evident that the
limited partner may exercise those privileges which are specifically granted him
by Section 10. It is at least arguable, however, that any privileges exercised
in excess of those expressly authorized will result in participation in "control"
within the meaning of Section 7,39 just as the "interference" sections of the pre-
existing statutes were generally interpreted to render the would-be limited part-
ner liable as a general partner whenever he attempted to participate in the man-
34. The death of a limited partner has been held to cause the dissolution of a partner-
ship formed under the old statutes. Ames v. Downing, 1 Bradf. 321 (1850) ; see Jacquin
v. Buisson, 11 How. Prac. 385, 393 (N. Y. 1855). The rights of the executor of a deceased
limited partner are given in § 21.
Under § 20 of the Uniform Act, the death, retirement or insanity of a general partner
will, with certain exceptions, dissolve the partnership.
35. The Uniform Act represents a great improvement over pre-existing statutes in the
definiteness and specificness of its provisions. See, e.g., § 18, expressly making the interest
of the limited partner personal property; § 22, setting forth the rights of the creditorg
of a limited partner; § 26, providing who are proper parties to actions; § 28, indicating
the rules of construction applicable to the Act and making inapplicable the rule that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. (See note 10, supra.)
36. 8 U. L. A. § 10. The section in part 2 provides that the limited partner is also to
have the right to compensation by way of income as provided in § 15, and to the return
of his contribution on dissolution as provided in § 16. See notes 27, 29 supra.
In § 9, the rights of the general partner in the limited partnership are expressed.
37. 8 U. L. A. § 7. The limited partner who violates the provisions of § 7 apparently
may not avail himself of the privilege offered by § 11 (see note 25, supra). See also Com-
missioners' note to § 11 (8 U. L. A.).
The analogous provisions of the English Limited Partnership Act allow the limited
partner the privilege of inspecting books and obtaining information, and provide that If the
limited partner takes part in the management of the partnership he shall be liable for all
debts and obligations of the firm incurred during that time. Tin L TED PARmsmS=
ACT (1907) 7 Edw. VII, c. 24, § 6 (1). See also LioL N-, PARTNERmSH (10th ed., 1935)
936; Burdick, The Limited Partnership in England and Amdrica (1908) 6 Mcn. L, Rn-v.
525.
38. E.g., Crane, Are Limited Partnerships Necessary (1933) 17 MN'N. L. REV. 351;
Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. REV. 715. See also
Commissioners' Notes to H8 1, 7 and 10 (8 U. L. A.).
39. Cf. Crane, supra note 38, at 363.
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agement of the business in a degree greater than that expre-sly permittedY0
This interpretation may be said to be applicable to the Uniform Act on the
ground that the "interference" provisions have in substance been reEnacted in
the Uniform Act. Although in the other statutes, the enumeration of permis-
sible privileges and the penalty for "interference" in management are generally
found in the same section, 19 the separation of similar provisions in the Uniform
Act does not seem important. The language of Section 7, namely, "in addition
to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner," incorporates by
reference the provisions of Section 10. Nor is it material that Section 7 speaks
of "liability as a general partner," whereas in the other statutes, the interfering
limited partner is "deemed a general partner." This change in language may be
said to be merely declaratory of those decisions which hold that when a "limited"
partner has failed to obtain, or lost through interference, the limitation upon
his liability, although he is thei obligated as a general partner, he is not
necessarily thereby transformed into a general partner for other purposes.O
On the other hand, however, the introduction of the term "control" as the
basis for the imposition of general partnership liability upon the limited partner
may be indicative of an intent to permit a different measure of participation
than obtains under the "interference" provisions of the preexisting statutes.
The criterion of control has comparatively recently developed into one of the
most important tests of partnership liability.41 Since the drafting of the
original limited partnership statutes, this standard has almost universally been
employed to determine partnership liability-not only that of the profit-sharing
investor,42 but of the cestui of the business trust.4a Hence, it may be main-
40. Robinson v. McIntosh, 3 E. D. Smith 221 (N. Y. 1854) (defective formation);
Whittemore v. MacDonneil, 6 U. C. C. P. 547 (1857) (interference); Tilge v. Brooks, 124
Pa. 178, 16 AtI. 746 (1889); see Abendorth v. Van Dolsen, 131 U. S. 66, 73 (1889); cf.
Hutchins v. Page, 204 Mass. 284, 90 N. E. 565 (1909) (defective formation, but limited
partner held entitled in his suit against the general partners to share in the good will of
the business on dissolution). But see Hogg v. Ellis, 8 How. Prac. 473, 474 (N. Y. 1853).
See also BATEs, supra note 4, at 89.
41. See Rowley, The Influence of Control in the Determination of Partnership Liability
(1928) 26 Mica. L. Rav. 290; Crane supra note 3, at 6; Douglas, supra note 3, at 721.
This test has also been adopted by the Uniform Partnership Act. See Commiconers' Note
to § 6 (7 U. L. A.)
42. See Steffen, supra note 1, at 516. For a rationalization of "control" as the power
to manipulate the profit differential so as to effectuate distribution of risk, see Douglas, supra
note 3, at 720 et seq. See also as representative cases, Nowell v. Oswald, 96 Cal. App. 536,
274 Pac. 423 (1929), noted (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1152; Southern Can Co. v. Sayler, 152 Md.
303, 136 AtI. 624 (1927) (lender held general partner where he was given privilege of
exclusive sale of product, power to determine payroll, and all goods manufactured -were to
be stored in his name and not moved without his consent); Martin v. Peyton, 246 N. Y.
213, 158 N. E. 77 (1927) (extensive veto power, no partnership); Austin Nichols & Co. v.
Neil, 62 N. J. Law 462, 41 AtI. 834 (1898) (lease giving lessor right to be con-ulted in
employment of servants, to place agent to keep accounts, to join in price fixing on certain
items, held not partnership agreement).
43. See Magruder, The Position of Shareholders in Business Trusts (1923) 23 Coa. L.
REV. 423; WAsmEN, supra note 6, at 382; WnIHTnrG=O=N, sura note 32 at 60 et s-q.
Here, too, the question is whether the cestuis and not the trustees may be said to b in
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tained that when the Act provides that the limited partner shall be liable as a
general partner when he takes part in the "control" of the business, the "con-
trol" referred to constitutes the same standard as that used to determine part-
nership liability apart from the Act. And if such be the interpretation of
Section 7, then the fact that the limited partner attempts to obtain a measure
of participation in the conduct of the enterprise greater than that expressly
authorized, need not necessarily subject him to unlimited liability.
It is evident that the Uniform Act represents a substantial improvement over
the preExisting statutes. Yet it is by no means clear that the limited partner-
ship for which the Uniform Act provides, presents an opportunity for invest-
ment for which there is any need at the present time. To the investor who
desires merely a share of the profits and a limited liability, the limited partner-
ship today offers no advantages that are not otherwise obtainable. For it is
now possible in almost every jurisdiction for an investor to obtain a share of
the profits of an enterprise, and yet limit his liability to the amount which
he wishes to invest.4 4 And while as a limited partner, this investor would
be assured of certain possibly advantageous restrictions upon the privileges
of the entrepreneur or general partners, and of the right under certain cir-
cumstances to force the dissolution of the partnership and obtain an accounting,
these alone, do not provide sufficient reason for becoming a limited partner.4
For, these rights, if desired, generally may be obtained through contract or
proper court action.
The profit-sharing investor who desires to participate in the management of
the enterprise, but only through the exercise of the privileges of obtaining in-
formation and inspecting books, may find it advantageous to become a limited
"control" of the enterprise. For a rationalization, see Douglas, supra note 3, at 740. See
also Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1103, at 1108, for abstracts of leading cases on what
constitutes "control."
44. The steps leading to the breakdown of the doctrine that profit-sharing conclusively
results in partnership liability are described in Douglas, supra note 3, at 720, and in LruDiaa,
supra note 37 at 52 et seq.; the cause, in Steffen, supra note 1, at 517. On the latter point see
also Eastman v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276 (1872). In some states, notably New York, the profit-
sharing doctrine was believed to be so firmly entrenched in the law of the jurisdiction that
it could be changed only by legislative action. See Hackett v. Stanley, 115 N. Y. 625, 22
N. E. 745 (1889); Comment (1922) 22 CoL. L. R-v. 576; MECI M, PARsuNmsui (2d ed,
1920) 84. This change was effected in New York by the adoption of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act: Laws 1919, ch. 408. However, the influence of profit-sharing as indicia of partner-
ship has never disappeared. Even under the Uniform Partnership Act, it still is prima
facie evidence of partnership. 7 U. L. A. § 7 (4).
45. See 8 U. L. A. § 9 (restrictions upon the rights of general partners in a limited
partnership), and § 32 of the Uniform Partnership Act (7 U. L. A. § 32) which sets forth
the occasions upon which a general partner may force a dissolution of the partnership.
The latter section has apparently been incorporated into the Limited Partnership Act by
§ 10, which says, "The limited partner shall have the same rights as a general partner
to ... (3) have dissolution and winding up by decree of court."
The justification now urged for the limited partnership in view of the modification of the
profit-sharing rule is that the limited partnership offers such degree of participation in the
conduct of the enterprise, as would otherwise impose partnership liability on the profit-
sharing investor. See Commissoner's note to § 1 (8 U. L. A.); Lewis, supra note 22, at 720,
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partner for the reason that such privileges are expressly allowed him under
the Uniform Act. 36 Indeed, commentators upon the Act have maintained that
such an investor should always become a limited partner in order to avoid any
possibility of unlimited liability.40 For, an attempt to secure such privileges
might be regarded by some courts as a contrivance to obtain the advantages
of a limited partnership without complying with the limited partnership sta-
tutes, the investor consequently being held liable as a general partner.1  How-
ever, usually the reservation of the right to information and to inspection of the
firm's books is not now held sufficient to constitute the profit-sharing investor
a partner in the enterprise.4 But the general desirability of becoming a limited
partner in such a case, both as a precautionary measure and to obtain the
privileges assured him by the Act45 must be conceded.4
In the more usual situation, however, of the investor who desires to partici-
pate further than by merely inspecting books and obtaining information, it is
questionable whether the limited partnership for which the Uniform Act pro-
vides, affords the means of securing the greatest possible degree of participation
consistent with a limited liability. Under a favorable interpretation of Section
7, the limited partner will be allowed to exercise the privileges specifically
granted him plus those which have been held not to create partnership liability
when reserved to one who has merely lent capital to the business. Hence, in
any event the sum total of the permissible privilges of the limited partner will
be equal only to that of the general investor. s And under the interpretation of
Section 7 which would restrict the permissible acts of "control" to those speci-
46. See Crane, supra note 38, at 360.
47. There are some cases, generally those in which the validity of the business trust is
attacked, where, although there is in reality no measure of participation reserved to the
cestuis, the organization is held a partnership because of participation in "control. Here
language may be found to the effect that where two or more perons associate together in
carrying on an enterprise for mutual benefit, exemption from personal liability may be
obtained only through compliance with the limited partnership or corporation statutes.
See Wells v. Mackay Telegraph Cable Co., 239 S. W. 1001, 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922);
Thompson v. Schmitt, 274 S. W. 554, 560 (Teax. Sup. Ct. 1925) noted in (1925) 39 HRnv. L.
REv. 276. Contra: Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S. W. 602 (1923). In effect,
such holdings involve a return to the doctrine that profit-sharing conlusively establishes
partnership liability. See Rowley, supra note 41, at 300; Hildebrand, The Massachuselts
Trst-a Sequel (1925) 4 TaxK. L. REV. 57.
48. Giles v. Vette, 263 U. S. 553 (1924); Petition of Williams, 297 Fed. 696 (C. C. A.
1st, 1924) cert. denied 265 U. S. 593 (1924); Martin v. Peyton, 246 N. Y. 213, 158 N. E.
77 (1927); Thillman v. Benton, 82 Md. 64, 33 AtL 485 (1895); Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Hibon, 92 Miss. 234, 46 So. 73, 18 L. R. A. (n.s.) 975 (1903); cf. Salter v. Condon, 236
Ill App. 17 (1925). But cf. Spaulding v. Stubbings, 36 Wis. 255, 56 N. W. 469 (1893).
See also Crane, Unintended Partnership (1924) 31 W. VA. L. Q. 1, 7.
49. However, the taxability of the partnership income is a factor to be considered. See
New York statute (L. 1935 c. 33), taxing the net income of all unincorporated associations.
Although under the Federal Income Tax Laws only the distributive share of each partner
is taxed, the partnership is required to file a return of income received. See 48 STAT. 730, 26
U. S. C. A. § 181 (1934); U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 181-1.
The share of the limited partner has been held taxable as income derived from a trade
or business and not income received from interest on money loaned. Parker v. Commis-
sioner of Corporations, 255 Mass. 546, 152 N. E. 34, 45 A. L. R. 13V9 (1926).
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fically authorized,39 a limited partner could not, without incurring a partnership
liability, exercise as much "control" over the affairs of the enterprise as would
be permitted him as a general investor in that enterprise.
Moreover, although under the most liberal interpretation of Section 7, the
tests as to that degree of participation which will result in the imposition of
partnership liability upon the general investor and the limited partner may be
alike in vacuo, the former may be able to acquire certain privileges which, if
exercised by a limited partner, would probably be held to violate Section 7.
Of course, the power to initiate and direct the execution of policy will result
in the imposition of partnership liability upon either the limited partner or the
profit-sharing investor.50 But the courts ha(e allowed the latter an extensive
veto power, on the ground that it constitutes security for the investment.51 In
a contract of limited partnership, the reservation of any comprehensive privi-
leges cannot so well be made to appear as securityY2 The investor is here
50. Strang v. Thomas, 114 Wis. 599, 91 N. W. 237 (1902) ("interference" case);
Southern Can Co. v. Sayler, 152 Md. 303, 136 AtI. 624 (1927) discussed in Douglas, supra
note 3, at 732. See also Rowley, supra note 41, at 301.
51. Martin v. Peyton, 246 N. Y. 213, 158 N. E. 77 (1922); Mollwo, March & Co. v.
Court of Wards, L. R. 4 P. C. 419 (1872); Cassidy v. Hall, 97 N. Y. 159 (1884). From
the point of view of the investor who desires to protect his investment and obtain the
largest possible return by curbing speculative ventures, the broad veto power Is the most
effective. The fact that such a power is permissible only where it can be made to appear as
"security" is illustrated by the opinion in Martin v. Peyton, supra.
52. Since "partnership" is not a fixed concept, but more often the means of expresing
the result reached, namely unlimited liability, it is of importance that an attempt be made
to keep the court from thinking in terms of "partnership" when the agreement is before It
for construction. This may be accomplished if the contract between "Investor" and
entrepreneur suggests a relationship that will afford "protective coloration" for the degree
of participation in the conduct of the enterprise. (Cf. Steffen, supra note 1, at 520). Such
is the situation in the "lease" cases, [see, e.g., In re Owl Drug Co., 12 F. Supp. 439 (D.
Nev. 1935); Holmes v. Old Colony Rr. Corp., 71 Mass. 58 (Mass. 1855); Hackney Co. v.
Robert E. Lee Hotel, 156 Tenn. 243, 300 S. W. 1 (1927). But cf. Merrall v. Dobbins, 169
Pa. 480, 32 AtI. 578 (1895); Whitney v. Ludington, 17 Wis. 140 (1863)] and in those cases
in which the creditors of an insolvent enterprise take over the management of the business,
run it and yet are not held liable as partners even for debts incurred during that period.
See, e. g., In re Hoyne, 277 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922); Wells Stone Mercantilo Co. v.
Grover, 7 N. D. 460, 75 N. W. 911 (1898) ; Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268 (1860). But ef
Purvis v. Butler, 87 Mich. 248, 49 N. W. 564 (1891); Furnace Run Saw Mill & Lumber
Co. v. Heller Bros., 84 Ohio St. 201, 95 N. E. 771 (1911). This group of cases Is rationalized
in Douglas, supra note 3, at 737.
When the reservation of a measure of participation in the management is sought tA be
justified on'the basis of the "debtor-creditor" relationship, it may be necessary that the in.
vestment of the creditor not appear to be a continuing stake in the enterprise, Cf. Hackett
v. Stanley, 115 N. Y. 625, 22 N. E. 745 (1889); Rosenfield v. Haight, 53 Wis, 260, 10 N, W.
378 (1881); San Joaquin Light and Power Corp. v. Costaloupes, 96 Cal. App, 322, 274 Pac,
84 (1929) [latter case, however, rendered before adoption in California of the Uniform
Partnership Act, see In re Mission Dairy Co., '56 F. (2d) 346 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932)]. But
cf. Waverly Bank v. Hall, 150 Pa. 466, 24 Ad. 665 (1892).
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denominated a "partner", albeit a "limited" partner, 3 and even under the
Uniform Act is by definition a co-owner of the business.' 4
STATUS OF HOLDERS OF HYBRID SECURITIES:
STOCKHOLDERS OR CREDITORS?
As a general rule corporate securities are broadly divisible into stocks and
bonds. The former normally provide for voting control, a permanent interest
in the enterprise, and an investment return contingent upon the existence of net
profits or surplus.' The latter, on the other hand do not give the holders any
voice in the management and usually provide for payment of a definite principal
amount on a certain date with specified interest in the meantime payable reg-
ularly and at all events.2 However, many modern corporations, presumably to
make investment in such companies more attractive,3 have issued "hybrid" or
"compromise" securities, purporting to combine in a single security some normal
characteristics of both stocks and bonds.4 Among such hybrid types are re-
deemable "stocks,"5 which are a corporation's agreements to repurchase its own
"stock" at a fixed time,0 and participating operation certificates, wherein a
53. The possible effect of calling the investor a "imited partner" is demonstrated in
the opinion of Evans, Circuit Judge, dissenting in In re Marcuse, 281 Fed. 928 (C. C. A.
7th, 1922) at 942, wherein he distinguishes an earlier case [In re Hoyne, 277 Fed. 663
(C. C. A. 7th, 1922)] partly on the ground that, in the latter, the parties had dezignated
themselves as "debtor and creditor," whereas in the instant case, they were called partners,
although "limited partners."
54. See 1 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (8 U. L. A. 1), defining the limited
partnership as a "partnership . . :' and § 6 of the Uniform Partnership Act, defining a
partnership as an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a businezs
for profit. See also Magruder, Stockholder's Liability in Dejcctivc Corporations (1927) 40
HAav. L. REv. 733, 736.
1. See DEwiNG, FiuNrcrm Poarcy or CoaRoexioxs (3d ed. 1934) 1S, 63; 6 Fxxrcuta
ConsoRApoNs (1917) § 3630.
At common law and today by statute stockholders can be paid dividends only out of
surplus or profits over and above the corporation's capital. See Benas v. Title Guaranty
Trust Co., 267 S. W. 28, 29 (Mlo. App. 1924).
2. See In rd Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357, 360 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); Dnwno
op. cit. suPra note 1, at 69, 75; 2 Jo.urs, Bonms (1935) § 601.
3. "In matters of investment there is much in a name'--D-vwmo, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 107.
4. See Jones, Redeemable Corporate Securities (1931) 5 So. CAx. L. REv. 83, at 97.
5. The post-war popularity of the compulsory redemption clause in non-voting preferred
stock issues has waned in recent years. See BAnara, IzvTzr.T PROCIxLES ,.D PM.c-
Ticrs (1928) 222; DzwnG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 51. A poEsIble reason for the trend
away from this device may be found in the fact that the existence of an izue of such
securities weakens a corporation's credit rating to some extent. See Jones, supra note 4,
at 88, 89.
6. Redeemable "stocks" herein referred to are those with absolute rights of redemption
and without voting rights. The majority of courts have held that the existence of net
profits or surplus is an implied condition precedent to the fulfillment of the redemption
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corporation promises to segregate a fixed portion of its gross income and to
pay the certificate holders at somewhat indefinite intervals the money so set aside
until they have received double the amount of their original investments.
Questions as to the status of holders of these securities have often arisen in
bankruptcy proceedings, where they have sought to be treated on an equal foot-
ing with unsecured creditors. Usually they have been relegated in such cases
to a position inferior to that of such creditors.8 In the future the status of
these two types of hybrids and, of more importance, others somewhat similar to
them may arise not only in ordinary bankruptcies, but also in proceedings under
77B of the Bankruptcy Act,9 where it is essential to decide whether the holders
promise. Thus enforcement has been denied in bankruptcies. Keith v. Kilmer, 261 Fed.
733 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919), cert. denied, 252 U. S. 578 (1920) ; In re Hicks-Fuller Co., 9 F.
(2d) 492 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Quinn-Marshall Co. v. McDaniels Co., 5 F. Supp. 937
(M. D. N. C. 1934). Contra: 'In re Fifty Gold Mines Corp., 190 Fed. 105 (D. Colo. 1911),
rev'd Spencer v. Smith, 201 Fed. 647 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912); cf. Durand v. Brown, 236 Fed.
609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916).
Under similar circumstances courts have reluctantly enforced such agreements where
by statute the holders were placed on a par with creditors. Mannington v. Hocking Valley
Ry. Co., 183 Fed. 133 (S. D. Ohio 1910); Heller v. National Marine Bank, 89 Md. 602,
43 Atl. 800 (1899); Williams v. Parker, 136 Mass. 204 (1884); Burt v. Rattle, 31 Ohio St.
116 (1876); cf. Cotting v. New York and New England Rr., 54 Conn. 156, 5 Atl. 851
(1886). But cf. Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 643 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929),
noted in (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 764.
7. Courts have held that holders of these securities have no rights as against general
creditors. United States & Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas & Oil Service Co., 19 F.
(2d) 624 (W. D. Penn. 1924) (fund for certificate holders had accumulated in bank);
Cities Service Refining Co. v. Go-Gas Co., unreported (D. Del.); In re Hawkeye Oil Co.,
19 F. (2d) 151 (D. Del. 1927).
Other courts have had merely to pass on the question whether such contracts gave the
holders an equitable lien either to money actually deposited in a bank or to the stipulated
percentage of the gross receipts taken in by the specified station. Such a lien has been
refused. Mass. Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Go-Gas Co., 259 Mass. 585, 156 N. E. 871 (1927),
267 Mass. 122, 166 N. E. 563 (1929), cert. denied 280 U. S. 604 (1929); Stephenon v.
Go-Gas Co., 268 N. Y. 372, 197 N. E. 317 (1935).
Holders of certain "royalty interests," similar to participating operation certificates, have
also been relegated to the non-creditor class. Bank of America National Trust Ass'n v.
Fisher, 61 F. (2d) 53 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); In re Lathrap, 61 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 9th,
1932), noted in (1933) 33 COL. L. Rav. 355; (1933) 42 YALn L. J. 782; see Comment
(1933) 6 So. CAL. L. REv. 324.
8. See notes 6 and 7, supra.
9. The problem of resolving the status of such security holders will doubtless continue
to arise in other less frequently recurring situations, such as
(1) Taxation controversies. See e.g., Arthur R. Jones Syndicate v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 23 F. (2) 833 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927); Elko Lamoile Power Co. v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 50 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); Finance & Investment
Corp. v. Burnet, 57 F. (2d) 444 (App. D. C. 1932); Hilson Co. v. State Board of As-
sessors, 82 N. J. L. 2, 80 AtI. 929 (1911); Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N. E.
496 (1890).
(2) Equity receiverships, where the problem, however, may not often arise in the
future because of the Corporate Reorganizations Act. See e.g., Storrow v. Texas Consoltdat-
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are creditors or stockholders, in order to determine whether they may file a
petition or in what capacity they may vote on any proposed reorganization'0 °
One method used by some courts in determining the status of a hybrid holder
is to analyze the stock and bond characteristics of the particular security and
upon that basis to fit the holder into the creditor or non-creditor class.1 Thus,
while redeemable "stocks" possess earmarks of bonds in having no voice in the
management and in having a provision for the absolute payment of a definite
principal sum at a fixed time, the fact that the "interest" or "dividend" pay-
ments are dependent upon net earnings or surplus, which is a usual stock fea-
ture, has been given as a reason for placing these securities in the category of
ed Compress & Mfg. Ass'n, 87 Fed. 612 (C. C. A. 5th, 1898), cert. denied 174 U. S. SOD
(1899); Bank of North America v. Pennsylvania Oil Refining Co., 216 Fed. 377 (E. D.
Penn. 1914); Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves, 8 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 2dj
1925); Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 643 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929); OlmI-
stead v. Vance & Jones Co., 196 Ill. 236, 63 N. E. 634 (1902); see Note (1933) 42 Yu.m
L. J. 1128.
(3) Cases where the issuing corporation is not in liquidation, but lacks either surplus
or net profits. See e.g., Acker v. Girard Trust Co., 42 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930);
Booth v. Union Fibre Co., 142 Minn. 127, 171 N. W. 307 (1919); Tophen, Loring &
Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735 (1928); Cross v. Beguelin, 252
N. Y. 262, 169 N. E. 378 (1929).
10. Only creditors may petition for reorganization. 48 STAT. 912, § 77B (a), 11 U. S.
C. A. § 207 (a) (1934). The term "creditors" applies only to those who have "claims,"
which in turn is defined to exclude "stock." 48 ST.%T. 912, § 77B (b) (10), 11 U. S. C. A. §
207 (b) (10) (1934).
The actual bargaining position of a group of security holders may be largely dependent
on whether they are classified as creditors or stockholders. Whereas a plan is binding on
all creditors in a particular class if accepted by two thirds of that class, the approval of a
majority is sufficient to bind a class of stockholders. Stockholders are automatically bound
by a plan if the debtor is insolvent. 48 STAr. 912, § 77B (b) (4), (5), 11 U. S. C. A. §
207 (b) (4), (5) (1934). See Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization (1935) 44
Y=r L. 3. 923, at 935.
Cases have already arisen on the question of whether stockholders, or others similarly
situated, may be petitioning creditors within the terms of the act. Most courts have
strictly construed the statute and denied such petitions. Bryan v. Welch, 74 F. (2d) 964
(C. C. A. 10th, 1935); In re Piccadilly Realty Co., 78 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935);
In re Draco Realty Corp., 11 F. Supp. 405 (S. D. N. Y. 1935); In re Arcadia Furniture
Co., 12 F. Supp. 477 (W. D. Mlch. 1935). Contra: In re Lehrenkrauss Corp., 10 F. Supp.
14 (E. D. N. Y. 1935), noted in (1935) 34 MIcu. L. REv. 114. Courts may be expected
to follow the bankruptcy rule that the liabilities of a corporation to its stockholders on
account of their stock are not corporate debts within the meaning of the act. See Curtis v.
Dade County Security Co., 30 F. (2d) 325, 326 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929).
Possibly the problem of determining hybrid holders' status may also arise in proceedings
under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. It appears that stockholders of a railroad
may not be petitioning creditors within the terms of the act. 47 STAT. 1474 (a) (b), 11
U. S. C. A. § 205 (a) (b) (1933). But while a plan must ordinarily be accepted by two
thirds of any class of creditors or stockholders, acceptance by the latter is not a requisite to
confirmation of a plan if the corporation is found insolvent. 47 STAT. 1474 (e), 11 U. S.
C. A. § 205 (e) (1933).
11. See Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves, 8 F. (2d) 716, 720 (C. C. A. 2d,
1925).
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stocks.' 2 Participating operation certificates have bond features in that no
voice in the management is given, and there is an agreement to pay a definite
sum irrespective of net profits or surplus, but they resemble stocks in that the
time of payment is uncertain. The latter characteristic, plus the absence of
an absolute promise to pay a principal sum at a definite time, have constituted
reasons given by some courts for classifying the holders of such securities in a
position inferior to that of general creditors.13 The result attained by the
courts in both hybrid types indicates that quantitatively the standard stock and
bond characteristics are inconclusive in determining a security's status, for in
both types the bond characteristics are the more numerous.14  The question
then remains whether the presence of any particular characteristic alone would
be determinative of the classification of a given hybrid security.
But an analysis of the standard characteristics reveals that prediction as to a
hybrid's status cannot be made on this basis. Some courts have held that where
the return on the investment has been made dependent upon the existence of
net profits or surplus, this factor is highly important in serving to render the
security holders inferior to general creditors.'5 Yet the inconclusiveness of
12. See In re Hicks-Fuller Co., 9 F. (2d) 492, 494 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Finance &
Investment Corp. v. Burnet, 57 F. (2d) 444, 445 (App. D. C. 1932); cf. Warren v. King,
108 U. S. 389, 398, 399 (1883) (trustees certificates). But see Best v. Oklahoma Mill Co.,
124 Okla. 135, 138, 253 Pac. 1005, 1007 (1926).
13. See Spencer v. Smith, 201 Fed. 647, 652 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912); In re Hawkoyo Oil
Co., 19 F. (2d) 151, 152 (D. Del. 1927).
14. However, some types of hybrid securities which have more stock than bond char-
acteristics have been held stocks.
Thus, holders of "stocks" to whom some sort of lien on the corporation's property has
been promised have not been permitted to enforce the lien where creditors' rights have been
involved. Hamlin v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co., 78 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897); Smith
v. Southern Foundry Co., 166 Ky. 208, 179 S. W. 205 (1915); Kinston Cotton Mills v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 185 N. C. 7, 115 S. E. 883 (1923); Hewitt v, Linnhaven
Orchard Co., 90 Ore. 1, 174 Pac. 616 (1918). For unlitigated examples, see Georgia,
Southern & Florida Rr. Co.'s 5% First Preferred Stock (mortgage); Armour & Co. of
Delaware's 7%o Preferred (principal guaranteed in the event of liquidation). The same result
might follow in negative pledge cases, where, for example, a corporation has promised Its
preferred stockholders not to issue any additional bonds without their consent. Cf. Miller
v. Ratterman 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N. E. 496 (1890). On the prevalence of such restrictive
covenants, see Daw-me, op. cit. supra note 1, at 61.
. Likewise promises to "guarantee" "dividends" to "stockholders" have been held unen-
forceable where creditors' rights have been involved. See e.g., Mercantile Trust Co. v.
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 82 Fed. 360 (C. C. D. Md. 1897); National Salt Co. v. Ingraham,
122 Fed. 40 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903); Coggeshall v. Georgia Land &I Investment Co., 14 Ga.
App. 637, 82 S. E. 156 (1914). Notwithstanding their weak legal standing, "guaranteed"
stocks may in a particular instance have a strong investment position. See MZAD, Coni'-
oRATION FnTAxcE (6th ed. 1930) 96. In the case of railway "guaranteed" stocks, this posi-
tion may be attributed to the fact that the "guaranteed" payments are treated as operating
expenses. See DEwMG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 46.
15. This may have been the decisive factor in the many cases involving the unusual type
of hybrid securities issued to stockholders upon the reorganization of the Chicago Railways
Company. The only bond characteristic found in these so-called "participation certifi-
cates" consisted in the absence of any control in the management, whereas stock earmarks
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this particular stock characteristic as a test is perhaps shown by the fact that,
despite its presence in other types of securities, their holders have nevertheless
usually been held creditors. Thus, holders of trade certificates have been held
creditors although, above a guaranteed minimum interest rate, they are paid
dividends pro rata with stockholders.' Moreover, subscribers to tontine in-
surance have been held creditors although, in addition to the face value of their
policies, they share in profits derived from other tontine policies in the same
class, such sharing, however, being contingent upon the subscriber surviving the
tontine period and having paid the fixed premiums. 17 And participating bond-
holders have generally been considered creditors although in addition to a fixed
interest return they participate equally per share in any dividends paid on
common stock above a specified amount.'3 Finally, income bondholders have
been held creditors although "interest" is payable only if earned within any
"interest"-paying period.'0 Nor may it be said that the absence of a promise to
were present in that a permanent interest in the enterprise was contemplated and net earn-
ings were a condition to any investment return. The holders' status was held not to be
that of stockholders when they sought to inspect the corporation's books in order to force
dividend payments out of net earnings, and failing this, when they sought to vote for
directors. Thatcher v. Chicago Rys. Co., 297 Fed. 466 (N. D. Ill. 1924), affd 4 F. (2d) 63
(C. C. A. 7th, 1925); Babcock v. Chicago Rys. Co., 325 I1. 16, 155 N. E. 773 (1927).
When later a receiver had been appointed, the holders were allowed to intervene in these
proceedings. In re Babcock, 26 F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928). But they were refuaed
a lien on the corporate assets to an amount equaling the undistributed net earnings. Harri
Trust & Savings Bank v. Chicago Rys. Co., 56 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932), cert.
denied, 287 U. S. 614 (1932).
16. In re Spot Cash Hooper Co., ISS Fed. 861 (W. D. Tex. 1911); Butler v. Beach, 82
Conn. 417, 74 At. 74S (1909) ; PettingiU v. State Mdarketing Asso., 199 Wis. 2C0, 225 N. W.
834 (1929). But cf. C. D. Hartnett Co. v. Shirah, 116 Tex. 154, 287 S. W. 902 (1926).
17. Breard v. New York Life Ins. Co., 138 La. 774, 70 So. 799 (1916); Pierce v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 145 Mass. 56, 12 N. E. 858 (1887); People v. Security
Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 78 N. Y. 114 (1879); Uhlman v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
109 N. Y. 421 (1888). The problem as to tontine insurance subscribers is not important
because this type of insurance is rare today. See VAnCE, Insuzcn (1930) 47.
18. The only case found involving a security resembling this unusual type of hybrid has
relegated the holders to the position of stockholders. Cass v. Realty Securities Co., 148
A. D. 96, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1074 (1st Dept. 1911), aff'd 206 N. Y. 649, 99 N. E. 110S
(1912). Treatise writers have, however, assumed such hybrids to be bonds. See Drwrw,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 112; GRAm AND DODD, Sacunr A=Iqrvs (1934) 256; RIPLLY,
RAr.aoAs, Fn.,AcE AND OROAN-OmATio (1915) 164, 205. The latter assumption seems
reasonable in view of the fact that income bonds, where the cnlire return is contingent upon
there being a surplus or net profitS, are usually held to create a creditor relationship. See
infra note 19.
19. While the pledge of the net income is binding upon the corporation issuing such
securities, no encumbrance is imposed upon the firm's property. Barry v. Alisouri, K. & T.
Ry. Co., 27 Fed. 1 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886); Willoughby v. Chicago Junction Rys. &
Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 656, 25 Aft. 277 (1892); Day v. Ogdensburgh and Lake Champlain Rr.,
107 N. Y. 129, 13 N. E. 765 (1887) ; Thomas v. New York & G. L. R. Co., 139 N. Y. 163,
34 N. E. 877 (1893); Gardner v. London, Chatham & Dover Ry. Co., (1867) 2 Ch. App.
201; see DEwnwo, op. cit. supra note 1, at 110; 2 JoN.Es, Bo.nZs (1935) § 803; 2 MAcam ,
MODEP.N LAW OF CORORTIONS (1908) § 2100; MEA , CoRpIomo:. Fn.A,.cz (6th ed. 1930)
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pay a principal sum at a fixed time invariably determines that the holders will
be held subordinate to unsecured creditors in the event of liquidation.20 For,
while irredeemable bonds 21 and tontine insurance have no definite maturity
date, the holders thereof have been considered creditors. It is possible that the
reservation of a power of control over the management in a particular security
might serve to render the holder thereof subordinate to general creditors. 22
Yet the absence of this stock feature in any type of hybrid security whose
holders have been held inferior to general creditors indicates that it will seldom
prove important.2 3  Moreover, the presence of this stock characteristic may be
far from conclusive. Holders of voting bonds have sometimes been considered
corporate creditors, 24 and holders of convertible bonds and bonds with stock
purchase warrants or subscription rights have been held creditors although they
may by the exercise of their option secure a permanent interest and voting
rights in the corporation.25 Nor will any particular grouping of these stock
57, 58. Where both principal and "interest" have been made payable solely out of net
profits, the security has been held a stock or similar thereto. Synnott v. Tombstone Consol.
Mines Co., 208 Fed. 251 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913); In re Fechheimer Fishel, 212 Fed. 357 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1914); Matter of Collier, 112 Misc. 70, 182 N. Y. Supp. 93 (Surr. Ct. 1920).
The numerous reorganizations since 1930 have produced great numbers of these income
bonds. See GRAuAu ADMD DODD, SEcuRrT ANALYsIs (1934) 286. For examples, see (1932)
134 Coim!. & FixN. CHmoN. 1039, 3463.
20. The absence of such a promise has often been held to indicate that a non-.creditor
relationship was intended. See Mercantile Trust Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 82 Fed. 360,
367 (C. C. D. Md. 1897).
21. Schachne v. Corporation of Chamber of Commerce, 102 Misc. 197, 168 N. Y. Supp,
791 (N. Y. City Ct. 1918); Union Canal Co. v. Antillo, 4 Watts & S. 553 (Pa. Sup, Ct.
1842); Philadelphia and Reading Rr. Co. v. Stichter, 11 Weekly Notes Cas. 325 (Pa. Sup.
Ct. 1882); see Dnwvuo, op. cit. supra note 1, at 76; 2 JoNs, BoNDs (1935) § 623; cf.
Koster v. Lafayette Trust Co., 207 N. Y. 336, 100 N. E. 1.117 (1913); Weinman v. Blake &
Knowles Pump Works, 156 A. D. 168, 140 N. Y. Supp. 1085 (1st Dep't 1913), aff'd 214
N. Y. 702, 108 N. E. 1110 (1915). Contra: Taylor v. Philadelphia & Reading Rr. Co., 7
Fed. 386 (C. C. E. D. Penn. 1881); see Note (1928) 76 U. or PA. L. Ray. 80, at 84.
22. The absence of such a right has frequently been considered a determinative factor.
See, e.g., Pettingill v. State Marketing Assoc., 199 Wis. 200, 209, 225 N. W. 834, 837 (1929).
23. Sometimes a lack of voting power has been held to point to a stockholder relation-
ship. See Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141, 157, 24 N. E. 496, 500 (1890), But the
same provision has also been held to point to a creditor relationship. See Best v. Okla-
homa Mill Co., 124 Okla. 135, 138, 253 Pac. 1005, 1008 (1927).
24. Cf. Phillips v. Eastern Rr. Co., 138 Mass. 122 (1884); New England Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 141 Mass. 535, 6 N. E. 534 (1886); State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio St. 354
(1872). Contra: Durkee v. The People, 155 Ill. 354, 40 N. E. 626 (1895); Polltz v.
Wabash Rr. Co., 167 A. D. 669, 152 N. Y. Supp 803 (1st Dep't 1915). For an example
of bondholders with a voice in the management, see the Erie Rr. Co.'s First Consolidated
Prior Lien 4s, due in 1996.
Some state statutes allow bondholders to be given voting rights. See e.g., Dr.. REV.
CODE (1915) § 1943; N. Y. STocx CORP. LAw (1923) § 97; Oiao Gnu. CoDE, (Page Supp.
o 1934) § 8623-77.
25. If the holder of the older type of convertible bond wished to become a stockholder,
he had to surrender his bond. But the more modern type with warrants or subscription
rights permits the holder to purchase stock (usually common) without requiring him to
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and bond characteristics prove a guide to a security holder's status. For re-
deemable "stocks" embody the same characteristics as income bonds, while
participating operation certificates bear most of the earmarks of trade certifi-
cates26 and tontine insurance.27
Thus it seems that an analysis of a particular security in the light of its stock
and bond characteristics may be of little utility in arriving at its holder's status.
In view of this fact it has been urged that the "general equities" of the situation
should govern,2s and holders of hybrids which contain the promise of "abnormal
profits" should be excluded from the category of creditors. On this basis some
holders of participating operation certificates have been held not to be cred-
itors.29 But the difficulty of balancing the "equities" in any situation is a
convincing argument against their use as a test. Not only would it be difficult
for a court to determine what constitutes an "abnormal profit," 30 but of more
surrender his bond. See DEWnG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 113, 114, 121; 2 jo.Es, Bo.Ds
(1935) § 795; M1EA, CoroRAzioN FniAmC (6th ed. 1930) 60; Berle, Convertible Bonds
and Stock Purchase Warrants (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 649, at 657. It is said that the num-
ber of such speculative senior securities is destined to increase. See Gm'ar Am DODD,
SEcuRITY AxALYsis (1934) 176, 286; MAD., CoRpoRAioN F.NL'nca (6th ed. 1930) 422, 424,
431.
26. Another similarity between participating operation certificates and trade certificates
lies in the fact that both are intended to enlist the patronage of the holder and his
friends in the retail business of the issuing corporation.
27. Likewise, preferred stocks which guarantee "interest" (supra note 14) bear the same
characteristics as irredeemable bonds.
28. See Note (1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 65, at 71.
29. See United States & Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas & Oil Service Co., 19
F. (2d) 624, 626 (W. D. Penn. 1924); cf. In re Lathrop, 61 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 9th,
1932). Courts usually look with disfavor upon such apparently speculative securities. See
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Fisher, 61 F. (2d) 53, 55 (C. C. A.
9th, 1932); Berl, The Vanishing Distinction Between Creditors and Stochholdcrs (1928)
76 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 814, at 821; Note (1933) 42 Y.L L. J. 782, at 785.
The dangers inherent in relying on "profits" as a criterion are well illustrated by the fate
of participating operation certificates. While it is apparent that the return on this invest-
ment is directly related to the number of such certificate holders and the amount of gross
receipts at the specified gasoline station, courts have been quick to conclude that an in-
vestment return of 100 per cent was contemplated. There has therefore been no judicial
consideration of what the actual return might be on such investments. However, it has
been speculated that such a long time for repayment was contemplated that possibly
no more than the ordinary interest rate was intended. See Note (1928) 76 U. or PA. L.
REv. SO, at 84.
It has been argued that such certificate holders could be held creditors by analogizing
their position to that of salesmen working on commission to obtain first a return on their
deposit and then a sum above this as strictly a payment for their influence in persuading
friends to patronize the filling station. See Hansen, Hybrid Securities (1935) 10 (Unpub-
lished thesis in Yale Law School Library).
30. The problem of determining what is a "normal" profit for a creditor has been even
further complicated by the profit-sharing devices inherent in many of the modern bonds.
Thus, in the bull market of 1929 speculators are said to have made "enormous" profits by
purchasing bonds bearing stock purchase warrants. See DE%,IMG, op. cit. supra note 1, at
122. Furthermore, the differential in yield between even high grade bonds and preferred
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importance, such a test would make it virtually impossible for a prospective
investor to ascertain his status in the corporation. And if the marketing of
hybrid securities is to be permitted, 3' it seems desirable that the latter be fully
apprised of his exact relation to the corporation.
It has been suggested that, in addition to applying the standard character-
istics, other tests might be utilized in determining the relationship which the
corporation and the hybrid security holder intended to establish. 32  Thus it is
said to be pertinent to inquire into such factors as whether a trust deed or
mortgage had been given as security; whether the issue had been authorized
by the corporate charter; whether the rate of return provided for had been
greater than the interest rate on a loan of similar risk; and finally whether the
corporation's capital had been principally realized through the issue.33 But
admitting that the intention of the corporation and holder should govern in
fixing the latter's status, it is unlikely that in many cases these factors would
prove particularly helpful in pointing to that intention.
While the presence of a trust deed or mortgage as security for a particular
hybrid may be said to indicate that the parties intended a creditor relationship,
practically all hybrids lack any such security.3 4 Similarly, in a case where the
issue would be held ultra vires and void because not authorized by the corporate
charter, if it were classified as a stock,85 the presumption seems proper that the
parties intended the issue to be a valid corporate debt." But again, such cir-
cumstances seldom surround the flotation of any issues of hybrids. 87 The third
stocks has steadily diminished. See BAnGER, INVESTMET PRINCIPLES AND PRAnCTES (1928)
210.
31. The argument has been made that redeemable "stock" issues should be prohibited
or strictly regulated in order to protect investors. See Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., 200
Wis. 476,'483, 484, 228 N. W. 130, 132, 133 (1930); Jones, Redeemable Corporate Securities
(1931) 5 So. CAr.. L. Rv. 83, at 104.
32. If on the basis of the standard characteristics the instrument is construed as having
been intended to establish a stockholder relationship, any evidence showing a different In-
tention will be required to be very clear in order to refute the terms of the instrument
itself. See In re Hicks-Fuller Co., 9 F. (2d) 492, 494 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
33. See Note (1928) 28 CoL.. L. R-v. 65, at 67. Relative to the factor of whether the
corporation's capital had been principally realized through the issue, it would be necessary
to inquire into whether the security had been issued at the time of organization, or after
a substantial class of stockholders already existed. See In re Spot Cash Hooper Co., 188
Fed. 861, 863 (W. D. Tex. 1911).
34. Where "stockholders" have been promised some sort of lien, the provision has been
held inoperative as against creditors. See note 14, supra.
35. But stockholders in a bankrupt corporation have been held estopped to plead that
because they held stock which had been issued them in excess of that authorized by the
charter of incorporation, they should therefore be treated as creditor4. In re R. Rombach &
Co., 3 F. (2d) 46 (W. D. Penn. 1924), aff'd, 9 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925).
36. See In re Spot Cash Hooper Co., 188 Fed. 861, 863 (W. D. Tex. 1911); Allen v.
Northwestern Mfg. Co., 189 Iowa 731, 738, 179 N. W. 130, 132 (1920). In one such
case, however, liability has been imposed on the security holders on the basis that, even
though not stockholders, they were partners, or members of a joint-stock association. C.
D. Hartnett Co. v. Shirah, 116 Tex. 154, 287 S. W. 902 (1926).
37. Occasionally a loan has been purposely disguised as a purchase of redeemable
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proposed factor would be of no aid in the case of those hybrids which provide
that the investment return shall be contingent upon the existence of net profits,
because there would then be lacking a provision for a definite rate of return.
Where, however, a definite rate of return is provided, and it is shown to be
greater than the interest rate on a loan of similar risk, it may be proper to hold
that the parties intended a non-creditor relationship. But difficulty would arise
in many cases in determining what constituted the "normal" interest rate on a
loan of similar risk. s Thus there would be introduced an element of uncer-
tainty similar to that raised by the test of "general equities," and the same ob-
jections would be applicable to the former as to the latter. The final factor
likewise raises the problem of uncertainty.30  For, in the majority of cases it
would be most difficult for the court to set a figure in the corporation's capital-
ization below which certain security holders would be transformed from credi-
tors into some kind of stockholders. At any rate, each case would necessarily
have to be decided on its own facts, thereby making it impossible for a pros-
pective investor to know his status.
Some courts have concluded that if hybrids have been represented on the
corporate balance sheet or in the articles of incorporation to prospective cred-
itors as stocks,40 and the holders thereof have permitted such representation
to be made, it will be presumed that the corporation and the hybrid holders
intended that the securities should be treated as stocks.4 ' The basis of such a
holding is that it would be unfair to creditors relying upon such representation
to have the hybrid holders treated on a par with them in liquidation proceed-
ings. That being the case, assuming other factors to point to a creditor re-
lationship, it would seem that, logically, the hybrid holders should in such a
case be held inferior only to such creditors as relied upon the representation.
In the absence of such reliance there would be no reason for preferring such
"stock" in order to avoid state usury statutes. Arthur R. Jones Syndicate v. Commlsioner
of Internal Revenue, 23 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
38. See supra note 30. Even assuming that it were possible to determine what is a
"normal" return on capital, an approach to such a problem would be most unrealistic if
it failed to take into consideration the possibilities of appreciation in market values, which
supplement and perhaps exceed the current interest rate. See BeRA. D ,um MnMs, Tim
MOD=¢ CoaPoRATiox AN PRIATE P om "Er (1932) 282.
39. This factor has, however, been relied upon in concluding that holders of redemable
"stock" cannot be considered creditors. See Hewitt v. Linnhaven Orchard Co., go Ore. 1,
11, 174 Pac. 616, 619 (1918).
40. The fact that occasionally the redemption agreements have been kept secret has
undoubtedly influenced some courts in holding them ineffective as against creditors.
Olmstead v. Vance & Jones Co., 196 Ill. 236, 63 N. E. 634 (1902).
41. Armstrong v. Union Trust & Savings Bank, 248 Fed. 268 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918);
Booth v. Union Fibre Co., 142 M.inn. 127, 171 N. W. 307 (1919); Koeppler v. Cracker
Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 228 N. W. 130 (1929).
42. Public policy is sometimes said to preclude stockholders from occupying a position
on a par with creditors. United States & exican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas. & Oil
Service Co., 19 F. (2d) 624 (W. D. Penn. 1924); Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Ass'n v. Fisher, 61 F. (2d) 53 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Hoover Steel Ball Co. v. Schaefer
Ball Bearings Co., 90 N. J. Eq. 164, 106 Ad. 471 (1919); Hewitt v. Lianhbaven Orchard
Co., 90 Ore. 1, 174 Pac. 616 (1918).
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creditors over the hybrid holders.43 A further problem is presented where an
unscrupulous management, without the knowledge, and contrary to the under-
standing of the parties, alters the corporate balance sheet so as to represent the
securities as stocks. Under such circumstances it would be difficult to spell out
an intention on the part of the hybrid holders to assume a relation to the cor-
poration analogous to that of stockholders solely on the basis of the representa-
tion made to creditors. In that case it would seem advisable to treat the hybrid
holders on a par with other creditors and enable those of the latter who had
relied upon the misrepresentation to maintain personal actions against those
responsible for the misrepresentation.
It may be seen that all these various tests will not in many cases be of great
value in establishing the status of hybrid holders where a determination thereof
is essential. Moreover, no final solution of the problem appears likely at the
present time. Some aid in solving the problem might be afforded, however,
through state Blue Sky Laws, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Thus, where the combination of stock'and bond pro-
visions is such as possibly to mislead prospective hybrid holders as to their
status in the event of any corporate liquidation proceeding, the Securities and
Exchange Commission has power to insist that the registration statement contain
a clear indication of the exact relationship which the issuing corporation intends
to establish.44 The majority of hybrids would be within the jurisdiction of the
commission,45 and for those beyond its authority essentially similar statements
43. Cf. Durand v. Brown, 236 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916).
44. Hybrids are included within the term security, which "means any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or particl-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate
of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a security or any certificato
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 48 STAT. 905, 1S
U. S. C. A. § 77b (1934).
Such information could undoubtedly be demanded in the registration statements. The
statute would seem to require it in the provision for disclosure of "the amount of the
funded debt outstanding and to be created by the security to be offered, with a brief
description of the date, maturity, and character of such debt, rate of interest, chnracter
of amortization provisions, and the security, if any, therefor." 48 STAT. 88, 15 U. S. C. A.
§77aa (12) (1934). The Commission could certainly require such information "as being
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 48 STAT.
78, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77g (1933).
45. Among the exempted securities are those which are "a part of an issue sold only
to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security
is a person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and
doing business within such State or Territory." 48 STAT. 906, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c (11)
1934). Thus, the Commission's jurisdiction would extend to a hybrid security such as
the Go-Gas Co.s participating operation certificates. For, the issuing corporation was
organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, but marketed securities in numerous
other states, supra note 7.
Hybrids issued in a merger or consolidation will not be exempted from the provisions
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could be demanded under many state Blue Sky Laws4 Thereafter, the status
indicated therein could be considered as a highly important factor iti resolving
the intent of the corporation and the holder, and thereby the latter's status,
In those cases where the statement reveals that a creditor status was contem-
plated, and the relationship was represented as such on corporate balance sheets
subsequently issued to creditors, there is no reason to relegate the hybrid holders
to a position inferior to such creditors. In other cases, where, despite the in-
dication of a creditor relationship in the registration statement, the security
had subsequently been set up on the balance sheets as a stock, it might be
argued that since the hybrid holders allowed the management to make this
representation, they should be held to such a status as against creditors. But
there would seem to be no reason for giving these creditors any such preference
unless they had relied upon the balance sheet. Furthermore, even as to those
who could show such reliance, little justification appears for holding them
superior to the hybrid class. The creditor status revealed in the registration
statement contradicts any assumption that the hybrid holders by contract agreed
to be represented on the balance sheets as stockholders. And the theory that
the hybrid holders acquiesced in such representation seems hardly realistic in
view of the fact that investors in modern corporations can exercise no effective
control to prevent the management from misrepresenting their status to pros-
pective creditors.47  However, creditors who had to their disadvantage relied
upon the balance sheets should be given rights of action against the corporate
management for misrepresentation of the hybrids' status.
of the Act. See Hanna and Turlington, The Securities Act of 1933 (1934) 28 ILL. L. Rm,.
482, at 495.
As to the Commission's jurisdiction over securities issued in corporate reorganization
proceedings, see generally Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1343; (1935) 2 Cora,. REonG.
163.
46. For examples of such statutes, see CoN-N. Gmr. Srm. (1930) § 4044; Mhss. A,.
LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 110 A, § 6; Oro Grms. Coon (Page, 1931) § 6373-9.
Some hybrid securities have been banned, and others have been held void under state
Blue-Sky Laws. Cecil B. De Mfile Productions v. Woolery, 61 F. (2d) 45 (C. C. A. 9th,
1932); Brownie Oil Co. of Wis. v. Railroad Commission of Wis., 207 Wis. 88, 240 N. W.
827 (1932), noted in (1932) 30 McH. L. REv. 1113.
47. Cf. BFars AND Al-rnas, op. cit. supra note 38, at 277-281.
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